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Chapter 1
Introduction
“It is evident that the fortunes of the world’s human population,
for better or for worse, are inextricably interrelated with the use
that is made of energy resources.”
— M.K. Hubbert (Hubbert, 1969)
1.1 Motivation
More than a century after William Stanley Jevons raised the “question concerning the
duration of [...] present cheap supplies of coal” (Jevons, 1865, p.3), the world once again
realized the threat of rising energy prices. The energy source was different, yet the
threat was the same. After experiencing a relatively low and stable period, oil prices
quadrupled during the two crises that occurred in 1973 and 1979. Since then, much has
been written about the driving factors and the effects of energy prices. The essays in
the thesis at hand attempt to contribute to this stream of energy economics literature
by evaluating the effects of energy prices on economic activity (Chapters 2 and 3), the
microeconomic foundations of prices for exhaustible energy resources (Chapter 4) and
the financial regulatory activities to cope with the effects of fluctuating energy prices
(Chapter 5).
“The pure theory of exhaustible resources is trying to tell us that if exhaustible resources
really matter, then the balance between present and future is more delicate than we are
accustomed to think...”, stated Robert Solow in 1974 (Solow, 1974a, p.10). Within
the same decade, OPEC supply cuts showed that exhaustible resources, indeed, matter.
1
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Crude oil futures contracts and financialisation1 of the oil market, which took place in the
early 1980s, were meant to be the tools for the western economies to find the “delicate”
balance in oil prices. However, since then, the effects of energy prices, specifically oil
prices, on macroeconomic performance have become more complicated. Energy prices
have established themselves as an important factor in sustainable development due to
their influence on not only physical industrial activity but also on financial markets.
Over the last decade, the financial markets of the developing countries, which attracted
massive short-term capital inflow from developed nations, have become more sensitive to
global economic and financial circumstances, such as the skyrocketed oil prices during
the 2008 credit crunch. Chapter 2 attempts to identify the channels through which
oil prices affect stock market activity by employing data from one particular emerging
economy, Turkey.
The effects of energy prices are evident in all economies, not just developing ones. As
correctly noted by Heinberg, “The historic, global shift from a regime of cheap fossil
fuel energy sources to one of declining and expensive fossil fuels [...] will impact every
living person, every community and every nation” (Heinberg, 2007, p.127). Because,
the “human advances during the twentieth century” were closely related to the high
consumption of fossil fuels, which led to current “high-energy civilization” (Smil, 2000,
2005). Hence, even the modern and developed economies, which are on a relatively
steady-state growth path, are expected to be influenced by rising energy prices.
In order to support long-term economic growth, developed countries should implement
sustainable energy policies to ensure energy supply at a “reasonable cost” (Evans, 2007,
p.165). However, fossil fuel-driven energy prices would not allow energy costs to be kept
at a reasonable and affordable level because they tend to increase, by nature, due to
scarcity. This is commonly known as the Hotelling rule, named after Hotelling (1931).
Although the short-run legitimacy of the Hotelling rule is extensively questioned, there
has not yet been sufficient evidence against its long-term applicability. Within this
context, Chapter 3 tries to identify and test the long-term effects of rising energy prices
on economic growth for developed countries.
The inevitable long-run shift to a regime of expensive fossil energy sources does not nec-
essarily mean that short-term declines in prices are impossible. For instance, during the
aftermath of the OPEC crises in the 1970s, the world experienced a nearly 43% decline
in oil prices in just 5 years (BP, 2014). This decline was not only due to the shrinking
demand but also due to the supply enhancements. Higher oil prices let oil companies
invest in the development of higher cost reservoirs outside the OPEC countries, such
1O’Sullivan defines “financialisation” of the crude oil market as the increasing involvement of financial
investors (O’Sullivan, 2009).
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as the North Sea. This adjustment by the industry to the high oil prices has emerged
as the most important argument of economists and government institutions against the
peak oil theorists. Hence, the ‘optimists’ tend to refer to the issue as ‘the end of cheap
oil’ rather than ‘the end of oil’ (Tertzakian, 2007).
As correctly noted by Steven Gorelick, “Today, the oil industry is a high-tech business,
with technological advances being adopted in areas ranging from discovery to recov-
ery” (Gorelick, 2011, p.223). Technological progress driven by high oil prices, such as
enhanced recovery techniques, directional drilling and cracking, are promising for the
future global oil supply. In addition to the exploration or development of new fossil
resources, mature reservoirs, mostly in OPEC, also need new investments to increase
global oil supply capacity.
Currently, the oil market is dominated by two blocks of companies, namely the interna-
tional oil companies (IOCs) and the national oil companies (NOCs). While the NOCs,
particularly of OPEC countries, control the majority of the global oil supply and the
reserves, the IOCs, with their extensive know-how and capital, are leading the market.
According to Hartley and Medlock (2008), the NOCs operate less efficiently than the
IOCs as they often need to consider the overall welfare of the society in the host coun-
try. Moreover, Marcel (2006) states that the NOCs need to acquire know-how for the
mature reservoirs. The Oil Field Service (OFS) companies, such as Schlumberger or
Halliburton, usually emerge as business partners for the NOCs. To this end, Chapter 4
analyzes a stylized model of an exhaustible resource market in which two firms compete
in quantities for two consecutive periods. This two-period duopoly model is extended
to a three-stage game with the inclusion of the rivalry in capacity investments at the
interim stage. Within this context, the model is able to capture the short-term stylized
characteristics of the most exhaustible resource markets in which occasional price drops
are observed.
One other determinant in crude oil prices is, without a doubt, the financial market, par-
ticularly the futures market. Since the financialisation of the oil market in the 1980s, oil
prices have begun to be determined by taking into account not only the physical market
conditions but also the decisions and expectations of the increasing number of investors,
hedge funds and speculators. Yet, this notable increase in the liquidity of the oil futures
markets caused even more volatile and aggressive oil prices (Orwel, 2006, p.117). Espe-
cially during 2000–2008, the increase in oil prices was mostly attributed to speculation
in the markets (Masters, 2008). Since then, the Commodities Futures Trading Commis-
sion (CFTC) has started to extensively monitor the crude oil futures markets. CFTC’s
main role has been to “ensure that the futures markets are able to perform their primary
function of hedging prices for commercial producers and consumers of the commodity
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in question” (O’Sullivan, 2009, p.90). Within this context, Chapter 5 tests whether the
CFTC was able to fulfill its duty as the main regulatory authority in the oil market by
applying an event study analysis to oil-related stocks in US financial markets.
1.2 Outline of Thesis
This thesis consists of four essays, of which two are related to the economic impacts
of energy prices, one to the microeconomic structure of resource markets and one to
the effects of financial regulations on the stock returns of oil and gas companies. In
Chapter 2, the effects of oil prices on stock market activity is investigated using data
from one particular emerging economy, namely Turkey. Specific attention is given to
global liquidity conditions in order to consistently explain the causal relationship. The
essay in Chapter 2 is based on a revised version of the working paper entitled “Crude
oil price shocks and stock returns: Evidence from Turkish stock market under global
liquidity conditions” (Berk and Aydogan, 2012). Berna Aydogan co-authored the study,
and contributions to all aspects of the essay were made in equal parts.
Chapter 3 of this thesis continues to analyze the effects of energy prices on macroeco-
nomic indicators. The purpose of the essay in this chapter is to derive and test the
impact of energy prices on economic growth. First, the paper establishes a theoretical
relationship between energy prices and several macroeconomic variables. Next, the de-
rived theoretical relationship is tested empirically by employing data for sixteen OECD
countries. This chapter is based on the article, “Energy prices and economic growth in
the long run: Theory and evidence” (Berk and Yetkiner, 2014), which is a joint study
with Hakan Yetkiner, who equally contributed to all parts of the article.
The essay in Chapter 4 focuses on the strategic firm behavior in exhaustible resource
markets within the context of a two-period duopoly model in which firms face endogenous
intertemporal capacity constraints. Firms’ capacity investments, which take place in
between two periods, change the structure of the Cournot game in the second period.
The main aim of this chapter is to show how the price of an exhaustible resource behaves
if the firms’ resource constraints are not exogenous. This chapter is based on the single-
authored work entitled “Two-period resource duopoly with endogenous intertemporal
capacity constraints” (Berk, 2014).
Finally, in Chapter 5, a different perspective on the effects of energy prices, particularly
oil prices, on stock market fundamentals are given. During the credit crunch period in
2008, US financial authorities attempted to cope with rising oil prices by introducing a
number of regulations (Masters, 2008). The actions of US Commodities Futures Trading
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Commission (CFTC) to regulate the commodity markets caused significant changes in
the oil price, which eventually affected the stock returns of oil and gas companies.
The essay in this chapter analyzes the effects of CFTC regulations on oil- and gas-
related stock returns. Chapter 5 is based on “The effects of the CFTC’s regulatory
announcements on US oil- and gas-related stocks during the 2008 Credit Crunch”, a
co-authored study with Jannes Rauch, who contributed equally to all parts of the work.
The following paragraphs briefly outline these four essays by introducing the background,
the research question, the methodological framework and the major findings.
The primary objective of the essay “Crude oil price shocks and stock returns: Evidence
from Turkish stock market under global liquidity conditions” in Chapter 2 is to ana-
lyze how significantly the crude oil price variations affect Turkish stock market returns.
Turkey is one of the most energy import-dependent countries and crude oil constitutes
a significant portion of the country’s primary energy demand (Ediger and Berk, 2011).
The Turkish economy appears to be sensitive to changes in the oil price not only be-
cause oil prices affect the country’s trade balance but also due to the fact that oil prices
directly influence the cost structure of industrial activity. Therefore, positive crude oil
price shocks would negatively affect the cash flows and the market values of companies,
causing an immediate decline in overall stock market returns. It would be beneficial
for investors, market participants, regulators and researchers to shed more light on the
causal relationship between crude oil prices and returns in the Turkish stock market,
which exhibits characteristics different from the well-documented developed markets.
There has been extensive research on the effects of oil prices on stock market activity
in a number of developed and developing countries. Most of the studies so far have suc-
ceeded in showing evidence that oil prices significantly affect stock markets of developed
countries; yet the impact on developing countries has been found to be weaker.2 One
additional stream of literature concentrated on the stock returns of individual compa-
nies. The main findings show that an increase (decrease) in the oil prices would lead
to a significant increase (decrease) in the stock returns of upstream oil companies while
causing a decrease (increase) in those of other firms who use oil as an input.
Following the literature, we used a structural vector autoregression (VAR) methodology
as proposed by Sims (1980). The VAR approach presents a multivariate framework that
expresses each variable as a linear function of its own lagged value as well as the lagged
values of all the other variables in the system. The main advantage of this approach is
the ability to capture the dynamic relationships among the economic variables of inter-
est. We used daily data of ICE’s Brent crude oil prices and the ‘National-100 Index’
(ISE-100), the main market indicator of the Turkish Stock Market, covering the period
2Please refer to Section 2.2 for a detailed literature survey.
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from January 2nd, 1990 to November 1st, 2011. It is to be expected that the oil price
trend experienced some strong structural breaks in this relatively long time horizon.
Therefore, we have divided the whole period into three sub-periods coinciding with spe-
cific oil price trends to allow for the testing of the performance of the Turkish stock
market under different oil price regimes. During the first sub-period (from January 2,
1990 to November 15, 2001), oil prices followed a comparatively stable and horizontal
trend. Within the second period (from November 16, 2001 to July 11, 2008), the crude
oil market, along with other commodities, witnessed historical record prices after expe-
riencing an upward trend. Finally, during the third sub-period (from July 14, 2008 to
November 1, 2011), the credit crunch crisis caused crude oil prices to be highly volatile,
first declining sharply and then increasing once again.
The variable that captures oil price variations is of central importance to this study.
Although it is common to use the percentage change in oil prices as a proxy for the
variation, some studies raise the issue of non-linear linkages between oil prices and other
macroeconomic indicators (Hamilton, 1996, 2003, 2011, Kilian and Vigfusson, 2011b).
In order to achieve robust empirical results, we employed two different proxy variables
for oil price variation, namely linear log-return and non-linear scaled oil price increase
(SOPI) variables.3
VAR methodology treats all variables as jointly endogenous and, for proper estimation,
ensures that all variables employed in the model be stationary or an I(0) process. We,
therefore, continue our analysis by performing two unit root tests, namely the Aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS)
tests, as proposed by Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981) and Kwiatkowski et al. (1992),
respectively.4
Our preliminary results show, in line with previous literature, that oil prices do not have
a particular effect on Turkish stock market activity. In fact, we find that the effect is
significant (yet still small) only during the third sub-period. This initial result would
lead to a conclusion that Turkish stock returns respond, to some extent, significantly to
the highly volatile oil prices. However, this interpretation may be biased either due to a
bi-directional causality or if any other variable that drives both highly volatile oil prices
and the Turkish stock market returns during this sub-period is omitted.
3The methodology for calculating SOPI was first proposed by Lee et al. (1995). Mork (1989) and
Hamilton (1996) also proposed linear and non-linear transformations of oil prices, yet SOPI fits better
for daily price data.
4Since all of the variables included in the VAR methodology are I(0) processes, a Vector Error
Correction Model (VECM) was not conducted in this paper.
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It has been shown recently in the empirical energy economics literature that bi-directional
causality would lead to inconsistent estimates for the effect of energy prices on macroeco-
nomic indicators, especially in the USA.5 Although there is a consensus that endogeneity
is not of significant importance when studying the stock markets of countries (apart from
the USA), there is still a belief that the spill-over effects from the US or global markets
would dominate the dynamics of such a causal relationship in developed economies (e.g.,
Park and Ratti, 2008). Moreover, it is also plausible to take these spill-over effects into
consideration for the stock markets of the emerging economies, which attract a large
amount of short-term capital from the major economies.
In order to avoid biased results which could emerge from these spill-over effects, we
incorporate the global liquidity conditions into the analysis. We choose global liquidity
conditions as the common factor for two reasons. First, the Turkish financial market
has been attracting worldwide short-term capital inflow for the last few decades. As of
November 2011, the foreign portfolio investments have been responsible for nearly 63%
of total Turkish stock market capitalization. Thus, the Turkish stock market appears to
be becoming more sensitive to global financial conditions. Second, with the increasing
volume of oil futures contracts, financial (more specifically futures) markets have be-
come the other major oil market since the late 1980s. Since then, crude oil prices have
been determined in such a manner that accounts for the decisions made by investors,
speculators, hedgers, and large investment funds in the future markets as well as the
physical market conditions. Analyzing these “non-physical” market conditions, such as
expectations about the market as well as the global financial and economic indicators,
may offer an additional explanation of the empirical variations in crude oil prices.
Therefore, a proxy for global financial liquidity may not only serve as an explanatory
factor in influencing stock market returns but also be used in explaining the variations
in oil prices and thus in obtaining a ‘purified’ oil price shock variable that is related only
to the oil market itself. In this essay, the evidence of such tridimensional interaction,
e.g., the joint response of the stock returns to the purified oil prices and to the global
liquidity conditions, is investigated. We employ the disentangling methodology proposed
by Kilian and Park (2009) in order to obtain a purified oil price shock variable. Then,
this variable along with Chicago Board of Exchange’s (CBOE) S&P 500 market volatility
index (VIX) as a proxy for global liquidity conditions is used in a trivariate VAR system
to explain the variance decomposition of Turkish stock market returns.
Results of this trivariate VAR system suggest that global liquidity is the most plausible
explanation for the changes in both the oil prices and the stock market returns. Three
5This reverse causality issue was first stressed by Barsky and Kilian (2004) and later empirically
quantified by Kilian (2009).
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deductions can be made from these results. First, oil prices seem to have a greater effect
on the Turkish stock market during the period of high volatility. Second, the effect of
oil prices are not persistent and rather weak. Finally, the liquidity shocks, rather than
crude oil prices, are the primary factor in Turkish stock market movements.
In order to thoroughly understand the effect of energy prices on countries’ economies,
economic as well as financial indicators must be analyzed. Without a doubt, GDP growth
rate, apart from stock market activity, is the other macroeconomic indicator that could
be directly exposed to changes in oil price. In this respect, the essay in Chapter 3
theoretically and empirically analyzes the effects of energy prices on economic growth.
The seminal study of Hamilton (1983), which analyzes the correlation between increases
in crude oil prices and US recessions, is accepted as the fundamental basis for subsequent
studies on the effects of energy prices on macroeconomic indicators such as GDP growth
rate, inflation and industrial activity. Since then, a number of empirical works have
tested the relationship between energy prices and macroeconomic variables. Although
there have been ongoing debates about the nature of the relationship such as non-
linearities and asymmetries, it is widely accepted that energy prices would at least have
a particular, if not pivotal, effect on economies.
In spite of abundant empirical literature, theoretical growth economists have yet to
pay substantial attention to the matter, possibly because they perceive it as a short-
run issue. Although the mainstream economic growth literature following Hotelling
(1931) has so far concentrated on the optimal depletion of exhaustible resources, the
endogenous economic growth literature has focused on a number of energy-related issues
such as transition between energy sources, directed technical change in energy-intensive
economies and induced energy-saving technologies. Hence, an analysis of the effect of
energy prices on economic growth seems to be an unexplored area in the theoretical
economic growth literature.
The essay in Chapter 3 tries to fill this gap by studying a stylized economy in which a
long-term energy price–economic growth nexus is developed and tested. A two-sector
(investment goods and consumption goods) market economy is developed following Re-
belo (1991). The derived theoretical relationship between energy prices and economic
growth is further (empirically) tested and quantified using the panel cointegration test
and the panel Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach, respectively. In addi-
tion to the theoretical contribution,6 this study sheds light on the empirical evidence of
the economic effects of energy prices by performing a long-run analysis. Although there
6Authors are aware of only two previous studies theoretically testing the energy price–economic
growth nexus using different setups, i.e., Van Zon and Yetkiner (2003) and Bretschger (2013).
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has been extensive research on the long-term effects of energy consumption on economic
growth,7 the long-term effects of energy prices seem to be an untapped area of research.
In the theoretical part of the essay, we modify the original model of Rebelo (1991) by
including energy along with the capital as inputs of the production function in the con-
sumption goods sector. Employing energy as an input in the consumption goods sector
is the first crucial assumption. This assumption is based on the fact that the demand of
the consumption goods sector constitutes a significant portion of global primary energy
consumption. More specifically, the combined share of the transportation and residential
sectors have reached more than 60% since 1990 and, according to the IEA’s 2012 World
Energy Outlook, are expected to remain slightly below that level upto 2035 (Birol et al.,
2013). This is also supported by recent empirical regularity (e.g. Edelstein and Kilian,
2009, Kilian and Park, 2009, Lee and Ni, 2002).
The second important assumption made in this essay is that the price of energy input
is growing at an exogenous rate. As previously mentioned, exogenous energy prices,
especially oil prices, with respect to the macroeconomic indicators creates empirical
problems when US or global data is used. Yet, the stylized model studied in this essay
proposes a closed economy and uses a broader definition of energy prices, i.e., the price
of energy services used in the consumption goods sector. While it is clearly possible to
endogenize the energy prices in the model, with regards to our research objective it is
more convenient to keep it as an exogenous variable.
The stylized economy, which is framed as a general equilibrium neoclassical growth
model, is solved using dynamic optimization.8 While representative consumer’s utility
function is defined to be isoelastic, AK and Cobb-Douglas functions are employed for
the investment goods sector and for the consumption goods sector, respectively. First,
the profit maximization conditions, i.e., input demand functions, from both the invest-
ment and consumption goods sectors are derived. Second, dynamic utility maximization
for the representative consumer is solved using a present-time Hamiltonian model. First
order conditions from the Hamiltonian maximization problem along with the input de-
mands lead to three equations, which are the major findings of the theoretical part.
With these equations, we are able to show that the growth rate of energy prices has a
negative effect on the growth rates of energy and capital input demands, as well as on
that of the total output in this economy, i.e., the GDP growth rate.
The derived theoretical relationships are simple enough to be linearized and thus be
used for empirical purposes. To this end, the panel cointegration and the panel ARDL
7Ozturk (2010) provides an extensive survey of the literature on the energy consumption-economic
growth nexus beginning with the seminal study of Kraft and Kraft (1978).
8Please refer to Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995) for examples of dynamic optimization problems.
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models are used to test two theoretical relationships: between energy prices - energy
consumption and energy prices - real GDP.9 The sample covers panel data for energy
prices (from the IEA (2013)) real GDP per capita and energy consumption per capita
(both from the The World Bank Group (2013)) for sixteen countries; namely Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lux-
emburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, over the period
between 1978 and 2011.10 Although in the theoretical part we assume a closed economy
to keep algebra tractable, the countries used in the empirical part are open economies.
Yet, it is rational to expect that these OECD countries will end up with a long-term
trade balance and, hence, they can be used as proxies for closed-economies in the long
run.
Our sample may exhibit usual time-series problems since this study employs a panel
data whose time dimension is larger than the cross-sectional dimension. Therefore, two
panel-unit root tests, namely Levin-Li-Chu (LLC) (proposed by Levin et al. (2002)) and
Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) (proposed by Im et al. (2003)) are employed. The unit root test
results suggest that all variables are integrated of order one, i.e., I(1), and hence can
be used in the cointegtaration and ARDL methodologies. Panel cointegration method-
ology, applied in this essay, was proposed by Westerlund (2007) and is preferred over
other tests, such as the one proposed by Pedroni (1999), because it avoids the problem
of common factor restriction. This test proposes four different alternative hypotheses
against the null hypothesis of no-cointegration. While two of these alternatives test
countries individually, the remaining two jointly test whether cointegration exists over
all countries. Results yield evidence of significant cointegration between energy prices
and real GDP per capita as well as between energy prices and energy consumption per
capita.
The cointegration test is followed by panel ARDL methodology to quantify the long-
term effects of energy prices on both energy consumption and real GDP. Two estimators,
namely the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) and the Mean Group (MG) (proposed by Pe-
saran et al. (1995, 1999)) are used. While the MG estimator is based on estimating the
time-series regressions N -times and averaging the coefficients, the PMG estimator re-
veals pooled coefficients. The PMG estimator is more efficient yet is only consistent when
the model is homogenous in the long run, i.e. the long-run coefficients are equal across
countries. The MG estimator is preferred because it is consistent even when the panel
data exhibits heterogeneous characteristics, which is common in cross-country studies.
9Once the log-linearization process has been applied to the equations, the growth rates of the variables
are converted to log-levels. Thus, in the empirical section of this essay, levels rather than the growth
rates are used for the respective variables.
10USA is excluded from the analysis due to the issue of energy price endogeneity.
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These two estimators give consistent estimates even when the assumption of strict exo-
geneity in the regressors is violated (Pesaran et al., 1999). Thus, ARDL methodology is
appropriate to analyze the long-run causal relationship between energy prices and real
economic output. According to estimation results, energy prices have significant and
negative effect on both GDP per capita and energy consumption per capita in the long
run. These are expected results and are in accordance with the theory proposed in this
essay, as well as with existing empirical literature.
Both the theoretical and empirical findings suggest significant long-term welfare losses
due to the fact that increasing energy prices lead to “under-capacity” or “below-capacity”
economic growth. Thus, even for the developed countries, in order to sustain stable long-
term economic growth, policy makers need to prevent, or at least to restrict, increases in
energy prices. Recall that both the theoretical and empirical sections implicitly assume
that energy price variable represents the price of non-renewable energy sources. In the
theoretical part, the price of energy is assumed to be exogenously increasing, which is
a common assumption for the long-run prices of exhaustible energy sources.11 Corre-
spondingly, the empirical findings are based on the energy price variable, which is driven
by prices of fossil fuels.12
Therefore, one of the most appropriate channels to achieve the policy goal of stable
energy prices is to subsidize the renewable energy sources. Although there has been
extensive research on the positive impacts of renewable energy sources on sustainable
development, this stream of literature has so far neglected the potential benefit of renew-
able energy sources in increasing the public welfare by avoiding long term increases in
energy prices. Thus, the essay in Chapter 3 also contributes to the literature on energy
and sustainable development.
Given the importance of energy prices for economic activity, it is valuable to shed some
light on the microeconomic foundations of price formation in energy markets. To this
end, in Chapter 4 a dynamic (two-period) duopoly model is studied. Due to the fact that
current energy prices are mostly driven by fossil fuels, the model developed in this essay
focuses on exhaustible resource markets in which two firms compete in quantity. Each
firm decides how much to supply with regard to the capacity constraint it faces at each
period and given the initial resource endowment. An important aspect of the strategic
firm behavior in exhaustible resource markets is the allocation of the initial resource
endowment. Yet, the issue becomes more complicated once this initial endowment is
endogenous and firms can invest in order to increase the endowment (to a certain extent).
11This rule is referred to as the Hotelling rule, which suggests that the price of nonrenewable energy
sources will increase gradually due to the scarcity or depletion of resources (Hotelling, 1931).
12IEA (2013) defines the energy prices to be the weighted average of oil products, coal, natural gas
and electricity consumed by households and industry.
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This essay tries to answer the question of how resource firms act in a market if their
capacity constraints are endogenous.
The essay is related to three streams of literature that deal with (1) the optimal depletion
of exhaustible resources following Hotelling (1931),13 (2) the microeconomic structure
of resource markets14 and (3) the strategic firm behavior under capacity constraints.
Specifically, the third stream of literature is the most relevant for this essay. Pioneering
works in this stream are Levitan and Shubik (1972) and Osborne and Pitchik (1986),
both of which are based on price competition under exogenous capacity constraints.
Important contributions are made, among others, by Bikhchandani and Mamer (1993),
Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997), Besanko and Doraszelski (2004), Laye and Laye (2008),
Biglaiser and Vettas (2004) and van den Berg et al. (2012). The essay in Chapter 4
contributes to the literature as it is among the first to address strategic firm behavior
under a two-period resource duopoly model with intertemporal capacity constraints. In
fact, Biglaiser and Vettas (2004) and van den Berg et al. (2012) are the only works
within this context examining price and quantity competition, respectively.
The current essay extends the model of van den Berg et al. (2012) by relaxing the as-
sumption of exogenous capacity constraints. Hence, in this setting, besides quantity
competition, firms also enter into a rivalry in capacity investments, which leads to en-
dogenous capacity constraints. The two-period resource duopoly model framed here is
a three-stage game. At the beginning of the first stage (the first period of production)
each firm is endowed with a fixed amount of exhaustible resource stock and chooses the
production strategy with regard to this initial endowment. At the second stage (in be-
tween two periods of production / interim period), they are allowed to invest in capacity
in order to increase their resource stock, thus choosing the level of capacity investment.
By doing so, their second period (the third stage) capacity constraints become endoge-
nous. At the third stage of the game, firms choose the quantity to produce with respect
to their remaining endogenous resources, i.e., the left-over capacity from the first stage
plus the additional capacity due to the investment at the second stage.
In order to solve the model algebraically, it is assumed that the costs of exploring the
initial resource stock and of the resource extraction are equal to zero. On the other hand,
the costs of additional capacity, i.e., the capacity investment function, is defined to be
strictly convex in added capacity. A cost (“reverse efficiency”) parameter is included
in the function as a cost shifter. Moreover, a linear inverse demand function for the
resource is proposed.
13See, for example, Solow (1974b), Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Stiglitz (1974), Loury (1978), Pindyck
(1978)
14See, for example, Salant (1976), Gilbert (1978), Lewis and Schmalensee (1980), Eswaran and Lewis
(1984), Loury (1986), Salo and Tahvonen (2001), Benchekroun et al. (2009, 2010).
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Besides these simplifying assumptions, it is assumed that the initial resource endowment
for each firm would be within a certain range. The upper bound of the interval guarantees
that the second period capacity constraints are binding for each firm and that firms invest
in capacity additions. If this part of the assumption is violated, then the problem is less
interesting as it reduces the typical dynamic Cournot game with exogenous intertemporal
constraints, such that equilibrium is achieved without positive capacity investments.
The lower bound, moreover, guarantees that each firm carries some of its initial resource
endowment to the second period. If this is violated, then the capacity constraints are
no longer intertemporal. In this case, firms would use up all of their initial capacity in
the first period, generate new capacities in the interim period and, then use them again
in the second period. This is the most crucial assumption as it is needed to obtain a
unique Nash equilibrium.
The sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) concept is employed to solve the model.
SPNE suggests that the strategy of each player at each instant of time is a function of
prior decisions made by both itself and its rival. Therefore, the solution methodology is
referred to as ‘backward-induction’. For instance, in our setting, for any state of the game
at the beginning of the third stage, each firm solves the profit maximization problem
by deciding how much to produce with respect to its rival’s strategy given the first and
second stage decisions. Using the same solution methodology in the second and first
stages and we end up with the Nash equilibrium of the game. Given the assumptions,
SPNE concept leads to a unique Nash equilibrium in which the firms decisions about
quantity supplied at the first stage, capacity addition at the second stage and quantity
supplied at the third stage are described as functions of exogenously given variables, i.e.,
the initial resource stocks, the demand shifter and the capacity cost parameters.
The most important result of this essay is that the price weakly declines over two peri-
ods. This contradicts the Hotelling-based reasoning, i.e., that the prices would increase
gradually due to scarcity (Hotelling, 1931). This reasoning is also confirmed by van den
Berg et al. (2012), which, as mentioned previously, is based on the exogenous capacity
constraint. Thus, the essay shows that once firms in resource markets are allowed to
invest in capacity, occasional price drops can be observed. This result, in fact, captures
the short-term stylized characteristics of exhaustible resource markets. For instance,
exploration of new oil reserves would lead to declining prices as a result of supply en-
hancements. However, this finding may not be applicable if this model is extended to an
infinite time horizon since in this case, the capacity addition cost function should have
a different structure, capturing the fact that it becomes harder to add capacity as the
cumulative capacity increases.
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Another important result depicted by the model is that if the firms have the same capac-
ity addition cost structure, i.e., symmetric cost function, any asymmetric distribution of
initial reserves does not lead to changes in the equilibrium price. On the other hand, if
the firms have different cost parameters, this result does not hold. As an illustration, let
us assume that the initial distribution of resources is altered in favor of the more efficient
firm, i.e., the one with lower a cost parameter. Then, the equilibrium price increases
due to a decrease in total output. In this case, the market moves to a more concentrated
structure in the second period (the third stage of the game) since the efficient firm dom-
inates the market share. It is also shown that the initial resource endowment of the firm
has a positive effect on its supply levels and a negative effect on capacity addition.
The essay in Chapter 4 interprets the results of the model for the oil market, one of
the most important exhaustible resource markets. The initial resource stock of the
firms and the capacity investments in the case of oil market could refer to the initial
recoverable reserves and the reserve growth investments, respectively. The oil market
has been dominated by two blocks of companies, i.e., the international oil companies
(IOCs) and the national oil companies (NOCs), since the 1970s. Therefore, a duopoly
model can be applied. Additionally, there exist asymmetries in capacity addition cost
structures that are caused by the differences in know-how, technology or investment
capabilities between the IOCs and the NOCs. In the ‘extreme’ case, we can assume that
NOCs have an infinitely large cost parameter. This case with the asymmetric capacity
additions is solved and the results are compared with the ‘general’ case. As expected, it
is found that when only one firm is allowed to invest in capacity, the market moves to a
more concentrated structure. Finally, the essay conducts a welfare analysis in order to
compare these two different cases with the first-best solution of the welfare maximization
problem. According to the results, we were able to prove that the general case scenario
is superior to the extreme case scenario in every aspect, as it yields higher total output,
lower prices and lower total capacity investment.
A different perspective regarding the energy prices is introduced in Chapter 5. Prior
to the credit crunch in 2008, a surge in commodity prices, specifically oil prices, raised
concerns of possible market manipulation. In order to avoid possible speculation and
market manipulation, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the major
financial market regulator in the USA, started to monitor and regulate the commodity
futures markets more intensively. Recently, the literature on energy economics provided
evidence that the surge in oil prices prior to 2008 was not driven by speculation.15
Nevertheless, increasing non-commercial trading volumes in the crude oil futures market
stimulated the CFTC to take actions against market manipulation (Masters, 2008).
15See, for example, Bu¨yu¨ksahin and Harris (2011), Kilian and Murphy (2012), Fattouh et al. (2013),
Alquist and Gervais (2013), Elder et al. (2013), Kilian and Hicks (2013).
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The CFTC can affect commodity markets through two channels. First, it can measure
and correct any deviations from the fundamental price of the commodity, which are often
caused by speculative activity. This channel can not explain the CFTC’s involvement
in the oil market during the 2008 credit crunch period since the prices were not driven
by speculation. Second, the CFTC can take action against increasing riskiness, whose
main indicator is volatility. As correctly noted by Fattouh et al. (2013), the aim of
regulatory efforts in oil markets has so far been to reduce volatility. Hence, we suggest
in this essay that the CFTC’s regulatory efforts meant to decrease the riskiness of the
oil market through suppressing the volatility.
The essay in this chapter analyzes the effects of the CFTC’s regulatory announcements
on oil- and gas-related stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) around the
time of the credit crunch, i.e., the period surrounding the financial crisis of 2008. Given
knowledge of how oil prices and stock market activities are interrelated, it is commonly
assumed that if the CFTC announcements have profound effects on the oil market, then
the oil- and gas-related stocks would also respond to these announcements. Stock market
returns are mostly driven by the expectations and perceptions of the traders. Thus, if
the CFTC is able to decrease the volatility, and hence the riskiness, of the oil market,
then the oil-related stocks would be significantly affected. This would show that the
CFTC’s regulatory announcements have a direct influence on the stock returns of firms
from the oil and gas sector.
Apart from the literature on the relationship between oil prices and stock market activity,
the essay in Chapter 5 also relates to the literature on the consequences of sector-specific
announcements in the crude oil market.16 The main finding of this stream of literature
is that the OPEC announcements significantly affect oil prices. In addition, Guidi et al.
(2006) suggest that the stock markets in the USA and the UK are significantly affected
by the OPEC announcements. Our essay contributes to the literature in two regards.
First, to the authors’ best knowledge, there is no other study investigating the effects of
the CFTC announcements on oil- and gas-related stocks. Second, despite the existence
of extensive literature on whether speculation is a driving force in the oil market, the
impacts of regulatory efforts have not yet been investigated entirely.
Event study methodology is applied to a comprehensive daily data set of 122 oil-related
stocks listed on the NYSE for the period between 2007 and 2009. Seven energy related
indices, namely Dow Jones US Oil & Gas Index, PHLX Oil Service Sector Index, SIG
Oil Exploration & Production Index, NYSE ARCA Oil Index, NYSE ARCA Natural
Gas Index S&P Global Oil Index and NYSE Energy Index, are used to determine the
16See, for example, Draper (1984), Deaves and Krinsky (1992),Horan et al. (2004), Wirl and Kujundzic
(2004), Lin and Tamvakis (2010), Demirer and Kutan (2010)
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companies to be included. Analyses are conducted on these indices in addition to the
individual companies and total industry returns, which are compiled as the average of
stock returns of all companies included in all analyses.
The most crucial step of the event study methodology is, without a doubt, the selec-
tion of announcements. Initially, 40 CFTC announcements related to energy futures
commodities (specifically oil and gas) are collected from the CFTC’s official website
by searching keywords including “oil”, “gas”, “WTI” and “energy”. However, some of
these announcements took place in quick succession and hence led to the problem of
confounding events. As suggested by McWilliams and Siegel (1997) this would cause
biased results. As a result, we had to delete five of the confounding events. When two
announcements overlapped, we kept the announcement that was thought to be of greater
importance for the oil and gas market.
The event study methodology, which is first proposed by Brown and Warner (1980,
1985), is based on capturing the stocks’ abnormal returns (AR), i.e., the firms’ ex post
stock return minus the firms’ normal return during the event window. Normal returns
are estimated using the market model proposed by Brown and Warner (1980) in which
S&P 500 index returns are used as the overall market returns. Moreover, we define the
event window to be the time period prior to and after the announcement takes place.
Although it is possible to use different event windows, the most common in financial
applications, which are based on high frequency data, is 2 days before and 2 days after
the announcement.17 Once the ARs over the five days of the event window are estimated,
the cumulative abnormal return (CAR), which is the summation of ARs over the event
window, is calculated for each and every company. Subsequently, index and industry
CARs are calculated by taking the average of the CARs of the respective stocks.
In addition to the analyses on the overall market and indices, stock returns of the five
biggest oil companies, namely BP, Chevron, Exxon, Shell and Total, are investigated in
detail. Moreover, we analyze whether the firms’ stock price reactions depend on their
geographic location and therefore test whether the effects of the CFTC’s announcements
are more pronounced for firms that are based in the US and Canada (North America)
than for firms that are located in other countries (Non-North American). Finally, we
continue our analyses by subdividing the firms with respect to their business model into
three sub-categories: Upstream, Mid & Downstream and Oil field service. Given the dif-
ferences across business models (e.g., upstream–related firms should benefit from rising
oil prices while downstream–related firms should suffer), an examination of the reaction
to CFTC announcements may provide valuable findings for regulators and shareholders.
17In order to end up with robust results, we also represent different event windows, which yields similar
results. Please refer to the Table B.4 of the Appendix B.
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It is found that the overall industry stock returns significantly responded to 16 out of
the 35 CFTC announcements. Most significant CARs are observed during the three
announcements that aim for tighter regulation of the crude oil futures market. The
announcements with greater effects generally subject severe punishments against market
manipulation. Thus, results suggest that the CFTC regulatory efforts may, in general,
affect the stock returns of oil- and gas-related companies. A CAR plot over the whole
period also reveals the fact that the CFTC’s regulatory announcements have a more
profound effect on stock returns around the time of the financial crisis. This shows
that during a period of high-assumed speculation, the CFTC can better interfere with
the stock market activity by properly fulfilling its purpose as the regulatory body in
the energy sector. Apart from the overall industry response, it is found that the stock
returns of five biggest companies, namely Chevron, BP, Shell, Exxon and Total, react
similarly to the CFTC’s announcements. Their responses were also more significant and
higher during the credit crunch period.
Our analyses on how companies from two different geographical locations, i.e., North
America and Non-North America, react to the CFTC announcements reveal no signif-
icant asymmetry between these two groups. In most cases, positive (negative) stock
market reactions of North American companies are accompanied by positive (negative)
stock market reactions of Non-North American companies. Furthermore, the stock price
reaction of the different subcategories of firms in the oil and gas sector (Upstream, Mid-
downstream and Oil field service) also shows no evidence of asymmetry. The CARs of
all three industry subcategories show strong co-movement over the whole period. Hence,
it is concluded that the CFTC announcements lead to comparable effects for all types of
firms in the oil and gas sector, irrespective of the firms’ geographic location or industry
subcategory.
The essay in Chapter 5 concludes that the CFTC announcements can, in general, affect
the stock returns of oil and gas companies. Strong reactions are found during the peak
of credit crunch, i.e., the Lehman Brothers failure. Most of the announcements during
this period have positive effects on the stock returns, yet negative stock reactions are
also observed. These negative responses may be explained by alternative events that
took place simultaneously. Hence, our overall results could not prove that the CFTC’s
announcements always cause positive stock price reactions; yet it is plausible to state
that it at least fulfilled its duty as the primary regulatory authority during this period
of high uncertainty. These findings are of notable importance for shareholders of the
companies, whose market capitalization are highly interrelated with the efforts made
against speculation in financial markets.
Chapter 2
Crude oil price shocks and stock
returns: Evidence from Turkish
stock market under global
liquidity conditions
2.1 Introduction
Since the first oil crisis experienced in 1973, the impact of oil price changes on macroeco-
nomic activity has been widely discussed by academic researchers, investors and policy
makers. In this respect, the pioneering study of Hamilton (1983), which concludes that
there is significant correlation between increase in crude oil prices and US recessions,
has been accepted as the fundamental basis for the subsequent studies on the effects of
crude oil price shocks on macroeconomic indicators such as GDP growth rate, inflation,
and industrial activity.18 According to these studies, the price of crude oil, which is the
primary fuel of industrial activity, plays a significant role in shaping the countries’ eco-
nomic and political developments, not only by directly affecting the aggregate indicators,
but also by influencing companies’ operational costs, and thus their revenues. When the
stock market is efficient, positive crude oil price shocks would negatively affect the cash
flows and market values of companies, causing an immediate decline in the overall stock
market returns.
Although there exists a major consensus in the literature that endogeneity is not an issue
when analyzing the impacts of oil prices on stock markets of the countries apart from
18Please see Section 2.2 for corresponding studies
18
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USA, some studies (e.g., Park and Ratti, 2008) suggest that there would, at least, be
some sort of spillover from US or global financial markets to that of developed, mostly
European, countries. It also seems plausible to consider this interrelationship when
studying stock markets of emerging economies, which attract large amount of short-
term capital movement from major economies. This paper extends the understanding
on the issue of global spillover effects on the dynamic relationship between oil prices and
stock market returns by employing data from one particular emerging economy, Turkey.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impacts of oil price shocks on the Turkish
stock market for the period between January 1990 and November 2011 using the vector
autoregression (VAR, hereafter) model. A proxy variable capturing liquidity conditions
in the global financial system is included into the analyses in order to examine the
above-mentioned spillover effect. Since Turkey has limited domestic oil production and
reserves, imports make up a significant portion of its oil consumption. Therefore, Turkish
economy appears sensitive to oil price changes, similar to other developing and crude oil
import-dependent countries. Moreover, over the last decades Turkish financial market,
through a condense trade liberalization, has been attracting worldwide capital inflow.
As of November 2011 foreign portfolio investments have been responsible for nearly 63%
of total Turkish stock market capitalization.19 Thus, Turkish stock market returns have
become sensitive to the shocks created in international financial markets.
One more reason for including financial liquidity is that financial, more specifically
futures, markets have been the other major crude oil market since the early 1990s.
This was the result of increasing volume of crude oil future contracts traded, which
exceeded global oil production/consumption during late 1980s.20 Since then crude oil
prices have been determined in a manner that accounts for the effects of decisions made
by investors, speculators, hedgers, and large investment funds in the future markets, as
well as physical market conditions. Analyzing these “non-physical” market conditions,
such as expectations about the market, global financial and economic indicators, would
increase the possibility to shed some more light on the empirical variations in crude oil
prices.
Therefore, a proxy for global financial liquidity will not only serve as an explanatory
factor that influences stock market returns, but also be used to explain variations in oil
prices. In the current study, the evidence of such tridimensional interaction, e.g. joint
respond of stock returns and oil prices to liquidity, is investigated using the disentangling
methodology proposed by Kilian and Park (2009).
19Data from website of Istanbul Stock Exchange (IMKB): http://www.ise.org/Data/StocksData.aspx
20Using data for global crude oil production/consumption from BP’s Statistical Review of World
Energy 2011 and for the volume of WTI crude oil futures contracts from NYMEX official website exact
year can be derived as 1988.
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Understanding the impact of crude oil prices on Turkish stock market is potentially
beneficial for investors, market participants, regulators and researchers, as it is likely to
exhibit characteristics different from those observed in well-documented developed mar-
kets. Thus, our study explores an underexploited area of potentially valuable research in
Turkey with a very comprehensive data set, ranging from January 1990 and November
2011. This relatively long time horizon has been divided into three sub-periods coincid-
ing with specific oil price trends to allow testing of the performance of the Turkish stock
market under different oil price regimes.21 Empirical results suggest that oil prices have
significant impacts on Turkish stock market returns only during the third sub-period,
during which crude oil prices represented extreme volatile structure. On the other hand,
whenever the financial liquidity conditions are incorporated into the analyses, it is found
out that liquidity is the most plausible explanation for the changes in both oil prices
and stock market returns.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides relevant
literature about the relationship between financial markets and oil price shocks. Section
2.3 outlines the econometric methodology concerning VAR analysis and disentangling.
The data set and empirical results are presented in Section 2.4. Finally, Section 2.5
contains discussion of results and concluding remarks.
2.2 Literature Review
Since Hamilton (1983), a plethora of studies have analyzed the interrelation between
macroeconomic activity and oil price changes, most of which demonstrated a negative
correlation.22 However, according to the studies on the relationship between oil prices
and stock markets, oil price shocks influence various industries’ stock prices differently
and the relationships between oil price shocks and financial markets are, for many coun-
tries, complex and ambiguous. A commonly held view is that an upward trend in oil
price is beneficial for oil producing companies’ stock returns and oil exporting countries’
market activity, yet has an adverse effect on most of other sectors and oil importing
countries.
21Sub-period I: January 1990–November 2001; Sub-period II: November 2001–July 2008; Sub-period
III: July 2008–November 2011. Please see Section 2.4.1 for details of sub-periods.
22Please refer to: Mork (1989), Kahn and Hampton Jr (1990), Huntington (1998), Brown and Yu¨cel
(1999, 2002), Gao and Madlener (1999), Hamilton (2003), Dickman and Holloway (2004), Guo and
Kliesen (2005), Rogoff (2006), Sill (2007), Kilian (2008b), Oladosu (2009). Moreover, a number of
researchers have examined the role of crude oil prices in monetary policy (e.g. Bernanke et al., 1997,
Hamilton and Herrera, 2004) and impacts of oil prices on exchange rates (e.g. Chen and Chen, 2007,
Coudert et al., 2007).
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A firm-specific study by Al-Mudhaf and Goodwin (1993) investigated the returns from
29 oil companies listed on the NYSE and demonstrated a positive impact of oil price
shocks on ex-post returns for firms with significant assets in domestic oil production.
Further, Huang et al. (1996) analyzed the relationship between daily oil future returns
and US stock returns by employing an unrestricted VAR model and found evidence that
oil futures clearly lead some individual oil company stock returns. Faff and Brailsford
(1999) used market model to investigate several industry returns in the Australian stock
market, finding significant positive oil price sensitivity of Australian oil and gas, and
diversified resources industries. In contrast, industries such as paper and packaging,
banks and transport appear to display significant negative sensitivity to oil price hikes.
Sadorsky (2001) indicated that stock returns of Canadian oil and gas companies are
positively sensitive to oil price increases. Boyer and Filion (2007) employed a multifactor
framework to analyze the determinants of Canadian oil and gas stock returns, finding
similar results to Sadorsky (2001). Although El-Sharif et al. (2005) demonstrated that
the oil prices have significantly positive impacts on oil and gas returns in the UK,
evidence for the oil price sensitivity existing in the non-oil and gas sectors is generally
weak. In this context, Henriques and Sadorsky (2008) measured the sensitivity of the
financial performance of alternative energy companies to changes in oil prices using
VAR model in order to investigate the empirical relationship between alternative energy
stock prices, technology stock prices, oil prices, and interest rates. They indicated
that technology stock price and oil price each individually Granger causes the stock
prices of alternative energy companies. More recently, Oberndorfer (2009) analyzes the
interrelationship between oil prices and European energy companies and finds both oil
prices and oil price volatility negatively affects the stock prices of utility companies.
Jones and Kaul (1996) examined whether the reaction of international stock markets to
oil shocks could be justified by current and future changes in real cash flows, or changes
in expected returns. They provided evidence that aggregate stock market returns in
the US, Canada, Japan and the UK are negatively sensitive to the adverse impact of
oil price shocks on the economies of these countries. Contradicting to Jones and Kaul
(1996), Huang et al. (1996) found no evidence of a relationship between oil futures prices
and aggregate stock returns using daily data from 1979 to 1990. However, Ciner (2001)
challenged the findings of Huang et al. (1996), and argued for the need for further re-
search to produce evidence from international equity markets to support the robustness
of the results. He concluded that a statistically significant relationship exists between
real stock returns and oil price futures, but that the connection is non-linear. Moreover,
Huang et al. (2005) investigated the effect of oil price change and its volatility on eco-
nomic activities in the US, Canada and Japan. They indicated that when exceeding a
certain threshold, oil price change and volatility possess significant explanatory power
Chapter 2. Crude oil price shocks and stock returns 22
for the outcome of economic variables such as industrial production and stock market
returns.
Theoretically, in oil exporting countries, stock market prices are expected to be positively
affected by oil price changes through positive income and wealth effects. In an analysis
of the effects of oil price shocks on stock markets in Norway, Bjørnland (2009) argued
that higher oil prices represent an immediate transfer of wealth from oil importers to
exporters, stating that the medium to long-term effects depend on how the governments
of oil producing countries dispose of the additional income. If used to purchase goods
and services at home, higher oil prices will generate a higher level of activity, and thus
improve stock returns. In addition, Gjerde and Saettem (1999) demonstrated that stock
returns have a positive and delayed response to changes in industrial production and
that the stock market responds rationally to oil price changes in the Norwegian market.
A negative association between oil price shocks and stock market returns in oil importing
countries has been reported in several recent papers. Nandha and Faff (2008) examined
global equity indices with 35 industrial sectors, showing that oil price rises have a nega-
tive impact on stock returns for all sectors except the mining, and oil and gas industries.
O’Neill et al. (2008) found that oil price increases led to reduced stock returns in the
US, the UK and France. In a study of the connection between oil price shocks and the
stock market for the US and 13 European countries, Park and Ratti (2008) reported
that oil price shocks had a negative impact on stock markets in US and many European
countries, while the stock exchange of Norway showed a positive response to the rise
in oil prices. These authors also provided evidence that stock markets in oil exporting
countries are less affected by oil prices relative to oil importing countries. The results
of Chiou and Lee (2009) study confirmed the existence of a negative and statistically
significant impact of oil prices on stock returns. Their findings also provided support for
the notion that oil shocks drive economic fluctuations, with the evidence indicating that
with changes in oil price dynamics, oil price volatility shocks have an asymmetric effect
on stock returns. Examining whether the endogenous character of oil price changes af-
fect stock market returns in a sample of eight developed countries, Apergis and Miller
(2009) found evidence that different oil market structural shocks play a significant role in
explaining adjustments in international stock returns. Aloui and Jammazi (2009) study
focused on two major crude oil markets, namely WTI and Brent, and three developed
stock markets, namely France, UK and Japan and was based on the relationship between
crude oil shocks and stock markets from December 1987 to January 2007. The results
indicated that the net oil price increase variable plays an important role in determining
both the volatility of real returns and the probability of transition across regimes.
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More recently, Arouri and Nguyen (2010) used different empirical techniques namely,
market model and the two-factor market and oil model, to test the causality between
oil prices and twelve European sector indices listed on Dow-Jones for the period from
January 1998 to November 2008. They found asymmetries in response of the different
sector indices to oil price changes. Fan and Jahan-Parvar (2012), studying the interrela-
tion between U.S. industry-level returns and oil prices, found no evidence that oil prices
have significant predictive power for industry-level returns. Chortareas and Noikokyris
(2014) has more recently investigated the effects of oil supply and demand shocks on
U.S. dividend yield components, i.e. dividend growth, real interest rate, equity premium.
Following disentangling methodology proposed by Kilian (2009) they showed that that
although positive relationship between oil price increase and dividend yield is evident,
the persistence of relationship is highly dependent on the driving force of the oil price
increase.
Jammazi and Aloui (2010) explore the impact of crude oil shocks on stock markets of
three developed countries, UK, France and Japan, using a combined approach of wavelet
analysis and Markov Switching Vector Autoregression. They evaluated the issue in two
phases of stock markets and found that while oil shocks do not affect stock markets
during recession phases, they have significant negative impact during expansion phases.
While Jammazi (2012b) uses the same approach with Jammazi and Aloui (2010) to
analyze the effect of crude oil shocks on stock market returns of USA, Canada, Germany,
Japan and UK, Jammazi (2012a) uses a transformation of wavelet analysis with “Haar
A Trous” decomposition to explore the interactions between crude oil price changes
and stock returns of same five countries. The results of these studies reveal that both
approaches are more accurate then the methodologies used in existing literature when
the focus is to account for changing intensity of crude oil shocks over time. Reboredo
and Rivera-Castro (2014) also used wavelet-based analysis to investigate the impacts of
oil prices on different stock market indices, including S&P 500, Dow Jones Stoxx 600
and sectoral indices, and found positive interdependence especially during post credit
crunch period.
Contrary to the work done on developed markets, relatively little research has focused
on the relationship between oil prices and stock markets of emerging – oil exporting
or importing – economies. Hammoudeh and Aleisa (2004) examined the relationship
between oil prices and stock prices for five members (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), all of
which are net oil exporters, for the period 1994–2001, while Zarour (2006) investigated
the same countries during 2001 to 2005. Hammoudeh and Aleisa’s findings suggested
that most of these markets react to the movements of the oil futures price, with only
Saudi Arabia having a bidirectional relationship. By analyzing the impulse response
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function, Zarour concluded that the sensitivity of these markets to shocks in oil prices
has increased, with responses becoming more rapid after rises in prices. Arouri and
Fouquau (2009) investigated the short-run relationships between oil prices and GCC
stock markets. To examine the phenomena of stock markets’ occasional non-linear re-
sponse to oil price shocks, they examined both linear and nonlinear relationships. Their
findings pointed to a significant positive relation between oil prices and the stock index
of Qatar, Oman and UAE, but for Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, they found no
such influence. As another GCC study, Naifar and Al Dohaiman (2013) using Markov
regime-switching model, found that the relationship between those markets and oil price
volatility is dependent upon the regime.
Employing an error correction representation of a VAR model, Papapetrou (2001)
concluded that oil price is an important factor in explaining the stock price move-
ments in Greece, and that a positive oil price shock tends to depress real stock returns.
Maghyereh (2004) studied the relationship between oil prices changes and stock returns
in 22 emerging markets, conducting VAR model from 1998 to 2004, without finding
any significant evidence that crude oil prices have an impact on stock index returns in
these countries. In contrast to this conclusion, Basher and Sadorsky (2006), analyzing
the impact of oil price changes on a large set of emerging stock market returns for the
period 1992 to 2005, proposed that emerging economies are less able to reduce oil con-
sumption and thus are more energy intense, and more exposed to oil prices than the
developed economies. Therefore, oil price changes are likely to have a greater impact on
profits and stock prices in emerging economies. Cong et al. (2008) apply multivariate
vector autoregression methodology to analyze the interactive relationship between oil
price shocks and Chinese stock market activity. Authors find no evidence that oil price
shocks have significant effect on stock returns except for manufacturing index and some
oil companies’. Similarly, Narayan and Narayan (2010) investigated the impact of oil
prices on Vietnam’s stock prices and concluded that oil price have a positive and signif-
icant impact on stock prices. Finally, Soytas and Oran (2011) examined the causality
between oil prices and Turkish stock market (ISE-100) aggregate and electricity indices.
They concluded that while oil prices do not Granger cause aggregate index, they have
significant impact on electricity index.
2.3 Methodology
This study employs VAR approach in order to examine the dynamic interactions be-
tween oil price shocks and the Turkish stock index, and compare results, which take into
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account global financial liquidity conditions with those that do not. The VAR model in-
troduced by Sims (1980), presents a multivariate framework that expresses each variable
as a linear function of its own lagged value and lagged values of all the other variables
in the system. The main advantage of this approach is the ability to capture the dy-
namic relationships among the economic variables of interest. The methodology treats
all variables as jointly endogenous, and for proper estimation in a multivariate stable
VAR system, all variables employed in the model must be stationary or I(0) process.
Although there are many tests developed in the time-series econometrics to test for the
presence of unit roots, two tests in particular the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF here-
after) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 1981) and the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and
Shin (KPSS hereafter) test (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) have been employed to investigate
the degree of integration of the variables used in the empirical analysis.23
Case I: Simple Model
Here, we start with a simple model, which takes the relationship between oil prices and
Turkish stock market into account and neglects effect of global liquidity constraints. In
this model we needed to transform oil prices into shock variables. Besides linear ones,
some nonlinear transformations of oil prices have also been proposed in the literature.24
Therefore, in order to achieve robust empirical results we have used both linear and
nonlinear transformations of oil prices. Two types of variables for oil price shocks em-
ployed in this study are log return and scaled oil price increase (SOPI hereafter). The
log return of oil prices, ot, is from t− 1 to t calculated as:
ot = log(pt/pt−1) (2.1)
where pt denotes oil prices at time t. The oil price shock variable is also calculated by
the method of SOPI developed by Lee et al. (1995).
SOPIt = max [0, (uˆt)/σt] (2.2)
where uˆt is the residuals and σt is the square root of the volatility (σt
2), which are
derived from equation system (2.3), and SOPIt captures positive oil price shocks for the
subjected date. For this specification, GARCH(p,q) model, which has been first pro-
posed by Bollerslev (1986) and has become popular, particularly, due to its explanatory
power for dependence in volatility, is estimated as follows:
23Since all the variables included in the VAR methodolog are I(0) process, Vector Error Correction
Model (VECM) was not conducted in this paper.
24Please refer to Mork (1989), Lee et al. (1995) and Hamilton (1996).
Chapter 2. Crude oil price shocks and stock returns 26
ot = µ+
l∑
m=1
ηmot−m + ut
σ2t = α0 +
q∑
k=1
αku
2
t−k +
p∑
j=1
βjσ
2
t−j
(2.3)
where ut is white noise with (ut|ut−1) ∼ N(0, σ2t ).
Furthermore, we have proposed a bivariate VAR(p) system with daily return of
Turkish stock index and two types of oil price change variable to analyze the variance
decomposition structure. The model is written in the reduced form of structural VAR
representation as follows:
rst = β10 +
p∑
i=1
β1i rst−i +
p∑
i=1
α1i Xt−i + u1t
Xt = β20 +
p∑
i=1
β2i Xt−i +
p∑
i=1
α2i rst−i + u2t
(2.4)
where rst is the log-return of daily Turkish stock exchange index price, and Xt is the
corresponding oil price shock variable, either ot or SOPIt.
Case II: Incorporating Global Liquidity Conditions
The dynamic system in equation (2.4) may lead to a conclusion that oil price shocks have
significant impacts on stock returns, however this result may be biased if any variable,
which affects both oil prices and stock returns in the long-run, is omitted. In order to
avoid such a consequence, we should obtain a ‘purified’ oil price shock variable, related
only to the oil market itself. In order to obtain such purified oil market specific price
shock variable we have employed disentangling methodology, proposed by Kilian and
Park (2009). A proxy variable for global financial liquidity conditions, which is thought
to be responsible for variations in oil prices besides physical oil market conditions, is
incorporated into the analyses.
Chicago Board of Options Exchange’s (CBOE, hereafter) S&P 500 market volatility
index, vix, is chosen as the proxy for global liquidity and its first difference, dvix, is
used in VAR framework:25
25First difference of CBOE’s volatility index dvixt is because vix is I(1) process.
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ot = δ10 +
p∑
i=1
δ1i ot−i +
p∑
i=1
φ1i dvixt−i + uo,t
dvixt = δ20 +
p∑
i=1
δ2i dvixt−i +
p∑
i=1
φ2i ot−i + uvix,t
(2.5)
The first equation of this dynamic system allows to capture residuals, uˆo,t, which can
be used as purified oil market specific shock variable. This residual series and dvixt are,
further, used in the VAR framework proposed below instead of oil price shock variable,
Xt, to examine their effects on Turkish stock index returns’ variance decomposition
structure. The proposed dynamic system, hence, becomes a tri-variate VAR with a
following representation:
rst = γ10 +
p∑
i=1
γ1i rst−i +
p∑
i=1
κ1i uˆo,t−i +
p∑
i=1
ϕ1i dvixt−i + 1t
uˆo,t = γ20 +
p∑
i=1
γ2i uˆo,t−i +
p∑
i=1
κ2i dvixt−i +
p∑
i=1
ϕ2i rst−i + 2t
dvixt = γ30 +
p∑
i=1
γ3i dvixt−i +
p∑
i=1
κ3i rst−i +
p∑
i=1
ϕ3i uˆo,t−i + 3t
(2.6)
Variance decomposition analysis of this tri-variate VAR system will enlighten whether
Turkish stock returns react to oil market specific shocks, or to shocks created in global
markets due to the liquidity conditions.
2.4 Data and Empirical Results
2.4.1 Data
The data of this study consists of daily observations of ICE’s Brent crude oil prices
(pt), log-return of ISE-100 stock market index (rst), and CBOE volatility index (vixt).
The ‘National-100 Index’ (ISE-100) is the main market indicator of the Turkish Stock
Market. The data for Brent crude oil prices, ISE-100 index prices and VIX obtained from
the US Energy Information Administration, the Matrix Database26 and CBOE’s official
website, respectively. The data covers the period from January 2, 1990 to November 1,
2011, realizing a total of 5,194 observations. In order to examine stock market behavior
under different oil price regimes, the data set is divided into three sub-periods. The first
26Matriks is a licensed data dissemination vendor located in Turkey. It provides data and information
on global financial markets as well as selected macroeconomic indicators.
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sub-period consists of 2833 observations, namely from January 2, 1990 to November
15, 2001, where oil prices follow a comparatively stable and horizontal trend, ranging
between 9 US Dollars per barrel ($/bbl hereafter) and 41 $/bbl. The second consists
1604 observations from November 16, 2001 to July 11, 2008, during when the crude oil
market, as with other commodities, witnessed historical record prices after an upward
trend reaching to approximately 145 $/bbl. During the third, from July 14, 2008 to
November 1, 2011, with the credit crunch period, crude oil prices immediately fell from
145 $/bbl barrel to nearly 40 $/bbl, and then increased again to approximately 125
$/bbl, representing high volatility, which led to extremely large positive and negative
returns within a relatively short time period.
The descriptive statistics for Brent crude oil returns (ot), ISE-100 stock index returns
(rst), and first difference of CBOE’s S&P 500 market volatility index (dvxit) series are
provided in Table 2.1. All three descriptive series display non-Gaussian characteristics
with negative skewness for Brent crude oil returns and positive skewness for ISE-100
stock index returns, and CBOE’s market volatility index. Moreover, all series exhibit
excessive kurtosis, a fairly common occurrence in high-frequency financial time series
data, and suggest that the observed excessive kurtosis may be due to heteroskedasticity
in the data, which may be captured with the GARCH models. Excessive kurtosis would
also explain the reasoning for high Jarque-Bera statistics, which reject the null hypothesis
of normality for all return series. Values for coefficient of variation (CV) represent
extreme and relatively high variance clustering around the mean of dvxit and ot. The
volatility index variable, by definition, captures variance of CBOE market; hence high
CV is expected for dvixt. On the other hand high CV value for ot suggests further
analyzing the variance structure of oil returns.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Sample Series
ot rst divxt
Mean 0.0003 0.0015 0.0034
Median 0.0008 0.0014 -0.0600
Maximum 0.1813 0.2655 16.5400
Minimum -0.3612 -0.2033 -17.3600
Standard Deviation 0.0247 0.0290 1.5876
Coefficient of Variation 82.33 19.33 466.94
Skewness -0.7742 0.0469 0.6606
Kurtosis 17.29 8.58 21.46
Jarque-Bera Stat 44736.01*** 6745.03*** 74148.06***
# of observations 5193 5193 5193
Notes: SD indicates standard deviation. Jarque-Bera normality test statis-
tic has a chi-square distribution with 2 degrees of freedom. *** denotes
statistical significance at 1% level.
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Volatility clustering is immediately evident from the graphs of daily oil returns, which
suggests the presence of heteroskedasticity (Figure 2.1). The density graphs and the
QQ-plot against the normal distribution show that return distribution exhibits fat tails,
which the QQ-plots reveal are not symmetric. Oil prices show the greatest volatility
and excess kurtosis, and the corresponding returns are positively skewed. This short
but important preliminary descriptive and graphical analysis of the series indicates that
the chosen statistical model should take into account the volatility clustering, fat tails
and skewness features of the returns.
Figure 2.1: Brent Crude Oil Prices, Returns and Tail Distribution with QQ-Plot
Note: The Brent crude oil price, daily returns, daily returns density and QQ-plot
against the normal distribution. The time period is from 02.01.1990 – 01.11.2011
2.4.2 Empirical Results
Before investigating the impacts of oil price shocks on the stock market, we proceed
to examine the stochastic properties of the series considered in the model by analyzing
their order of integration on the basis of a series of unit root tests. Specifically, the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests
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are performed for the three sub-periods and the findings, summarized in Table 2.227,
indicate that the first differences of all series are stationary, I(1) for all periods, allowing
us to model the dynamic interactions with VAR model.
Table 2.2: Unit Root Test Results
Level First Difference
ADF KPSS ADF KPSS
Brent Crude Oil (ot)
Sub-Period I -2.76 0.603* -17.905* 0.038
Sub-Period II 0.272 0.429*** -38.524*** 0.137*
Sub-Period III -5.120*** 0.338*** -27.608*** 0.289***
Whole Period -2.852 1.341*** -11.308*** 0.022
ISE-100 (rst)
Sub-Period I -2.129 0.976*** -13.685*** 0.035
Sub-Period II -1.531 0.297*** -40.282*** 0.136*
Sub-Period III -1.227*** 0.407*** -12.278*** 0.143*
Whole Period -2.157 1.434*** -14.754*** 0.035
VIX (vixt)
Sub-Period I -4.181*** 0.901*** -19.364*** 0.018
Sub-Period II -2.002 0.802*** -17.837*** 0.041
Sub-Period III -2.726 0.277*** - 8.907*** 0.053
Whole Period -5.046*** 0.273*** -13.629*** 0.014
Notes: *** and * indicate the statistical significance at 1% and 10% level,
respectively.
As represented in equation system 2.4, VAR analysis is conducted on two types of oil
price shock variables. In order to estimate SOPIt type shock variable, volatility of Brent
crude oil returns is modeled with AR(1)-GARCH(1,1)28 specification and the test results
are indicated in Table 2.3. All of the parameter estimates of the AR(1)-GARCH(1,1)
model are found to be highly statistically significant. The persistence in volatility as
measured by sum of β1 and α1 in GARCH model is closer to unity for each period.
As shown in Table 2.3, the estimated β1 coefficient in the conditional variance equation
is coniderably larger than α1 coefficient. The implication is that the volatility is more
sensitive to the previous forecast of volatility in the market place.
To check the performance of our model, ARCH-LM specification test was conducted on
the normalized residuals, and there should be no ARCH effect left in the normalized
residuals. Table 2.4 reports ARCH-LM test results for all three sub-periods. The results
indicate that no serial dependence persists left in squared residuals of Brent crude oil
returns after volatility modeling for sub-periods I and III, and also for the whole period.
27Note that null hypothesis (H0: unit root exists in time series) for ADF test is the alternative
hypothesis (HA) for KPSS test.
28Different AR(q)-GARCH(p,q) models were initially fitted to the data and compared on the basis of
the Akaike and Schwarz Information Criteria (AIC and SIC) from which a AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model
was deemed most appropriate for modeling.
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Table 2.3: GARCH Variance Estimation Results
µ η1 α0 β1 α1
Sub-period I 0.0001 0.0765*** 0.0000*** 0.8926*** 0.1032***
Sub-period II 0.0016*** -0.022 0.0000*** 0.8620*** 0.0400***
Sub-period III 0.0009 0.0013 0.0000** 0.9328*** 0.0600***
Whole Period 0.0005** 0.0328** 0.0000*** 0.9154*** 0.0747***
Notes: *** and ** indicate the statistical significance at 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Although test statistics for sub-period II rejects the null hypothesis of “no serial depen-
dence between squared residuals”, it is statistically significant only at the 10% level of
significance. Hence, the results suggest that AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model is reasonably
well specified to capture the ARCH effects.
Table 2.4: ARCH-LM Test Results
Constant Term Squared Residuals F-Statistics LM-Statistics
Sub-period I 1.003 (0.0000) -0.004 (0.8280) 0.0472 (0.8280) 0.0473 (0.8279)
Sub-period II 1.037 (0.0000) -0.041 (0.0986) 2.7306 (0.0986)* 2.7293 (0.0985)*
Sub-period III 1.013 (0.0000) -0.010 (0.7773) 0.0801 (0.7773) 0.0803 (0.7769)
Whole Period 1.006 (0.0000) -0.0072 (0.6026) 0.2712 (0.6026) 0.2712 (0.6025)
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are p-values. * denotes rejection of null hypothesis at 10%.
Since the volatility modeling has succeeded in capturing the oil prices variance to a
significant degree, the GARCH model and derived residual terms were further used
in equation 2.2 to calculate SOPIt data. Then we employed VAR framework as in
equation system in 2.4 with ISE-100 daily returns and two of the oil price shock variables,
log returns (ot) and SOPIt, separately for each period. The results of Wald test for
block significance and generalized variance decomposition of ISE-100 due to the oil price
shocks are summarized in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 respectively. According to the block-
significance test results, oil prices found to have a statistically significant impact on
stock returns only during the last sub-sample period. Yet the impact is rather small as
represented in variance decomposition results.
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Table 2.5: Block Exogeneity Wald Test Results for System in 2.4
Implied Coefficient Restrictions
SOPIt → rst ot → rst
χ2-stat χ2-stat
Sub-period I α1i = 0, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 1.8095 1.5544
Sub-period II α11 = 0 1.3681 1.8308
Sub-period III α11 = 0 6.5633*** 10.1163***
Whole Period α1i = 0, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 4.3473 6.7199
Note: AIC determines the lag-length for VAR model as 5 for the first sub-period, 1 for
the second sub-period, 1 for the third sub-period and 6 for whole period. *** indicates
the significance at 1% confidence level.
Table 2.6: Generalized Decomposition of Variance of ISE-100 in Response to Oil Price Shock
Variables
Days after Impulse
Sub-period I Sub-period II Sub-period III Whole Period
SOPIt ot SOPIt ot SOPIt ot SOPIt ot
1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2 0.0344 0.0258 0.0854 0.1144 0.8094 1.2432 0.0148 0.0011
5 0.0486 0.0522 0.0861 0.1147 0.8098 1.2433 0.0148 0.0234
10 0.0553 0.0593 0.0861 0.1147 0.8098 1.2433 0.0148 0.1322
Moreover, in order to include global financial liquidity conditions into the analyses,
VAR methodology between Brent crude oil prices and CBOE’s S&P 500 volatility index
(Eq. 2.6) was used to capture the variance decomposition, which is provided in Table
2.7. Although the block-significance test results imply a unidirectional lead-lag relation
between first difference of VIX and crude oil returns for all three sub-periods, it is
only during the third sub-period that shocks from VIX create a comparatively higher
variance on crude oil returns.29 On the other hand, regardless of the magnitude of the
effect of global financial liquidity condition on variance of crude oil prices, it would still
be considered possible to be able to capture residuals for oil returns that will be used as
oil market specific price shocks purified of global liquidity constraints.
Once oil market specific shock, uˆo,t, and financial liquidity shock, dvixt, are captured
by the disentangling methodology, they are considered as two separate variables, along
with stock prices in the VAR framework. Therefore, we have also used this multivariate
framework to investigate the interrelationship between ISE-100 returns, oil price shocks
and global financial liquidity shocks for the whole periods. The results, which are pro-
vided in Table 2.8, imply that the global liquidity statistically increases the variance of
ISE.
29According to the Block Exogeneity Wald Test, there exists a significant unidirectional causality from
first difference of VIX to log-returns of Brent crude oil prices at 1% level for all three sub-periods.
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Table 2.7: Generalized Decomposition of Variance of Brent Crude Oil Returns in
Response to Global Financial Liquidity
Days after impulse Sub-period I Sub-period II Sub-period III Whole Period
1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2 0.0912 0.6183 1.9680 0.1580
5 0.3545 0.6482 2.6108 0.2253
10 0.6819 0.6487 3.8427 0.3578
Note: AIC determines the lag-length as 7 for the first sub-period, 4 for the second
sub-period, 1 for the third sub-period and 7 for the whole period.
Table 2.8: Block Exogeneity Wald Test Results for System in 2.6
Imp. Coef. Restric.
divxt → rst Imp. Coef. Restric. uˆo,t → rst
χ2-stat χ2-stat
Sub-period I ϕ1i = 0 for i = {1, 6} 24.4151*** κ1i = 0 for i = {1, 6} 4.2867
Sub-period II ϕ11 = 0 34.1651*** κ11 = 0 1.4218
Sub-period III ϕ11 = 0 95.7573*** κ11 = 0 3.1124*
Whole Period ϕ1i = 0 for i = {1, 6} 85.0101*** κ1i = 0 for i = {1, 6} 6.0041
Notes: AIC determines the lag-length as 6 for the first sub-period, 1 for the second sub-
period, 1 for the third sub-period and 6 for the whole period. *** and * indicate the signifi-
cance at 1% and 10% confidence level respectively.
Table 2.9: Generalized Decomposition of Variance of ISE-100 in Response to Oil Price Shock
with Global Financial Liquidity
Days after Impulse
Sub-period I Sub-period II Sub-period III Whole Period
divxt uˆo,t divxt uˆo,t divxt uˆo,t divxt uˆo,t
1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2 0.6894 0.0052 2.0763 0.0874 10.051 1.7774 0.1153 0.0415
5 0.7595 0.0259 2.1237 0.0897 10.361 1.7871 0.1797 0.0884
10 0.9007 0.1582 2.1237 0.0897 10.361 1.7871 0.2186 0.1542
According to the results from variance decomposition analyses, provided in Tables 2.6
and 2.9, three deductions can be made. First of all, the contribution of oil price shocks
to the Turkish stock market is greater in the third sub-period than that of the first and
second. This is an expected result such that, since oil prices move in a considerably
more volatile manner in the third sub-period they create a higher impact on the ISE-
100 returns. Secondly, the impact on variance decomposition starts with the second day
of the impulse and dies out immediately without changing the structure of the trend
of ISE-100. This may be the result of a non-linear relationship between oil prices and
stock market returns, as proposed by prior researches (e.g., Arouri and Fouquau, 2009,
Jawadi et al., 2010). Finally, the liquidity shock variable seems to be a considerable
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source of volatility for ISE-100 returns during the third sub-sample period, contributing
more than 10%. This means that liquidity shocks, rather than crude oil prices, are the
primary factor in stock market movements.
2.5 Discussions and Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have investigated the impacts of crude oil price variations on the
Turkish stock market using structural VAR model for the period between January 2,
1990 and November 1, 2011. ISE-100 index is used as a proxy for the performance of
the Turkish stock market. The interactions between oil prices and ISE-100 have been
analyzed by dividing this long time horizon into three sub-periods in order to test the
response of Turkish stock market during different oil price regimes.
The empirical results suggest that the oil price changes significantly and rationally affect
the Turkish stock market activity during only the third sub-period, which begins after
the credit-crunch of 2008. Moreover, when the global financial liquidity conditions have
been incorporated into the model, CBOE’s market volatility index (VIX), which is used
as an indicator for global financial liquidity, has been found to significantly affect both
oil prices and ISE-100 returns. In this trivariate VAR analysis results also suggest that
the most significant impacts of global liquidity shocks on stock market returns occur in
the third sub-period.
The overall results suggest that the global financial liquidity conditions are the most
plausible explanation for the changes in Turkish stock market returns. Although there
exists some evidence that purified oil price shocks still have an impact on stock mar-
ket returns, this effect is smaller and less significant than the liquidity constraints.
This is an expected result provided that Turkish stock market, through widespread
trade liberalization, has been attracting worldwide capital inflow, which makes it more
vulnerable to shocks created in global financial markets.
This study can be extended by obtaining a comparable firm-based dataset and by ana-
lyzing the behavior of each firm after oil price shocks. The empirical findings will prove
to be extremely useful information to investors who need to understand the effect of oil
price changes on certain stocks across industries, as well as for the managers of certain
firms who require deeper insight into the effectiveness of hedging policies, which are
affected by oil price changes.
Chapter 3
Energy prices and economic
growth in the long run: Theory
and evidence
3.1 Introduction
There has been a plethora of empirical studies on short- or medium-term interactions
between energy (especially oil) prices and macroeconomic indicators following the pio-
neering study of Hamilton (1983). Although there has been debate over the nature of
the relationship, such as non-linearities (Hamilton, 1996, 2003, 2011, Kilian and Vig-
fusson, 2011b) and asymmetries, i.e. differences in response to positive and negative
shocks (Balke et al., 2002, Huntington, 1998, Kilian and Vigfusson, 2011a, Mork, 1989)
there seems to be a consensus on the fact that oil price changes would at least have a
particular, if not pivotal, effect on macroeconomic variables.30
On the other hand, the impact of (rising) energy prices has never received substantial
attention from growth economists, possibly because this has been perceived as a short
run issue. The main concentration of the mainstream economic growth literature has
been on the optimal depletion and the price path of exhaustible resources, following the
original study of Hotelling (1931).31 More recently, the ‘new’ growth economics , i.e. the
endogenous economic growth literature, has focused on transition/substitution between
energy sources (Chakravorty et al., 1997, Just et al., 2005, Tahvonen and Salo, 2001,
Tsur and Zemel, 2003), directed technical change in an economy with energy sources
30Please additionally see: Kahn and Hampton Jr (1990), Brown and Yu¨cel (1999, 2002), Sill (2007),
Kilian (2008a,b), Oladosu (2009), Edelstein and Kilian (2007, 2009), Kilian and Lewis (2011).
31Seminal works in this stream are as follows: Solow (1974a,b), Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Stiglitz
(1974, 1976), Heal (1976), Loury (1978), Pindyck (1978, 1981).
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(Andre´ and Smulders, 2013, Eriksson, 2004, Groth, 2007, Smulders and De Nooij, 2003,
Van Zon and Yetkiner, 2003, Yang et al., 2006) and induced energy-saving technolo-
gies and environmental issues (Goulder and Schneider, 1999, Nordhaus, 2002, Smulders,
1995). Therefore, the issue of effects of energy prices on economic growth seems to be
an unexplored area in the theoretical economic growth literature.
For this purpose, we study a stylized model of an economy, in which an energy price-
economic growth nexus is developed and tested. In the theoretical part of the pa-
per, we showed that energy price growth has a negative effect on the growth rates of
GDP per capita and energy demand by developing a two-sector market economy a` la
Rebelo (1991). In our setup, the source of endogenous growth in the economy, i.e. the
investment goods sector, uses only physical capital, while the consumption goods sec-
tor uses both energy and capital as inputs. Using energy as an input in consumption
function has been supported by relatively recent empirical literature (e.g., Edelstein
and Kilian, 2009, Kilian and Park, 2009, Lee and Ni, 2002). Additionally, it is known
that the consumption goods sector has been responsible for the majority of world en-
ergy consumption. According to EIA’s 2012 World Energy Outlook (Birol et al., 2013),
the combined shares of transportation and residential sectors in total primary energy
consumption increased slightly from 60.8% in 1990 to 60.9% in 2008. The report also
forecasts that these two sectors combined will remain dominant in energy demand, with
a total share varying between 59.4% and 59.8% until 2035.
Our model, further, presumes that the price of energy input is growing at an exogenous
rate.32 Exogeneity in energy, especially oil, prices has recently become a debated issue
in the literature. Barsky and Kilian (2004) was the first study to stress the bidirectional
causality between oil prices and US macroeconomic performance. This reverse causality
issue was later empirically quantified by Kilian (2009), who proposed a methodology
to disentangle major oil price movements with respect to three determinant forces: (1)
oil supply shocks, (2) demand shocks specific to oil market and (3) shocks due to the
global demand for all industrial commodities. The author found evidence that global
macroeconomic conditions have been the dominant factor in oil price movements for
the post-1973 period. Similarly, more recent studies have suggested that the increase
in oil prices between 2003-2008 was due to the global business cycle rather than to
supply shortfall (Kilian and Hicks, 2013, Kilian and Murphy, 2014). Therefore, there
32Here we implicitly assumed that the energy source is non-renewable, because until recently global
energy prices are driven mostly by fossil fuels such as oil, gas, and coal and the renewable energy sources
still constitutes smaller portion of global primary energy supply/demand. For instance, in 2011, the share
of fossil fuels and renewable energy sources in primary energy demand was 82% and 18%, respectively
(Birol et al., 2013). Moreover, according to the Hotelling-based reasoning following Hotelling (1931), it
is natural to expect that the price of nonrenewable energy sources would increase gradually in the long
run due to the scarcity or depletion of resources, although the short-term verification of the rule may
not be applicable.
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seems to be a consensus in the literature that endogeneity is a problem in the empirical
study of the relationship between oil prices and US macroeconomic indicators. Here,
we propose a closed economy and use a broader definition of energy price, i.e. the price
of energy services used in the consumption goods sector. While it is clearly possible to
endogenize the energy prices in the model, with regards to our research objective, it is
more convenient to keep it as an exogenous variable.33
The relationships derived in the theoretical part were tested empirically using an error-
correction-based panel cointegration test and a panel Autoregressive Distributed Lag
(ARDL hereafter) estimation for a group of countries, comprising Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.34 The data on real GDP per
capita, energy consumption per capita and composite energy prices cover the period
from 1978 to 2011. The test reveals that energy prices have a significant cointegra-
tion relationship with real GDP per capita, as well as with energy consumption per
capita. Moreover, we found that energy prices have negative and significant long-run
effect on both variables. These results provide clear support for the derived theoretical
relationships.
The contribution of this paper to the literature is two-fold. Firstly, there exist few
studies on energy price-economic growth nexus in endogenous economic growth litera-
ture. For example, Van Zon and Yetkiner (2003) considering a three-sector model and
embedding energy as an input in the intermediate goods sector, have already shown
the negative impact of rising energy prices on economic growth.35 In another study,
Bretschger (2013), shows that decrease in energy consumption due to rise in energy
prices would promote capital accumulation if the investment effect dominates the lower
energy use effect. Thus, higher energy prices do not necessarily hamper the growth
process. Secondly, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, although a number of studies
analyze the long-term relationship between energy consumption and economic growth,
only few studies test the empirical regularity on the long-term relationship between en-
ergy price and economic growth. The majority of existing studies use error-correction
based models (VECM or VAR) along with the cointegration tests to interpret the re-
lationships for different countries (e.g., Asafu-Adjaye, 2000, Gardner and Joutz, 1996,
33In the Appendix A, we present the results of the model when energy price is a non-renewable and
endogenous.
34Please see section 3.3 for the rationale for country selection.
35Van Zon and Yetkiner (2003), which is in fact based on Romer (1990), uses energy in intermediate
goods sector. Yet, as commonly known, intermediate goods are capital good varieties, thus intermediate
goods sector can be considered as investment goods sector.
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Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sanchez, 2005, Stern, 1993).36 Thus, this study explores an un-
tapped area of potential research by applying panel cointegration tests and panel ARDL
methodologies to the analysis of the long-term effects of energy prices on economic
growth and energy consumption.
The set-up of this paper is as follows. In section 3.2 we present the basic model showing
that endogenous growth is inversely affected by energy price growth. Section 3.3 presents
the empirical analysis. A summary and some concluding remarks are provided in section
3.4.
3.2 A Two-Sector Endogenous Growth Model
The model developed in this article is based on a closed economy with no
government. We define overall utility of the representative consumer in the economy
as U(Ct) =
∫∞
0 e
−ρt u(Ct) dt, where felicity function is u(C) = C
1−θ−1
1−θ , C is the con-
sumption level ρ is the subjective rate of discount and 1/θ represents intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. We presume that there are two types of factor of production
in the model: broader interpretation of physical capital, K, and energy, E. We fur-
ther presume that there are also two sectors in the economy, namely investment goods
sector and consumption goods sector. Following Rebelo (1991), we define production
technology of the investment goods sector as follows:
YI = A ·KI (3.1)
In 3.1, YI represents output in investment goods sector, A is overall factor productivity,
and KI , a flow variable, is a broader interpretation of physical capital used in investment
good production.
Consumption good is produced via flow variables physical capital (KC) and energy (E)
under constant returns to scale production technology defined as:
YC(≡ C) = KαC · E1−α (3.2)
We assume that total physical capital stock K(= KI +KC) is fully employed.
36Ozturk (2010) provides an extensive survey of the literature on energy consumption-economic growth
nexus since the seminal study of Kraft and Kraft (1978). Most recent studies mentioned in this survey
either use ARDL approach to individual countries (e.g., Acaravci and Ozturk, 2010, Ocal and Aslan, 2013,
Ozturk and Acaravci, 2010, Shahbaz et al., 2013a,b, Wang et al., 2011), or panel data error-correction
models (e.g., Balke et al., 2002, Eggoh et al., 2011, Lee, 2005, Lee and Chang, 2008, Mahadevan and
Asafu-Adjaye, 2007).
Chapter 3. Energy prices and economic growth in the long run 39
Equilibrium process in the investment goods sector from profit equation,
ΠI = pI ·A ·KI −RI ·KI , leads to
pI ·A = RI (3.3)
where, RI is nominal rental rate (user cost) of physical capital in investment good
production and pI is the price of investment goods. For any KI , condition in 3.3 must
be satisfied. Profit maximization of the consumption goods sector yields inverse demand
functions for physical capital (employed in the sector) and energy. In particular, the
nominal profit equation ΠC = pc ·KαC · E1−α −RC ·KC −RE · E yields
pc · α ·Kα−1C · E1−α = RC (3.4a)
pc · (1− α) ·KαC · E−α = RE (3.4b)
In equations 3.4a and 3.4b, RC is the nominal rental rate (user cost) of physical capital
in consumption good production, RE is the nominal price of energy and pC is the price
of consumption goods. Real energy price is defined as q = REpC , and a` la Van Zon and
Yetkiner (2003), it was considered as growing at a constant rate, qˆ > 0, and that energy
supply is infinite at the given energy price.
No arbitrage condition implies that rental rate of capital in both sectors must be equal.
Hence,
RI ≡ RC ⇒ pI ·A = pc · α ·Kα−1C · E1−α ⇒ p ·A = α ·Kα−1C · E1−α (3.5)
In 3.5, p = pIpC is the relative price of investment goods in terms of consumption goods.
Then, real user cost of capital (i.e. rental rate) is RR = p · A = α ·Kα−1C · E1−α. One
clear implication of equation 3.5 is that pˆ = (α− 1) · KˆC + (1−α) · Eˆ, where pˆ, KˆC and
Eˆ represent the growth rates of relative price of investment goods (p) and capital (KC)
and energy (E) used by consumption goods sector, respectively. Recall that standard
definition of user cost of capital is as follows:
RR ≡ (r + δ − pˆ) · p (3.6)
In 3.6 r is real interest rate in terms of consumption good price, δ is capital depreciation
rate and pˆ is the capital loss due to changes in price.
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For competitive equilibrium, we also need to examine the representative consumer’s
optimization problem. To this end, under the assumptions provided so far, the present
value Hamiltonian would be as follows:
H = e−ρ·t · c
1−θ − 1
1− θ + λ{r ·Assets+ q · E − C} (3.7)
In 3.7, Assets represents financial stock of the consumer and r is the real interest rate.
We hereby assumed that the consumers receive q ·E since they are treated as the owner
of the energy resource stocks. First order optimization conditions are as follows:
∂H
∂C
= 0⇒ e−ρ·t · C−θ = λ (3.8a)
λ˙ = − ∂H
∂Assets
⇒ λ˙ = −λ · r (3.8b)
˙Assets =
∂H
∂λ
⇒ ˙Assets = r ·Assets+ q · E − C (3.8c)
In addition to these conditions, transversality condition, limt→∞ λ(t) ·Assets = 0, must
be satisfied. Equations 3.8a and 3.8b yield:
C˙
C
=
1
θ
· (r − ρ) (3.9)
At equilibrium, financial assets must be equal to physical capital under a closed economy
with no government assumption; Assets = p(t) ·K(t). Using this information, we may
transform the representative consumer’s budget constraint. Firstly, ˙Assets = p˙·K+p·K˙.
Moreover, from 3.4b, real energy price is q = (1 − α) ·KαC · E−α, and from 3.5 and 3.6
we have r = A− δ + pˆ. Hence,
p˙ ·K + p · K˙ = p ·K · (A− δ + pˆ) + (1− α) ·KαC · E1−α −KαC · E1−α ⇒
p · K˙ = p ·K · (A− δ)− α ·KαC · E1−α
If one substitutes A · p for α ·Kα−1C ·E1−α due to 3.5 and divide both sides by p, we end
up with:
K˙ = (A− δ) ·K −A ·KC (3.10)
Hence, the optimization problem of representative consumer yields 3.9 and 3.10.
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The model can be solved via the first order conditions derived from the optimization
problems of representative firms and consumer. Firstly, if we use r = A− δ+ pˆ obtained
from equation 3.6 in 3.9, we get C˙C =
1
θ · (A− δ+ pˆ− ρ). Substituting pˆ = (α− 1) · KˆC +
(1−α) · Eˆ from 3.5 instead of pˆ, we find C˙C = 1θ · (A− δ+ (α− 1) · KˆC + (1−α) · Eˆ− ρ).
As Cˆ = YˆC = α · KˆC + (1− α) · Eˆ due to equation 3.2,
α · KˆC + (1− α) · Eˆ = 1
θ
· (A− δ + (α− 1) · KˆC + (1− α) · Eˆ − ρ)⇒
(1− α+ αθ)KˆC + (1− α)(θ − 1)Eˆ = A− δ − ρ
Finally, as αKˆC − αEˆ = qˆ due to 3.4b, we obtain
Eˆ =
1
θ
(A− δ − ρ− (1− α+ αθ)
α
qˆ) ≡ g′ (3.11a)
KˆC =
1
θ
(A− δ − ρ− (1− α)(1− θ)
α
qˆ) ≡ g (3.11b)
Cˆ = YˆC =
1
θ
(A− δ − ρ− (1− α)
α
qˆ) ≡ αg + (1− α)g′ (3.11c)
where qˆ is the growth rate of energy prices. Equations 3.11a – 3.11c imply that
energy price growth has negative impact on the growth rate of energy use, as also
shown by Van Zon and Yetkiner (2003). Note that (1−α+αθ)α >
(1−α)(1−θ)
α and that
(1−α+αθ)
α >
(1−α)
α . We will assume that the condition; A− δ−ρ > (1−α+αθ)α holds, hence
all growth rates above are positive. We may now solve the rest of the model under this
assumption. First of all, using pˆ = (α − 1) · KˆC + (1 − α) · Eˆ equality, one can easily
show that
pˆ = −(1− α
α
)qˆ
This result can also be expressed as p(t) = p(0) · e−( 1−αα )qˆ.t.37 As long as growth rate
of energy price is positive, relative price of investment goods in terms of consumption
goods p(t) approaches zero. From the equality of r = A− δ + pˆ, we may show
r = A− δ − (1− α
α
)qˆ
37Recall that growth rate of energy price is exogenously given. Note that we may write the result also
as p(t) = p′(0) · (q(t))−(1−α), p′(0) = p(0)(q(0))−(1−α)
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Obviously, real interest rate and hence growth rate of consumption level, Cˆ, are positive
if and only if A− δ > (1−αα )qˆ. Moreover from equation 3.8b we get,
λˆ = −{A− δ − (1− α
α
)qˆ
}
As r > 0, λ must be approaching to zero. If we solve equation 3.10 via integrating factor
method, we get
K(t) =
A ·KC(0)
A− δ − g · e
g·t + const · e(A−δ)·t
where, const stands for constant term. We may easily determine the value of the constant
term via the transversality condition. In particular, substituting respective values of λ
and Assets = p · K in transversality condition limt→∞{λ(t) · Assets} = 0 yields that
const must be zero. In addition to this, the condition A− δ − g > 0 must hold for the
transversality condition converges to zero at limit.38 In conclusion, total capital stock
path is given by,
K(t) =
A ·KC(0)
A− δ − g · e
g·t (3.12)
Hence, total capital stock is growing at rate g. Given that initial capital stock is defined
exogenously as, K(0) ≡ K0 = A·KC(0)A−δ−g , to the model, we can determine initial values of
flow variables, i.e. KC(0), KI(0), E(0).
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Finally, let us determine the time path of Real GDP. To this end, note that nominal
GDP (NGDP ) and real GDP in terms of consumption goods (Y ) would be defined as:
NGDP = pI · YI + pc · YC ⇒
Y = p.YI + YC
One can easily show that real GDP is:
Y = const′ · e[αg+(1−α)g′]·t (3.13)
38For θ > 1, (A−δ)α(θ−1)+ρ
αθ+1−α is certainly positive. If θ < 1, ρ > (A− δ)α(θ − 1) must hold.
39It is straightforward to show that E(0) = (1 − α) 1α A−δ−g
A
· K0 · (q0)− 1α , KC(0) = A−δ−gA · K0,
KI(0) =
δ+g
A
·K0 and p(0) = (1− α) 1−αα · αA · (q0)−
1−α
α .
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In 3.13, const′ = p(0) · YI(0) + (KC(0))α · (E(0))1−α, a collection of initial values of the
model. In conclusion, total physical capital stock, investment capital and consumption
capital all grow at rate g. On the other hand, energy demand grows at rate g′ and real
GDP and consumption grow at rate αg + (1 − α)g′, which is the weighted growth rate
of energy and physical capital. Energy price growth rate has a negative effect on all
growth rates.
3.3 Testing the Long-run Effects of Energy Prices
In this section, we attempted to test the long-run relationship between energy prices,
economic growth and energy consumption, that we have derived in theoretical part, cf.,
equations 3.11a and 3.11c. For empirical purposes, these equations can, respectively, be
reformulated as:40
Eˆ = β10 + β1qˆ (3.14a)
YˆC = β20 + β2qˆ (3.14b)
where, β10 = β20 =
1
θ (A − δ − ρ), β1 = −1θ (1−α+αθ)α and β2 = −1θ (1−α)α . The growth
rates YˆC , qˆ and Eˆ can further be defined as
d
dt ln(E),
d
dt ln(YC) and
d
dt ln(q), respectively.
Therefore, integrating both sides of 3.14a and 3.14b will lead to:
ln (E) = α10 + β10t+ β1 ln (q) (3.15a)
ln (YC) = α20 + β20t+ β2 ln (q) (3.15b)
where, α10 and α20 are the constant terms emerged from the integration procedure and
t is the time trend component. The equations 3.15a and 3.15b are the long-run re-
lationships to be tested. To this end, error-correction based panel cointegration test
(Westerlund, 2007) and panel ARDL methodology (Pesaran et al., 1995, 1999) are ap-
plied on balanced panel data, consisting of real GDP per capita (Y ), composite energy
prices (q) and energy consumption per capita (E), covering the period between 1978
and 2011 for sixteen countries; namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Portugal, Spain and Sweden.41
40Please note that, the growth rates of output in the consumption goods sector and of composite GDP
are the same, i.e. YˆC = Yˆ
41Although the theoretical model assumes closed economy, for empirical applications we use open
economies. Yet, since we are dealing with long-run equilibrium, it is rational to expect that those
countries have to end up with trade balance thus energy import would be met by export of consumption
and service goods.
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The countries have been chosen regarding the data availability. Historical data on com-
posite energy prices for each country, defined as real index for households and industry
(2005=100), have been taken from the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) statistics
database (IEA, 2013).42 This data set has been provided for OECD countries. Out of
these countries we have eliminated the ones, which have been net energy exporters in
the subjected period as our main consideration is for imported energy. We, moreover,
excluded the United States following the concerns on the endogeneity problem (please
see Barsky and Kilian (2004)) and some other OECD countries due to data restrictions
on other variables; i.e. GDP per capita and energy consumption per capita which have
been taken from WDI (The World Bank Group, 2013). All three variables are used in
natural logarithms and indexed taking 2005 as the base year. Table 3.1 provides the
descriptive statistics for all three variables.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of variables
(in natural logarithms) over 1978–2011
Statistics\Variables ln(Y ) ln(E) ln(q)
Mean 4.368 4.487 4.509
Std. Dev. 0.238 0.173 0.186
Minimum 3.492 3.598 3.804
Maximum 4.711 4.785 5.006
# of Countries 16 16 16
# of Observations 544 544 544
As for panels with time dimension larger than the cross-sectional dimension, usual time
series problems would emerge. To this end we have tested the variables for unit root
using Levin-Li-Chu (LLC) and Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) tests proposed by Levin et al.
(2002) and Im et al. (2003), respectively. Table 3.2 provides the results of the unit
root tests. According to these results, the first differences of all three variables are
stationary, i.e. all variables are integrated of order one, I(1). We proceed further with
panel cointegration test and panel ARDL as both methodologies are convenient to be
applied on I(1) variables.
We have applied error-correction based panel cointegration test proposed by Westerlund
(2007). As correctly noted by Pesaran et al. (1995), this approach is more advantageous
than other panel cointegration tests, such as the one proposed by Pedroni (1999), as
it avoids the problem of common factor restriction. Persyn and Westerlund (2008)
describes the data generating process assumed by this error-correction test as follows:
42The composite energy price in IEA (2013) is defined as a weighted average of oil products, coal,
natural gas and electricity consumed by households and industry.
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Table 3.2: Panel Unit Root Test Results
Variable
LLC (adjusted t-stat.) IPS (z-stat.)
Level First Difference Level First Difference
lny 1.3440 -6.6046*** 3.3643 -8.9687***
lne 2.9221 -2.8324*** -0.8323 -12.8586***
lnq 1.5540 -8.1549*** 0.6028 -10.5024***
Notes: Tests conducted with constant and trend components. ***
represents significance at 1% level.
∆yi,t = δ
′
idt + αiyi,t−1 + λ
′
ixi,t−1 +
pi∑
j=1
αi,j∆yi,t−j +
pi∑
j=−qi
γi,j∆xi,t−j + εi,t (3.16)
where, yi,t is the dependent variable, which in our case is either ln(Y ) or ln(E) and xi,t
is the independent variable, which is ln(q) for our case, for country i in year t. Moreover,
while dt represents the deterministic component, λi is defined as −αiβ′i with αi capturing
the seed at which the system yi,t−1 − β′ixi,t−1 adjusts back to the equilibrium after an
unexpected shock. Therefore, if αi < 0 model implies a cointegration between variables
and thus the null hypothesis tested is H0 : αi = 0 for all i. Westerlund (2007) proposes
four different tests; two of these, namely the group mean tests Gτ and Ga, use alternative
hypothesis of HA : αi < 0 for at least one i. The remaining two, namely, the panel tests
Pτ and Pa, use the alternative hypothesis of HA : αi = α < 0 for all i. The optimal
lag and lead lengths of the variables have been chosen via Akaike Information Criteria
(AIC). Moreover, following Persyn and Westerlund (2008) the Kernel width has been
set as 4(T/100)2/9, where T is the number of observations in time series dimension.
We further proceed with the estimation of equation 3.16 and following the procedure
described above; we have presented the results of the four-cointegration tests on Table
3.3. All test statistics, except for Pτ test on ln(Y ) vs. ln(q), lead us to reject the null
hypothesis of no cointegration between ln(Y ) vs. ln(q), as well as between ln(E) vs.
ln(q) at 1% significance level.
Table 3.3: Panel Cointegration Test Results
Relationship Tested Gτ Ga Pτ Pa
ln(Y ) vs. ln(q) -2.842*** -30.345*** -8.820 -17.103***
ln(E) vs. ln(q) -2.852*** -20.312*** -12.088*** -18.806***
Notes: Optimal lag and lead lengths selected via AIC are both 1 and opti-
mal Bartlett kernel window width is set to be 3. *** represents significance
at 1% level.
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Having concluded that two cointegrating relationships exist, we have, subsequently, ap-
plied Pooled Mean Group (PMG hereafter) and Mean Group (MG hereafter) estimators
(i.e., panel ARDL methodology) proposed by Pesaran et al. (1995, 1999). While MG
estimator is based on estimating N times time-series regressions and averaging the co-
efficients, PMG estimator reveals pooled coefficients. Pesaran et al. (1999) suggests
that PMG estimator is more efficient, yet this is only consistent when the model is ho-
mogenous in the long run, i.e. the long-run coefficients are equal across countries. MG
estimator is advantageous because it is consistent even when the panel data exhibits
heterogeneous characteristics, which is common in cross-country studies. As proposed
by Pesaran et al. (1999), these estimators lead consistent estimates in larger time di-
mensional heterogenous panels even when the assumption of strict exogeneity in the
regressors is violated. Therefore, although we have accounted for the endogeneity is-
sue when selecting countries to be analyzed, panel ARDL methodology is appropriate
with regards to the possible doubts on the endogeneity of composite energy prices with
respect to the macroeconomic conditions in the corresponding countries.
Following Blackburne and Frank (2009), we have defined ARDL(1,1) dynamic panel
specification of equations 3.15a and 3.15b as:
yi,t = λiyi,t−1 + δ10,ixi,t + δ11,ixi,t−1 + δ20,it+ µi + εi,t (3.17)
and the error-correction parameterization as:
∆yi,t = φi(yi,t−1 − θ0,i − θ1,ixi,t − θ2,it) + δ11,i∆xi,t + εi,t (3.18)
where; φi = −(1−λi) is the error-correction term (ECT) speed of adjustment, θ0,i = µi1−λi
is the non-zero mean of cointegration relationship, θ2,i =
δ20,i
1−λi and θ1,i =
δ10,i+δ11,i
1−λi are
the coefficients of interest, i.e. long-run estimates of elasticity (β10, β1) and (β20, β2)
in equations 3.15a and 3.15b, respectively. Obviously, for our case, negative and sig-
nificant φi and θ1,i should be expected for both two relationships under consideration,
i.e. lnY vs. ln q and lnE vs. ln q. The estimation results for both relationships and for
both estimators (MG and PMG) have been provided on Table 3.4.
The results are in accordance with the expectations on the coefficients; β1 < 0 and β2 <
0. MG and PMG estimators estimate negative and highly significant long-run impact of
energy price on both GDP per capita and energy consumption per capita. Estimation
results reveal also that the effect on GDP per capita (-0.76 for MG estimator and -0.59
for PMG estimator) is slightly higher than that of energy consumption per capita (-0.73
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Table 3.4: Panel ARDL Long Run and ECT Estimates
Long-Run Estimates
ln(Y ) ln(E)
MG PMG MG PMG
ln(q)
-0.7595*** -0.5865*** -0.7308*** -0.5417***
(0.2826) (0.1277) (0.1887) (0.0479)
t
0.0246*** 0.0098*** 0.0119*** 0.0059***
(0.0073) (0.0020) (0.0041) (0.0007)
ECT
-0.1831*** -0.0649*** -0.3830*** -0.2067***
(0.0281) (0.0105) (0.0521) (0.0329)
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. *** represents significance
at 1% level.
for MG estimator and -0.54 for PMG estimator). These results are consistent with the
theory proposed in this article, as well as with the empirical literature. For instance,
Kilian (2008b) has estimated the price elasticity of US total energy demand as -0.45
with error bounds of -0.27 and -0.66, moreover, Greene and Leiby (2006) suggested a
range between -0.03 and -0.56 for price elasticity of oil demand for different countries.
Although our estimates of effect on GDP per capita appears to be higher than that of the
literature (e.g., Brown and Yu¨cel, 1999, Greene and Leiby, 2006), they are reasonable
as the prior studies mostly concentrated only on the effects of oil prices in the short-
run. Moreover, negative and significant ECT terms indicate that the deviations from
the long-run path are corrected each period, thus all variables return to their long-run
equilibrium.
3.4 Conclusions and Policy Implications
In this paper we have presented a two-sector endogenous growth model, following
Rebelo (1991). By including energy as an input in the consumption good sector, we
have been able to show that the endogenous growth rate of both output and energy con-
sumption depends negatively on the rate of growth of energy price. These findings are
consistent with Van Zon and Yetkiner (2003), who use precisely this argument in a study
of a three-sector model in which energy is identified as an input in the intermediate-good
sector. By testing the theoretical relationships derived by employing error-correction
based panel cointegration and panel ARDL methodologies, we found that energy prices
have negative and significant impact on both real GDP per capita and energy consump-
tion per capita in the long-run. Thus, both the theoretical and empirical findings suggest
significant long-term welfare losses due to the fact that increasing energy prices leads to
“under-capacity” or “below-capacity” economic growth.
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One policy implication that clearly emerges from this result is the need for policy makers
to prevent or at least restrict energy price increases in order to sustain higher long-term
economic growth. Yet, this policy recommendation would be superfluous without the
introduction of the appropriate channels for the achievement of this policy goal. Recall
the energy price variable in the theoretical part is assumed to follow the Hotelling rule
(Hotelling, 1931), which suggests that the price of nonrenewable energy sources would
increase gradually due to scarcity or depletion of resources. This assumption is based
on the fact that current global consumer energy prices are largely driven by scarce fossil
fuels, such as oil, natural gas, and coal, which constitute 82% of global primary energy
demand (Birol et al., 2013). Correspondingly, the composite energy prices, used in the
empirical part, are also driven by fossil fuels. As defined by IEA (2013), these prices
are determined as the weighted average of oil products, coal, natural gas, and electricity
consumed by households and industry. Therefore, in order to prevent long-term welfare
losses due to the rise in composite energy prices, and the consequent below-capacity
growth rates, governments should subsidize renewable rather than non-renewable energy
sources, as the prices of the latter tend to increase by their very nature in the long run.
There has been extensive literature on the profound positive impacts of renewable energy
sources on sustainable development. It has been found previously that the dominance of
renewable energy- in energy systems would increase public welfare not only by overcom-
ing environmental constraints and by providing sustainable energy supply (e.g., Dincer,
2000, Lund, 2007, Omer, 2008, Panwar et al., 2011, among others), but also by job cre-
ation (e.g., Frondel et al., 2010, Lehr et al., 2012, Mathiesen et al., 2011, among others).
To the authors’ best knowledge, this stream of literature has so far neglected an ad-
ditional important channel through which renewable energy sources have the potential
to contribute to countries’ long-term welfare. We suggest that increasing the share of
renewable energy sources would directly serve to prevent permanent long-term increases
in consumer energy prices, which would lead to increased economic growth. This po-
tential benefit is confirmed by several empirical studies investigating the direct effect of
increasing renewable energy consumption on economic growth (e.g., Apergis and Payne,
2010, Awerbuch and Sauter, 2006, Chien and Hu, 2007, Ewing et al., 2007, Fang, 2011,
Sadorsky, 2009, among others).
Chapter 4
Two-period resource duopoly
with endogenous intertemporal
capacity constraints
4.1 Introduction
One of the most important aspects of strategic firm behavior in oligopolistic non-
renewable or exhaustible resource markets is the allocation of a finite resource stock
over time. The problem of resource allocation becomes more complicated once firms
seize the opportunity to increase the resource base. In this case, in addition to the pro-
duction decisions, firms also need to choose the optimal amount of resource additions
over time.
In order to address the question of how firms would react under endogenous capacity
constraints, we study a resource duopoly model with two firms, competing in quantity for
two consecutive periods. At the beginning of the first period, each firm is endowed with
a fixed amount of exhaustible resource stock and is then allowed to invest in capacity
in between the two periods of production in order to increase its resource stock. Thus,
their 2nd period capacity constraints become endogenous. With this setup, we find that
the equilibrium price weakly decreases over time. Moreover, asymmetric distribution
of initial resource stocks leads to a significant change in equilibrium outcome, provided
that firms do not have the same cost structure in capacity additions. It is also verified
that if only one company is capable of investment in capacity, the market moves to a
more concentrated structure in the second period.
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Apart from the mainstream economic growth literature dealing with the optimal deple-
tion of exhaustible resources following Hotelling (1931)43, there has been a plethora of
works that deal with the microeconomic structure of resource markets. Salant (1976)
proposes a cartel with a competitive fringe model to explain the world oil market and
suggests that a cartel would restrict its supply, leading to a monotonic increase in prices,
until it takes over the whole market and the competitive fringe exhausts its resources.
Gilbert (1978) extends the study of Salant (1976) with a Stackelberg model under the
price and quantity leadership of the cartel and confirms that the price would increase
until the reserves of the fringe firms are exhausted. Another dynamic oligopolistic mar-
ket is examined by the study of Lewis and Schmalensee (1980), which proposes that any
firm having a greater initial resource endowment will produce more at each period of the
game. Eswaran and Lewis (1984) extend the oligopoly model such that each firm has
an initial share of the common reserve. The authors find that given uneven distribution
of the shares among firms, industry extraction is inefficient as it is not cost minimizing.
In his famous work entitled “A Theory of ‘Oil’igopoly: Cournot Equilibrium in Ex-
haustible Resource Markets with Fixed Supplies”, Loury (1986) proposes a
non-cooperative Cournot oligopoly model. He finds that marginal returns on resource
stocks are inversely related to players’ initial resource endowments and that aggregate
production decreases over time. He also suggests that firms with smaller resource stock
exhaust their stocks at the same time as larger stock firms. Polasky (1992) extends
the model of Loury (1986) by introducing different extraction costs among the firms
and empirically testing the model. Gaudet and Long (1994) criticize the assumptions
thought to be necessary by Loury (1986) in order to achieve a unique equilibrium for
the game with uneven distribution of initial resource stocks among players. Contrary to
Loury (1986), they suggest that exhaustion of resources in finite time is not a necessary
condition for equilibrium. Later, Salo and Tahvonen (2001) contributed to this stream
of literature by considering the economic depletion of resources instead of the physical
depletion. They find, contrary to the literature, that the degree of concentration in
supply would decline such that the market would head in the direction of more compet-
itive rather than monopolistic. On the other hand, more recently Benchekroun et al.
(2009) and Benchekroun et al. (2010) suggest, in accordance with Loury (1986), that
the oligopolistic market, in which players have different initial resource stocks and dif-
ferent cost structures, would move towards a cartel with a competitive fringe structure
as low-cost deposits are exhausted.
This article also relates to the literature on strategic firm behavior under capacity
constraints. Pioneering works in this stream are Levitan and Shubik (1972) and Osborne
43Seminal works in this stream of literature are as follows: Solow (1974b), Dasgupta and Heal (1974),
Stiglitz (1974), Loury (1978), Pindyck (1978).
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and Pitchik (1986), both of which are based on price competition under exogenous ca-
pacity constraints. Important contributions are made, among others, by Bikhchandani
and Mamer (1993), Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997), Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) and
Laye and Laye (2008). Moreover, Saloner (1987) introduces intertemporal production
decisions with a two-period Cournot duopoly, which is later extended by Pal (1991) with
the inclusion of cost differences.
The primary contribution of this paper is that it is among the firsts to subject dynamic
duopoly markets to endogenous intertemporal capacity constraints. In fact, the author
is only aware of two papers that address the strategic firm decisions under a two-period
duopoly with exogenous intertemporal capacity constraints, namely Biglaiser and Vet-
tas (2004) and van den Berg et al. (2012), examining price and quantity competition,
respectively. We extend the model of van den Berg et al. (2012), which most resem-
bles the current study, by relaxing the assumption of exogenous capacity constraints.
Thus, in our setting, besides the quantity competition firms also enter into a rivalry in
capacity investments, which leads to endogenous capacity constraints. In contrast to
van den Berg et al. (2012)’s main finding that the price weakly increases over time, we
are able to show that the price decreases with endogenous capacity constraints. This
would explain the temporary downward price trends experienced occasionally in most
exhaustible resource markets. Thus, the author believes that the model presented in
this study better explains the stylized characteristics of such markets.
The organization of the current paper is as follows: Section 4.2 introduces the model.
Section 4.3 solves the model using the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium concept and
provides major results. Section 4.4 presents oil market interpretation of the model.
Welfare analysis is conducted in Section 4.5. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Model
This article proposes a resource duopoly model with two firms, i = 1, 2, competing in
quantity for two consecutive periods, t = 1, 2. At the beginning of the first period (t = 0),
each firm is endowed with a fixed amount of exhaustible resource, Ri,0 ≥ 0, which can
be increased to a cumulative recoverable resource, (Ri,0 + Radd,i) ∈ [Ri,0, Rmax], where
Radd,i is the additions to the resource base (capacity additions) of firm i and Rmax is
finite. Thus, firms can endogenize their 2nd period capacity by simultaneously choosing
Radd,i in the interim period at a cost of xi, i.e., capacity investment. This creates a
three-stage game as depicted in Figure 4.1.
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Ri0 
qi1 
Ri=Ri0-qi1+Radd,i 
qi2 
xi 
Radd,i 
Figure 4.1: Structure of the Game
In Figure 4.1, qi,1 is the quantity decision of firm i in the first stage (1
st period of
production) subject to its initial resource endowment (Ri,0), Radd,i is the decision made
on capacity addition in the second stage (in between the two periods of production) at a
cost of xi, and finally qi,2 is the quantity decision of firm i in the third stage (2
nd period
of production) subject to its remaining endogenous capacity defined by the following
equation:
Ri = Ri,0 − qi,1 +Radd,i. (4.1)
Assumption 1. Initial resource endowment for each firm lies in the following range:44
α1A+ α3Rj,0
α4 − α2 < Ri,0 <
(α4 − 3α8)A− 3α10Rj,0
3α9
for i, j ∈ 1, 2 and i 6= j
The upper bound of the interval provided by Assumption 1 guarantees that the second
period capacity constraint for each firm is binding; thus, at equilibrium firms invest
in capacity Radd,i > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}. If this part of the assumption is violated, the
problem becomes less interesting as it reduces to the typical dynamic Cournot game with
exogenous intertemporal constraints, in which equilibrium is achieved without positive
capacity investments. This case is in fact already considered in van den Berg et al. (2012).
The lower bound, moreover, guarantees that each firm would carry some of its initial
resource endowment over to the second period. If violated, the capacity constraints are
no longer intertemporal. In this case, each firm uses up all of its initial capacity in the
first period, generates new capacity in the interim period and uses it again in the second
period. Since the focus of this paper is the intertemporal allocation of the endogenous
resource, a lower bound of Assumption 1 is also necessary.
We, furthermore, assume that the costs of exploring initial resource stock and resource
extraction are sunk and therefore do not have a role in the model. The inverse demand
44The α’s are defined on page 59 by Proposition 1.
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function for each period is as follows:
Pt = Pt(Qt) = A−Qt,
where A captures the market size and Qt = qi,t+qj,t for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. Moreover,
we define the capacity addition cost function as:
xi = ai ×Radd,i2, (4.2)
where ai (∈ N+) is a finite constant that captures the “reverse efficiency” (or the cost)
of capacity investments such that, as it becomes larger, capacity additions become more
costly.45
4.3 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
We employ the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE, hereafter) concept, which
suggests that the strategy of each player at each instant of time is a function of the prior
decisions made by both itself and its rival. Therefore, for any state of the game at the
beginning of the 2nd period z(qi,1, qj,1, Radd,i, Radd,j), which is the result of the 1
st and
interim period decisions, firm i will solve the following maximization problem given firm
j’s production decision:
max
qi,2
pii,2 = qi,2 P2(qi,2, qj,2)− xi(Radd,i)
subject to
0 ≤ qi,2 ≤ Ri,
where, recall that, Ri is the 2
nd period capacity constraint defined by Equation 4.1. The
resulting best response correspondence for firm i in the 2nd period, σi,2(z) : [0, Rj ] →
[0, Ri], will be as follows:
σi,2(qj,2) =
{
Ri if 0 ≤ Ri ≤ A−qj,22
max (0,
A−qj,2
2 ) otherwise.
45We would have assumed a general functional form for capacity addition cost, xi, that is convex in
Radd,i, yet the functional form provided is tractable as its first derivative is linear.
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Equilibrium strategies for firm i are given by the function f∗i (z) and defined as follows:
f∗i (z) =

A
3 if Ri, Rj >
A
3
A−Rj
2 if Ri >
A−Rj
2 and Rj ≤ A3
Ri if either Ri ≤ A3 and Rj > A−R12 or Ri ≤ A−Rj2 and Rj ≤ A−Ri2 .
(4.3)
Region q∗1,2 q∗2,2 R1 R2
I A/3 A/3 > A/3 > A/3
II R1
A−R1
2 ≤ A/3 > A−R12
III A−R22 R2 >
A−R2
2 ≤ A/3
IV R1 R2 ≤ A−R22 ≤ A−R12
Table 4.1: Second Period Possible Equilibrium Outcomes
There may exist four possible Nash equilibria for the second-period subgame (q∗1,2, q∗2,2),
which satisfy both σ1,2(q
∗
2,2) = q
∗
1,2 and σ2,2(q
∗
1,2) = q
∗
2,2 as provided in Table 4.1. Since
in Region I the 2nd period capacities of both firms are non-binding, each firm chooses the
Cournot outcomes and ends up with a residual amount left ‘unproduced’ in the resource
base. Regions II and III correspond to the outcomes when only one firm has a binding
capacity, firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. And, finally, in Region IV both firms have
binding capacities, thus producing whatever their capacity allows. Given Assumption
1, the equilibrium can not occur in Regions I, II and III (See Lemma 1).
Lemma 1. Given Assumption 1, each firm chooses the second period equilibrium quan-
tity to be:
q∗i,2 = Ri = Ri,0 − qi,1 +Radd,i
for i = 1, 2 where Ri, Rj ≤ A/3
(4.4)
Proof. Firms would deviate from this equilibrium if and only if at least one of them, say
firm 1, has non-binding capacity in the second period. Given Assumption 1, this can
arise due to either the firm investing too much in the capacity in the interim period and
thus generating more capacity addition than it needs, or the firm producing too little in
the first period thus saving the capacity for the second period in order to end up with
the Cournot outcome. Let us analyze these two cases:
i. Let us assume that firm 1 chooses to over-invest in capacity in the interim period
to end up with the non-binding second period capacity constraint and thus pro-
duce the Cournot quantity. Since the capacity addition cost function is strictly
increasing in Radd,1, the firm can decrease the capacity addition, and hence the
cost, until the second period capacity reaches the threshold value of R1 = A/3,
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without changing the second period equilibrium strategy of q∗1,2 = A/3. Once the
second period capacity equalizes to R1, the firm is in Region IV. Note that the
capacity addition decisions in the interim period are being made simultaneously.
Thus, there is no first-mover advantage in the game. If this was the case, the
outcome may have been different than that proposed here.
ii. Let us assume that firm 1 chooses to produce too little –strictly lower than the
Cournot quantity– in the first period to assure non-binding capacity for the second
period, i.e., q1,1 < A/3. This implies that it would not add further capacity in the
interim period since it has already ensured the Cournot outcome for the second
period, i.e., Radd,1 = 0. First of all, one must note that firm 1 will affect firm 2’s
decision at this stage of the game if and only if it has a binding capacity. If its
capacity constraint is not binding, then firm 2’s behavior is left unaltered (firm 2
chooses the optimal quantity given firm 1’s production not the capacity). Hence,
firm 1 could deviate from this strategy by producing one marginal unit more at the
first stage instead of having left over at the third stage. This reallocation continues
until the second period capacity of firm 1 becomes binding, i.e., R1 ≤ R1.
Moreover, the firm would not choose an equilibrium quantity of zero for the second
period, i.e., q∗i,2 = 0, because it would always have the incentive to generate additional
capacity for the second period. 
Given the 2nd period equilibrium provided in Equation (4.4), firm i will subsequently
choose the capacity additions with the following maximization problem:
max
Radd,i
pii,2 = q
∗
i,2 P2(q
∗
i,2, q
∗
j,2)− xi(Radd,i), (4.5)
where q∗i,2 and q
∗
j,2 represent the 2
nd period equilibrium quantities of firms i and j,
respectively. Following the maximization problem in Equation (4.5), the best response
correspondence for the interim period capacity addition decision, γi, for firm i is as
follows:
γi(Radd,j) =
{
0 if Radd,j > A+ 2qi,1 + qj,1 − 2Ri,0 −Rj,0
A+2qi,1+qj,1−2Ri,0−Rj,0−Radd,j
2+2ai
otherwise.
The corresponding possible Nash equilibria, which satisfy γ1(R
∗
add,2) = R
∗
add,1 and
γ2(R
∗
add,1) = R
∗
add,2, for the subgame at the interim period are provided in Table 4.2.
Region A corresponds to the equilibrium in which none of the firms generate additional
capacities for the second period. Regions B and C are the regions in which firm 1 and
Chapter 4. Two-period resource duopoly 56
Region R∗add,1 R
∗
add,2
A 0 0
B
A+2q1,1+q2,1−2R1,0−R2,0
2+2a1
0
C 0
A+2q2,1+q1,1−2R2,0−R1,0
2+2a2
D
A(1+2a2)+(3+4a2)q1,1+2a2q2,1−(4a2+3)R1,0−2a2R2,0
4a1a2+4a1+4a2+3
A(1+2a1)+(3+4a1)q2,1+2a1q1,1−(4a1+3)R2,0−2a1R1,0
4a1a2+4a1+4a2+3
Region Parameter Conditions
A
A+ 2q1,1 + q2,1 < 2R1,0 +R2,0
A+ 2q2,1 + q1,1 < 2R2,0 +R1,0
B
A+ 2q1,1 + q2,1 ≥ 2R1,0 +R2,0
(1 + 2a2)A+ (3 + 4a2)q1,1 + 2a2q2,1 < (3 + 4a2)R1,0 + 2a2R2,0
C
(1 + 2a1)A+ (3 + 4a1)q2,1 + 2a2q1,1 < (3 + 4a1)R2,0 + 2a1R1,0
A+ 2q2,1 + q1,1 ≥ 2R2,0 +R1,0
D
(1 + 2a2)A+ (3 + 4a2)q1,1 + 2a2q2,1 ≥ (3 + 4a2)R1,0 + 2a2R2,0
(1 + 2a1)A+ (3 + 4a1)q2,1 + 2a1q1,1 ≥ (3 + 4a1)R2,0 + 2a1R1,0
Table 4.2: Interim Period Possible Equilibrium Outcomes
firm 2, respectively, choose not to add capacity. Finally, Region D represents the equi-
librium with positive amount of capacity additions for both firms. Given Assumption 1
and Lemma 1, Lemma 2 will rule out the equilibria in regions A, B and C (See Lemma
2).
Lemma 2. Interim period equilibrium capacity addition for each firm, i = 1, 2, is as
follows:
R∗add,i =
A(1 + 2aj) + (3 + 4aj)qi,1 + 2ajqj,1 − (3 + 4aj)Ri,0 − 2ajRj,0
4aiaj + 4ai + 4aj + 3
where (3 + 4aj + 2ai)(Ri,0 − qi,1) + (3 + 4ai + 2aj)(Rj,0 − qj,1) ≤ (2 + 2ai + 2aj)A.
(4.6)
Proof. Given the best response correspondence, we have 4 different equilibria for the
interim period subgame as provided in Table 4.2. The equilibrium can not occur in
Regions A, B and C because:
i. Parameter conditions in Region A together suggest the following:
2A
3
< (R1,0 − q1,2) + (R2,0 − q2,2)
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since the capacity addition for each firm in this region is zero, which, given Lemma
1, follows directly as:
q∗1,2 + q
∗
2,2 >
2A
3
.
This inequilibrium can occur only if at least one of the firms has non-binding
capacity in the second period and produces an amount larger then the Cournot
outcome. This contradicts Assumption 1.
ii. The equilibrium outcomes in Regions B and C suggest that one firm chooses not to
invest in capacity additions in the interim period. Recall that the decisions at this
stage are held simultaneously. Thus, this case can occur only if the firm ensures
the Cournot quantity for the second period. Given Assumption 1, this can arise if
and only if its first period supply is strictly lower than the Cournot quantity. This
case has already been eliminated by Lemma 1.

Using equilibrium outcomes in the 2nd and the interim periods, q∗i,2 and R
∗
add,i defined
by Equations (4.4) and (4.6), the game to a one-period optimization in which firm i only
chooses the 1st period quantity. The maximization problem is defined as follows:
max
qi,1
Πi = pii,1(qi,1, qj,1) + pii,2(q
∗
i,2, q
∗
j,2, xi(R
∗
add,i))
subject to qi,1 + q
∗
i,2 ≤ Ri,0 +R∗add,i,
(4.7)
where pii,1 and Πi are firm i’s first period profit and reduced profit functions, respec-
tively.46 Consequently, given Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, the best response correspondence
for firm i in the 1st period, σi,1 : [0, Rj,0]→ [0, Ri,0], will be as follows:
σi,1 =

β1A−β2qj,1+β3Ri,0+β4Rj,0
β5
if max
{
−β6A+β7qj,1−β8Rj,0
β9
,
β6A−β7qj,1+β8Rj,0
β10
,
β11A−β12qj,1+β13Rj,0
β14
}
≤ Ri,0 ≤ β15A+β16qj,1−β17Rj,0β10
Ri,0 if Ri,0 <
β6A−β7qj,1+β8Rj,0
β10
0 if qj,1 >
β6A+β9Ri,0+β8Rj,0
β7
,
46Please note that discount factor assumed to be unity for simplicity.
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where
β1 = 8a
2
i (1 + aj) + 16ai(1 + aj)
2 + (3 + 4aj)
2
β2 = 24ai(1 + aj)(1 + 2aj) + 16a
2
i (1 + aj)(1 + 2aj) + (3 + 4aj)
2
β3 = 16a
2
i (1 + aj)(1 + 2aj) + (3 + 4aj)
2
β4 = 8(1 + ai)aj(1 + aj)
β5 = 2(1 + ai)(3 + 4aj)(3 + 4aj + 8ai(1 + aj))
β6 = 8a
2
i (1 + aj) + 16ai(1 + aj)
2 + (3 + 4aj)
2
β7 = (3 + 4ai)
2 + 24aj(1 + ai)(1 + 2ai) + 16a
2
j (1 + ai)(1 + 2ai)
β8 = 16aiaj(1 + ai)(1 + 2ai)
β9 = 2ai(8ai(1 + aj)(1 + 2aj) + (3 + 4aj)
2)
β10 = 2ai(3 + 4aj + 4ai(1 + aj))
2
β11 = 3ai(5 + 6ai)− 4aj(1 + ai)(3 + 2ai)− 16a2j (1 + ai)(1 + 2ai)
β12 = 3(ai(3 + 4ai) + 4aj(1 + ai)(3 + 8ai) + 16a
2
j (1 + ai)(1 + 2ai))
β13 = 12aj(1 + aj)(3 + 4aj + ai(7 + 8aj))
β14 = 6ai(3 + 4aj + 4ai(1 + aj))
β15 = 3 + 4aj + 2ai(8 + 10aj + ai(7 + 8aj)))
β16 = 9 + 12aj + 2ai(3 + 2ai)(5 + 6aj)
β17 = (1 + ai)(9 + 12aj4ai(6 + 7aj)).
The quantities (q∗i,1, q
∗
j,1) are the Nash equilibrium of the reduced game if and only if
q∗i,1 ∈ σi,1(q∗j,1) and q∗j,1 ∈ σj,1(q∗i,1). Lemma 3 provides the unique Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilbrium of the reduced game.
Lemma 3. Nash equilibrium of the reduced game for firm i is as follows:
q∗i,1 =
α1A+α2Ri,0+α3Rj,0
α4
for Ri,0 >
α1A+α3Rj,0
α4−α2
where;
α1 = 32a
2
i (1 + aj)(1 + 6aj + 6a
2
j ) + 4ai(1 + aj)(15 + 88aj + 88a
2
j )
+(3 + 4aj)(9 + 50aj + 40a
2
j )
α2 = 4ai(1 + aj)(27 + 60ai + 32a
2
i + 16(1 + ai)(6 + 7ai)aj + 16a
2
j (5 + 11ai + 6a
2
i ))
α3 = −2aj(3 + 4ai + 4aj + 4aiaj)(9 + 8ai + 8aj + 8aiaj)
α4 = 64a
3
i (1 + aj)(1 + 2aj)(5 + 6aj) + 48ai(1 + aj)(9 + 34aj + 28a
2
j )
+32a2i (1 + aj)
(
21 + 8aj(9 + 7aj)
)
+ (3 + 4aj)
(
27 + 4aj(27 + 20aj)
)
.
(4.8)
Proof. The other two possible equilibrium strategies for firm i at this stage are [i] q∗i,1 = 0
and [ii] q∗i,1 = Ri,0. Let us explain why the firm would not choose these two strategies:
i. Let us assume that in the first period the firm chooses to produce 0 and save all of
its initial resource for the second period. Choosing zero production quantity leads
to monopoly prices since the only supplier will be the rival. It is a fact that in the
second period the firm will not be a monopoly because even if the rival supplies all
its initial resource endowment in the first period, it still has an incentive to invest
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in capacity and to generate new capacity for the second period. Thus, the second
period price will be less than the monopoly price. In this case, the firm would
enjoy monopoly prices in the first period by reallocating its capacity such that it
would increase the production in the first period without changing the production
in the second period.
ii. Firm i will choose the first period quantity to be equal to its initial resource
endowment if and only if Ri,0 ≤ α1A+α3Rj,0α4−α2 . Yet, Assumption 1 excludes this.

Following Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, the Nash equilibrium of the reduced game (q∗i,1, q
∗
j,1),
defined by Lemma 3, leads to the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the entire game,
which is defined by Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. The Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the entire game is unique
and defined as follows:
(q∗i,1, R
∗
add,i, q
∗
i,2) =
(
α1A+α2Ri,0+α3Rj,0
α4
,
α5A+α6Ri,0+α7Rj,0
α4
,
α8A+α9Ri,0+α10Rj,0
α4
)
,
where
α1 = 32a
2
i (1 + aj)(1 + 6aj + 6a
2
j ) + 4ai(1 + aj)(15 + 88aj + 88a
2
j )
+(3 + 4aj)(9 + 50aj + 40a
2
j )
α2 = 4ai(1 + aj)(27 + 60ai + 32a
2
i + 16(1 + ai)(6 + 7ai)aj + 16a
2
j (5 + 11ai + 6a
2
i ))
α3 = −2aj(3 + 4ai + 4aj + 4aiaj)(9 + 8ai + 8aj + 8aiaj)
α4 = 64a
3
i (1 + aj)(1 + 2aj)(5 + 6aj) + 48ai(1 + aj)(9 + 34aj + 28a
2
j )
+32a2i (1 + aj)
(
21 + 8aj(9 + 7aj)
)
+ (3 + 4aj)
(
27 + 4aj(27 + 20aj)
)
α5 = 2
[
8a2i (1 + aj)(1 + 4aj)(5 + 6aj) + (1 + aj)(3 + 4aj)(9 + 40aj)
+ai
(
66 + 4aj(107 + 2aj(89 + 44aj))
)]
α6 = −
(
3 + 4aj + 4ai(1 + aj)
)(
27 + 4aj(27 + 20aj) + 4ai(9 + 8a2(4 + 3aj))
)
α7 = −
(
3 + 4aj + 4ai(1 + aj)
)(
4aj(9 + 10aj + 2ai(5 + 6aj))
)
α8 =
(
3 + 4aj + 4ai(1 + aj)
)(
9 + 8aj(6 + 5aj) + 4ai(3 + 2aj(7 + 6aj))
)
α9 =
(
3 + 4aj + 4ai(1 + aj)
)(
4ai
(
9 + 12ai(1 + aj)(1 + 2aj) + 10aj(3 + 2aj)
))
α10 = −(3 + 4aj + ai(1 + aj))(2(3 + 4ai)aj(3 + 4aj))
(4.9)
for
α1A+ α3Rj,0
α4 − α2 < Ri,0 <
(α4 − 3α8)A− 3α10Rj,0
3α9
.
Proof. Nash equilibrium of the reduced game, provided by Lemma 3, corresponds one-
to-one with the SPNE of the entire game. Moreover, the parameter constraints provided
by Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 restrict our attention to only one region, which is
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disjoint to the other excluded regions. Thus, given the interval for the initial resource
endowments of each firm, the SPNE defined by Proposition 1 is unique. 
Note that the equilibrium in Proposition 1 is valid only for the initial resource endow-
ments that lie in the provided interval. With this interval, we restrict our attention to
the equilibrium in which both firms would have positive capacity additions and positive
supplies in both periods. As the upper bound of this range is approached, the second
period reduces to the unconstrained Cournot game in which the equilibrium is achieved
without capacity additions, since the capacity constraints become non-binding.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium price, P ∗t , weakly decreases over time.
Proof. Given the interval for initial resource endowments of each firm, we can verify
for any combination of (ai, aj) that Q
∗
1 ≤ Q∗2, where Q∗t = q∗1,t + q∗2,t. Since the inverse
demand function does not change over time, i.e., Pt = A−Qt, the equilibrium price in
the first period is larger than or equal to the second period price, P ∗1 ≥ P ∗2 . 
Proposition 2 contradicts Hotelling-based reasoning, which states that the scarcity rent
of the exhaustible resources would cause the prices to increase gradually (Hotelling,
1931). Yet, this reasoning is based on the assumption of a fixed amount of initial resource
endowments. Thus, the result proposed by Proposition 2 is due to the endogenous
capacity constraints. This result, in fact, captures the short-term stylized characteristics
of exhaustible resource markets in which price drops are observed from time to time.
For instance, exploration of new oil reserves would lead to declining prices as a result
of supply enhancements. Proposition 2 may not be applicable if this model is extended
to an infinite time horizon since in this case, the capacity addition cost function should
have a different structure, capturing the fact that it gets harder to add capacity as the
cumulative capacity addition increases.
Proposition 3. Given a fixed aggregate initial resource endowment, S0 = Ri,0 +Rj,0:
i. if ai = aj, an increase or decrease in |Ri,0−Rj,0| leads to no change in equilibrium
price.
ii. if ai > aj, the equilibrium price in both periods increases (decreases) as the share
of Rj,0 relative to Ri,0 increases (decreases).
Proof. Let us assume a fixed amount of aggregate initial resource, S0 = Ri,0 + Rj,0.
For ai = aj , total amount of supply in both periods will be a function of only the
aggregate initial resource endowment, i.e., Q∗t (S0). Thus, given a fixed S0, a change in
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|Ri,0 − Rj,0| would not affect the outcome. Yet, when ai 6= aj , we can verify that an
uneven distribution of the fixed aggregate initial resource stock among firms would lead
to a significant change in equilibrium supply. More specifically, we can verify that for
ai > aj , an increase in Rj,0 relative to Ri,0 leads to a decrease in equilibrium supply in
both periods, Q∗1 and Q∗2. 
Proposition 3 suggests that if the firms are symmetric in their cost functions, any asym-
metric distribution in reserves do not affect the equilibrium outcomes. Moreover, if firms
have different cost parameters, ai 6= aj , equilibrium price increases due to a decrease
in equilibrium quantity when the distribution is altered in favor of the more efficient
firm, i.e., the one with lower a. The equilibrium price, on the other hand, would decline
if the asymmetry is in favor of the less efficient firm, i.e., the one with higher a. This
is an expected result since if one firm is more efficient in capacity addition, it would
become more dominant in the second period, leading to a more concentrated market
structure and eventually to an increase in prices. On the other hand, distribution of
initial resource stock in favor of the less efficient firm would offset the advantage of a
more efficient firm leading to a more competitive market structure.
Proposition 4. At equilibrium,
i. if Ri,0 > Rj,0, then, ceteris paribus, q
∗
i,t > q
∗
j,t and R
∗
add,i < R
∗
add,j for i, j ∈ {1, 2},
i 6= j and t ∈ {1, 2}.
ii.
∂q∗i,t
∂Ri,0
> 0,
∂q∗j,t
∂Ri,0
< 0,
∂R∗add,i
∂Ri,0
< 0 and
∂R∗add,j
∂Ri,0
> 0 for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j and
t ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the first derivatives of the corresponding continu-
ous functions, i.e. q∗(.) and R∗add(.), with respect to the initial resource endowments. 
Proposition 4 implies, not surprisingly, that the firm with a greater initial resource
endowment would supply more in both periods and generate smaller additional capac-
ity, all else being equal. Moreover, initial resource endowment of a firm has a positive
effect on its supplies and a negative effect on the supplies of rival firm in both periods.
Finally, initial endowment has negative and positive effects on the capacity additions of
the firm itself and its rival, respectively.
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Proposition 5. At equilibrium,
i. if ai < aj then, ceteris paribus, q
∗
i,t > q
∗
j,t and R
∗
add,i > R
∗
add,jfor i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j
and t ∈ {1, 2}.
ii.
∂q∗i,t
∂ai
< 0,
∂q∗j,t
∂ai
> 0,
∂R∗add,i
∂ai
< 0 and
∂R∗add,j
∂ai
> 0 for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j and
t ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the first derivatives of the corresponding contin-
uous functions, i.e., q∗(.) and R∗add(.), with respect to the cost parameters. 
Proposition 5 implies that the firm with higher efficiency, or lower cost parameter, will
supply more output in both periods and generate larger capacity addition. Moreover,
ai has negative effects on both supply and investment decisions of firm i and positive
effects on those of firm j.
4.4 Oil Market Interpretation: Oil Field Service (OFS)
Companies
One of the most important resource markets is, without a doubt, the oil market. The
model presented in Section 4.2 would, therefore, be applicable to this specific market.
The initial resource stock of the firms and the investment in capacity additions could refer
to the initial recoverable reserves and the reserve growth investments in the oil market,
respectively. As is commonly known, the upstream petroleum industry represents a
highly concentrated market structure. For instance, in 2004, 81% of the world’s proved
reserves was controlled by the major National Oil Companies (NOCs) including Saudi
Aramco, National Iranian Oil Company, Iraq National Oil Company, Kuwait Petroleum
Corporation, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, PDVSA (National Oil Company of
Venezeula) and National Oil Company of Libya (PWC, 2005). Moreover, according to
the US Energy Information Administration, in 2011, NOCs accounted for around 55%
of global oil supply, while major International Oil Companies (IOCs) were responsible
for 27% (EIA, 2013). Thus, it is a reasonable simplification to assume that the current
upstream oil industry is dominated by two blocks of companies, i.e., IOCs and NOCs.
Over the last few years, high oil prices, fluctuating around 100$/bbl (well above the
maximum marginal costs for producing a barrel of conventional (around 60$) and of
unconventional (around 80$) crude oil), have encouraged upstream petroleum companies
to increase production. However, in addition to other factors, substantial risks and costs
Chapter 4. Two-period resource duopoly 63
associated with upstream activities, especially exploration and development operations,
remain as the main obstacles facing supply enhancements. The excessive profits that
the IOCs can extract create an incentive to face these risks and costs; yet NOCs would
not be able to invest further in these activities as they may not have the required know-
how or may be required to consider other factors, such as maximizing social welfare in
the host country. In this respect, Oil Field Service (OFS, hereafter) companies, which
specialize in development activities, emerge as business partners for NOCs.
Increasing recoverability of the reserves is one of the main objectives of development
activities in the upstream petroleum industry. Reserve growth technologies, such as
enhanced or improved oil recovery techniques, would lead to enhancement in supply
via increasing the recoverability ratios of the reserves. Therefore, investment in such
technologies is of great importance for upstream petroleum companies as well as for the
future market structure of the petroleum industry.
In the general model presented in Section 4.2, we suggest that both firms can generate
additional capacity for the second period. The reality, however, may differ. In fact, as
previously mentioned, we implicitly assume that one of the firms, i.e., NOC, may not
have the necessary know-how or funding opportunity to invest further into increasing
the recoverable reserve and instead employs an OFS company, which is specialized in
reserve growth technologies. Now let us assume that there are no OFS companies ex-
isting in the upstream oil market and that the NOC, which is represented by firm 2, is
not capable of capacity investment. This means that for the NOC, the cost parameter
is infinitely large and they can not generate additional capacity for the second period.
We call this new case “no-OFS”.
Proposition 6. The Nash equilibrium for the no-OFS case is as follows:
(q∗1,1, R
∗
add,1, q
∗
1,2)noOFS =
(
(5+6a1)A+2a1(5+6a1)R1,0−(2+2a1)R2,0
2(1+a1)(5+6a1)
,
2A−R2,0−2R1,0
2(1+2a1)
,
(5+6a1)A+2a1(5+6a1)R1,0−(3+4a1)R2,0
2(1+a1)(5+6a1)
)
(q∗2,1, R
∗
add,2, q
∗
2,2)noOFS =
(
(2+3a1)R2,0
5+6a1
, 0,
(3+3a1)R2,0
5+6a1
)
.
(4.10)
Proof. The proof follows directly from the fact that as the cost parameter for the NOC,
a2, approaches infinity, the Nash equilibrium given in Equation (4.9) will approach the
one represented in Equation (4.10):
lim
a2→∞
(q∗i,1, R
∗
add,i, q
∗
i,2)General → (q∗i,1, R∗add,i, q∗i,2)noOFS .
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Note that given the cost function in Equation (4.2), Radd,i = (
xi
ai
)1/2 (which satisfies
Inada conditions) we make sure that as a2 approaches infinity, Radd,2 approaches zero
and not a negative value, i.e., lima2→+∞Radd,2 = 0 
In order to investigate the effects of OFS companies on the market dynamics, we compare
the Nash equilibria of both the General and no-OFS cases, represented by Equations
(4.9) and (4.10), respectively. Let us assume that in the General case each firm has
exactly the same capacity addition cost structure, i.e., a1 = a2 = a. In the no-OFS case,
the cost parameter of firm 1, a1, stays at the same level, while the cost parameter of
firm 2, a2, approaches infinity.
Proposition 7. The effect of OFS companies on equilibrium supply and capacity addi-
tions for a1 = a and a2 →∞:
i. The quantity supplied by the capable firm, firm 1 (IOC) in our setup, is greater at
each instant of time in the no-OFS case:
q1,1,General ≤ q1,1,noOFS and q1,2,General ≤ q1,2,noOFS.
ii. The quantity supplied by the incapable firm, firm 2 (NOC) in our setup, is lower
at each instant of time in the no-OFS case:
q2,1,General ≥ q2,1,noOFS and q2,2,General ≥ q2,2,noOFS.
iii. Total quantity supplied to the market is greater at each instant of time in the
General Case:
Qt,General ≥ Qt,noOFS where Qt = q1,t + q2,t and t = 1, 2.
iv. Total capacity addition in the General case is greater:
Radd,total,General ≥ Radd,total,noOFS where Radd,total = Radd,1 +Radd,2.
v. The additional capacity generated by the capable firm is greater in the no-OFS
case:
Radd,1,General ≤ Radd,1,noOFS.
Proof. The proofs for [i.], [ii.], [iii.], [iv.] and [v.] follow directly from Proposition 1 and
Proposition 6. 
Proposition 7 implies that the existence of OFS companies leads to a more competitive
market structure in the upstream oil industry. The market would move to a more con-
centrated structure if we only allow for one firm to invest in reserve growth technologies
or, in other words, if there were no OFS companies in the market, because the capable
firm would supply more and increase its supply periodically. Existence of OFS firms,
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moreover, has a significant effect on reserve growth investments and, thus, equilibrium
capacity additions. As expected, due to the rivalry between firms, total additional ca-
pacity generated in the General case is greater than that in no-OFS case. Yet, the
additional capacity generated by the capable firm is greater in the no-OFS case. This
result emerges possibly due to the fact that in the no-OFS case, capable firm would
enjoy higher profits in the 2nd period by increasing its capacity even more.
4.5 Welfare Analysis
In the previous sections, we derived the Nash equilibrium for the General case
(Section 4.3) and the no-OFS case (Section 4.4). In this section, we conduct a wel-
fare analysis. At equilibrium, the consumer surplus (CS) is defined as follows:
CS∗ =
1
2
[
(Q∗1)
2 + (Q∗2)
2
]
,
where Q∗1 and Q∗2 are the equilibrium aggregate supplies in periods 1 and 2, respectively.
Proposition 8. In both the General and the no-OFS cases, an increase in the initial
resource endowment for at least one of the firms leads to a weak increase in consumer
surplus.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the first derivatives of the equilibrium outcomes
with respect to Ri,0 for i ∈ 1, 2. 
Proposition 8 suggests, not surprisingly, that consumers would benefit from an increase
in the availability of the exhaustible resource. This result is in accordance with the
previous findings in the literature, such as Gaudet and Long (1994), and with the stylized
characteristics of exhaustible resource markets.
Proposition 9. Given fixed aggregate initial resource endowment, S0 = Ri,0 +Rj,0,
1. in the General Case,
i. if ai = aj, an increase or decrease in |Ri,0 − Rj,0| leads to no change in
consumer surplus.
ii. if ai > aj, the consumer surplus increases (decreases) as the share of Rj,0
relative to Ri,0 decreases (increases).
2. in the no-OFS Case,
for any a1, the consumer surplus increases (decreases) as the share of R1,0 relative
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to R2,0 decreases (increases) or as the share of R2,0 relative to R1,0 increases
(decreases).
Proof. The proof follows directly using the same reasoning provided in the proof of
Proposition 3. 
Proposition 9 implies, in line with Proposition 3, that if one firm is slightly more efficient
than the other, consumer welfare tends to change with the asymmetric distribution of
initial resource endowment. Consumer welfare decreases if the asymmetry is in favor of
the more efficient firm. On the other hand, if the initial resource distribution is in favor
of the less efficient firm, the consumer welfare increases.
The total welfare function in our setting can be defined as follows:
W = TS1 + TS2 −X = A
(
Q∗1 +Q
∗
2
)− 1
2
[
(Q∗1)
2 + (Q∗2)
2
]− (a1R2add,1 + a2R2add,2),
where TS1 and TS2 are total surpluses in periods 1 and 2, respectively, and X is the
aggregate amount of capacity addition costs. The first-best decisions made on total
quantity and capacity addition, which maximize total welfare, are as follows:
Q1,FB = Q2,FB =
A(a1+a2)+2a1a2(R1,0+R2,0)
a1+a2+4a1a2
Radd,FB =
(a1+a2)(A−R1,0−R2,0)
a1+a2+4a1a2
.
(4.11)
Proposition 10. The equilibria in the General case defined by Proposition 1, in the
no-OFS case by Proposition 6 and first-best case by Equation 4.11 reveal the following:
i. WFB > WGeneral > WnoOFS,
ii. Qt,FB > Qt,General > Qt,noOFS for t ∈ {1, 2},
iii. Radd,FB > Radd,General > Radd,noOFS.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the equilibria defined by equations (4.9), (4.10)
and (4.11). 
According to Proposition 10, the total welfare and all three decision variables are the
largest in the first-best calculation and smallest in the no-OFS case. We confirm, in line
with Proposition 7, that the General case, in which both firms are capable of capacity
addition is superior to the no-OFS case.
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4.6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the strategic firm behavior within the context of a two-period re-
source duopoly model in which firms face endogenous intertemporal capacity constraints.
We find that the equilibrium price weakly decreases over the two periods. This result cap-
tures the short-term stylized characteristics of exhaustible resources markets, in which
price drops are occasionally observed. For instance, exploration of new oil reserves may
lead to declining prices as a result of supply enhancements. Moreover, we show that
asymmetric distribution of initial resource stocks leads to a significant change in equi-
librium outcome, provided that firms do not have the same cost structure in capacity
additions. It is also verified that if only one company is capable of investment in capacity,
the market moves to a more concentrated structure in the second period.
We also conduct an oil market interpretation of the general model. For this purpose, we
assume that the NOC does not have the necessary know-how or funding opportunities
for reserve growth investments. Yet, it can employ an OFS company to compete with
the IOC in capacity addition. We find that under the absence of OFS companies, only
one firm is capable of increasing the capacity for the second period, thus moving the
market towards a more concentrated structure. Therefore, the OFS companies carry
significant importance in the upstream petroleum industry. Although the integrated
structure of the companies, mostly IOCs, increases the profitability, the increasing role
of small independent firms that are specialized only in exploration and production is
sustainable only if these small firms are supported by OFS companies in development
activities. Hence, promoting specialization in these activities, especially reserve growth
technologies, would not only serve as a useful tool to increase the competition but also
lead to more recoverable resources.
A possible extension of the model could be the introduction of stochasticity in capacity
generation such that the capacity additions would be a result of R&D activity held
at a prior stage of the game. Another extension would be to analyze the first-mover
advantages in the game. However, these extensions could only be made if one could find
a model specification that is sufficiently general but also analytically tractable.
Chapter 5
The effects of the CFTC’s
regulatory announcements on US
oil- and gas-related stocks during
the 2008 Credit Crunch
5.1 Introduction
The surge in crude oil prices during the commodity boom of the 2000s raised concerns of
possible speculation and manipulation in oil markets. Although the prices have declined
after a trend reversal that occurred due to the credit crunch in 2008, the issue has
remained a priority among policy makers and regulatory authorities. The common view
was that the price boom in crude oil markets was not driven by economic and physical
market fundamentals but rather by speculation. However, mainstream energy economics
literature has recently provided evidence that speculation and market manipulation were
not responsible for the 2008 price spikes and that economic fundamentals were the major
cause.47 Nevertheless, the increasing volume of non-commercial trading in the crude
oil futures market stimulated the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC,
hereafter) to take action against possible market manipulation in commodity futures
markets (Masters (2008)).
The CFTC is the main regulatory authority in commodity futures markets. It has closely
monitored the crude oil futures market, one of the most liquid commodity markets in
47Seminal works in this stream of literature are as follows: Sanders et al. (2004); Hamilton (2009a,b);
Kilian (2009); Bu¨yu¨ksahin and Harris (2011); Kilian and Murphy (2012); Fattouh et al. (2013); Alquist
and Gervais (2013); Elder et al. (2013); Kilian and Hicks (2013).
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the USA, since the surge in oil prices in the early 2000s, which was followed by record
levels in summer 2008. Regulation, in order to avoid speculation in futures markets,
can in general affect the commodity markets through two channels. Firstly, speculators
might benefit from rising or declining prices depending on their positions, i.e., long or
short respectively. Thus, any deviation of the futures price of the commodity from its
fundamental value needs to be corrected by the regulatory authorities. Yet, this was not
the case for the oil market during the 2008 financial crisis because, as already mentioned,
the recent energy economics literature provided evidence against the role of speculation
in driving the oil prices. Secondly, during periods of high uncertainty, regulation is meant
to decrease the riskiness of the commodity markets through suppressing the volatility.
Although there exists little evidence in the literature that speculation was responsible
for the increases in oil price volatility, as correctly noted by Fattouh et al. (2013), the
aim of regulatory efforts in oil markets has so far been to reduce volatility. Thus, during
the credit crunch period, this second channel might explain how the CFTC interventions
affected the oil market.
Moreover, there has been an extensive literature on the relationship between the oil price
and the stock market activity since Hamilton (1983) showed that crude oil price shocks
affect macroeconomic indicators and company stock prices by influencing companies’
operational costs and hence their income.48 This consequently affects the firms’ stock
returns. Several papers confirm the significant impact of oil price changes on aggregate
stock markets. For example, Jones and Kaul (1996) show the sensitivity of the aggregate
stock markets of several countries (USA, Canada, Japan and the UK) to oil price shocks.
Huang et al. (2005) show that stock market returns in the US, Canada and Japan can be
affected by oil price changes and volatility. Aside from aggregate stock market returns,
the relationship between the oil price and the stock price of individual firms and sectors
has been analyzed in previous studies. For our research, the effect of oil price changes on
companies from the energy sector is of particular importance. Al-Mudhaf and Goodwin
(1993) show that oil price shocks can affect the returns of NYSE-listed oil companies. Faff
and Brailsford (1999) analyze Australian oil and gas companies and find a significant
degree of oil price sensitivity for these firms. Sadorsky (2001) and Boyer and Filion
(2007) show a positive sensitivity of Canadian oil and gas companies’ stock returns to
oil prices. Hence, we observe that changes in the oil price and its volatility can affect
the stock returns of oil and gas-related firms as well as the aggregate stock markets.
Therefore, in the event that CFTC announcements are found to affect the crude oil
markets, there should also be a relationship between these announcements and the oil
and gas companies’ stock returns.
48Refer to Section 2.2 for a comprehensive literature review on the relationship between the oil prices
and stock market activity.
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This paper investigates the effects of CFTC announcements, which are released in order
to prevent manipulation and excess speculation in energy markets (particularly oil and
gas), on oil and gas related stocks listed in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE,
hereafter) around the credit crunch period surrounding the financial crisis of 2008. Given
the relationship between the oil prices and the stock market activity, the theoretical
linkage between CFTC announcements and oil related stocks should be through the
crude oil prices. The announcements may serve as a signal for the CFTC’s willingness
to reduce speculation in the commodity markets. If, for example, the CFTC were
to announce substantial fines against speculation and manipulation in the oil futures
market, potential manipulators might be prevented from engaging in these activities.
Well functioning regulatory interventions can decrease the volatility of oil prices and
hence make the oil market less risky. Given that the stock market activity is generally
driven by the expectations and perceptions of traders, decreasing riskiness would lead
to increasing investments in oil related financial stocks. Hence, we suggest that the
CFTC’s regulatory announcements have a direct effect on the stock prices of firms from
the oil and gas sector.
Furthermore, we focus our analysis on the credit crunch period surrounding the finan-
cial crisis of 2008. We expect the CFTC’s regulatory interventions to have a stronger
impact during this time of high manipulation, as their regulatory measures might be
more appreciated during this period. Investors of oil and gas firms should advocate the
implementation of tighter regulation and higher sanctions against manipulators given
rumors about severe market manipulation in the oil and gas sector.
Hence, two questions, which are of significant importance, arise: (1) Do the CFTC
announcements affect the stock returns at all? (2) If so, is the sign of the effect system-
atically the same during the financial crisis of 2008? In order to address these questions
we employ event study methodology and analyze the effects of CFTC announcements
on daily returns of oil related stocks listed in the NYSE for the period between 2007
and 2009. We identify 35 CFTC announcements related to energy futures commodities,
specifically oil and gas.49 The companies whose stocks are analyzed are chosen from the
following indices: Dow Jones US Oil & Gas Index, PHLX Oil Service Sector Index, SIG
Oil Exploration & Production Index, NYSE ARCA Oil Index, NYSE ARCA Natural
Gas Index S&P Global Oil Index and NYSE Energy Index. We employ the methodology
both on individual companies and overall industry, which is compiled as the weighted
average of all companies included in the analysis, as well as on the aforementioned
indices.
49The announcements are collected from CFTC’s official website by searching keywords including:
“oil”, “gas”, “WTI” and “energy”. All announcements are provided in Table B.1. Please see section
5.2.2 for more detailed explanation of the announcements.
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Regarding the effects of sector-specific announcements and the consequences for the
oil sector, a vast amount of literature investigates the effects of OPEC meetings on
oil markets since Draper (1984).50 For instance, recently, Lin and Tamvakis (2010)
examine three types of decisions made by OPEC (quota cut, quota increase and quota
unchanged) and find the decision ‘quota cut” to stimulate significant feedback via the
increase in prices of different grades of petroleum. They also distinguish between price
regimes as they suggest the effects may differ for different price ranges. Demirer and
Kutan (2010) examine the informational efficiency of crude oil spot and futures markets
with respect to OPEC conference and U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve announcements.
They find asymmetry in the response of oil prices to the OPEC announcements. They
also conclude that Strategic Petroleum Reserve announcements have short-term effects.
Moreover, Guidi et al. (2006) find significant responses of the US and the UK stock
markets to the outcomes of OPEC meetings for the period between 1986 and 2004. This
result is of higher importance for our analysis as it takes the stock market responses to
sectoral announcements into account.
The current paper contributes to the literature in two regards. Firstly, to the authors’
best knowledge, we are not aware of any study investigating the effects of CFTC an-
nouncements on oil and gas related stocks. For oil companies, understanding of their
reaction towards CFTC announcements may provide valuable knowledge regarding their
stock price exposure. This is particularly relevant in times of high volatility in the oil
market, since the announcements may be published more frequently and may contain
more drastic punishments or significant regulatory amendments, which in turn may
strongly affect the firms’ stock prices. As discussed above, several arguments can be
found that these announcements affect stock prices positively, but also negative reac-
tions can be explained. Our paper is the first to address the question how investors of
oil and gas related stocks perceive the CFTC announcements with respect to the oil and
gas firms’ stock prices in reality. Secondly, although there exists extensive literature on
whether speculation is a driving force in the oil market, the impacts of regulatory efforts
have not yet been investigated entirely. Given that a huge amount of speculation is as-
sumed to have occurred during the rise in oil prices prior to the financial crisis of 2008,
the period around the crisis provides an interesting opportunity to assess the CFTC’s
regulatory influence. We, therefore, contribute to the existing literature by employing
event study analysis on a firm-level database with a unique set of announcements to
explain the effects of regulatory efforts by the CFTC on the oil market and thus oil
related stocks.
Our results indicate that, depending on the content and the importance, the CFTC
announcements can affect the oil and gas companies’ stock prices. This holds particularly
50See, for example, Deaves and Krinsky (1992), Horan et al. (2004), Wirl and Kujundzic (2004).
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true for announcements during the peak of the financial crisis, i.e., period following
Lehman Brothers failure, hence indicating a strong regulatory influence in times of high
speculation, market manipulation and market turmoil, which cause higher volatility in oil
prices. Although the firms’ stock prices are affected positively for most events during this
period, we cannot identify a clear pattern with respect to the direction of the effect, as the
positive effects alternate with two negative effects in our analyses. Unfortunately, a basic
weakness of the event study methodology is that results may be driven by confounding
events. When analyzing possible confounding events, we find convincing explanations
that the two negative stock price reactions may have been driven by alternative events
that occurred within the same event window and potentially dominating the effect of
the CFTC announcements.51 With respect to the different types of companies operating
in different branches of the industry (e.g., upstream, downstream), we could not find
any statistical differences in responses to the CFTC announcements. This shows that
traders in general perceive the CTFC’s interventions same (either positive or negative)
for all companies regardless of their sub-branch. Furthermore, given their economic
importance, we closely examine the stock price movements of the 5 biggest oil and gas
companies, finding significant stock market reactions and high co-movements around the
time of the announcements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 5.2 describes the methodology
and the data used in detail. Section 5.3 provides the major results. Finally, Section 5.4
concludes.
5.2 Data and Methodology
5.2.1 Data
We use publicly available daily stock price returns for all companies included in the
following indices: Dow Jones US Oil & Gas Index, PHLX Oil Service Sector Index, SIG
Oil Exploration & Production Index, NYSE ARCA Oil Index, NYSE ARCA Natural
Gas Index S&P Global Oil Index and NYSE Energy Index. Our observation period
covers the years 2007–2009, i.e., the announcements during the year of the financial
crisis in 2008 and the years directly preceding and following it. We exclude firms if
the stock prices are not available on the date of the announcements, the event window
and the estimation period. The stock prices are adjusted for stock splits. Our analysis
includes 122 firms and 35 announcements.
51Clearly, we can never exclude the possibility that the positive effects are also caused by confounding
events. Yet, we could not find suitable candidates that would lead to positive effects for most of the
announcements.
Chapter 5. The effects of the CFTC’s announcements on US oil and gas stocks 73
5.2.2 CFTC Announcements
The announcements are collected from CFTC’s official website by searching keywords
including: “oil”, “gas”, “WTI” and “energy”. All announcements are listed in Table
B.1 of the Appendix. The CFTC announcements are not standardized, thus our anal-
ysis contains a set of heterogeneous events. Most announcements contain fines against
manipulation in the energy sector, while others contain announcements on the CFTC’s
staff. The announcements also differ regarding their relevance for the stock prices of oil
and gas related firms in our analysis. While the announcement of a major fine should
significantly affect the energy firms, pure information on the CFTC’s staff should have a
negligible effect. However, judging their importance ex ante and deleting announcements
that we consider unimportant might bias our results, as this decision would represent our
subjective opinion, while investors could still perceive these announcements as impor-
tant. Hence, we include all announcements in our analysis, irrespective of our opinion
on their importance, and discuss potentially unimportant events in more detail while
interpreting our results.
Initially, our search yielded 40 announcements, but some of them occurred in quick
succession and hence led to a problem of confounding events.52 As a result, we deleted
5 events that occurred on the same date as another event or within two days before or
after the event. We kept the announcement that we regarded to be of greater importance
when two announcements overlapped. Moreover, confounding events might explain an
unexpected stock price reaction during some events. In case a CFTC announcement does
not contain relevant information, but still triggers significant abnormal stock market
returns (or a reaction in another direction as expected), the reaction might rather be
driven by other events that occurred on the same date, e.g., news related specific to
the oil market. Hence, these events and not the CFTC announcements might cause the
abnormal returns in this case. Thus, we carefully check the event windows in our analysis
for confounding, oil markets related news that might affect the oil firms’ stock market
response instead or in addition to the CFTC announcements. This is, in particular, of
high importance in case the CFTC announcements contain relatively unimportant news
that should not trigger abnormal returns, but the firms still react significantly. When
analyzing the results, we carefully examine if our results are driven by confounding
events and mention this if necessary.
52Please refer to McWilliams and Siegel (1997) for the problem of confounding events in event study
methodologies. They suggest that the effects of two events are hard to differentiate if they take place
on the same date or follow each other within a short period of time.
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5.2.3 Methodology
For our analysis, we use event study methodology following, e.g., Brown and Warner
(1980, 1985). In order to examine the impact of the CFTC announcements on the firms,
we consider the firms’ cumulated abnormal return (AR), i.e., the firms’ ex post stock
return minus the firms’ normal return during the event window. The event window is
defined as the time period several days after the respective CFTC announcement (the
event) in order to fully incorporate all relevant information associated with the event and
several days prior to the event to account for the possibility that some information leaks
out prior to the announcement. However, the use of long event windows can violate the
assumption of market efficiency (McWilliams and Siegel (1997)). Hence, we use event
windows of 2 days before (τ− = 2) and 2 days after (τ+ = 2) the CFTC announcement
for our analysis.53 The company’s normal returns are estimated based on the individual
stocks’ betas (β’s), estimated by a market model (Brown and Warner (1980)) using
a period from 280 to 30 trading days (250 trading days) before the event (estimation
window). We use the S&P 500 index for our calculation as market beta, given that we
analyze companies listed in the US. Finally, we calculate the firms’ abnormal returns
by subtracting the normal return for each firm from its actual stock return during the
event window. Hence, we estimate the following model:
ri = α+ βi · rS&P + εi (5.1)
where rS&P is the daily return on the S&P 500, ri is the daily stock return for each
company and βi is the firm’s beta coefficient. Next, for each CFTC announcement
we calculate the abnormal return for each company (i.e., the difference between the
predicted stock return based on our estimation and the actual stock return during the
event window). Thus, the following model is estimated:
ARi =
(
ri − (α+ βi · rS&P )
)
(5.2)
53Given that our events are heterogeneous, they may require different event windows to incorporate
all relevant information. Thus, the duration of our event window is crucial for our analysis as different
event windows may include different information and thus lead to different stock price reactions. Hence,
we use different event windows for robustness in our analysis. The results can be seen in Table B.4.
It can be seen that the results are comparable and similar. In particular, the stock price reactions are
strongly pronounced during the financial crisis and less pronounced after and before the crisis. Given
that all event windows provide highly similar results, we restrict our analysis to the standard event
window, i.e., 2 days before (τ− = 2) and 2 days after (τ+ = 2) the CFTC announcement.
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Finally, we calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) by summing up the firm’s
abnormal returns over the event window for each firm individually,
CARi =
+2∑
t=−2
ARit (5.3)
Moreover, we test whether the announcements significantly affect the individual compa-
nies’ stock returns and the overall sector’s stock returns by determining the significance
of their stock price impact. In doing so, we examine the significance of the individual
firms’ CARs and the overall industry’s CAR, i.e., the mean of the CAR of all firms in
our sample for a given event. Following Angbazo and Narayanan (1996), the sample
mean of the abnormal return for an event on a given event day t is calculated by:
ARt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ARit (5.4)
Its significance can be tested by the following statistic:
ARt
Sˆ(ARt)
(5.5)
with Sˆ(ARt) equal to the estimation of the standard deviation of ARt calculated during
the estimation window (trading days ranging from 280 to 30 days prior to the event) as
follows:
Sˆ(ARt) =
√√√√ 1
250
−30∑
t=−280
(ARt −AR)2 (5.6)
where AR = 1250
∑−30
t=−280(ARt). We test the significance of ARt using a student’s
t-distribution, assuming independent and identical distributions.
The significance of the average CAR across all companies over the event window is tested
by examining the significance of
CAR =
+2∑
t=−2
ARt (5.7)
The test statistic for the overall CAR is given by∑τ+
t=τ− [ARt/(τ+ − τ− + 1)]∑τ+
t=τ− [σ
[
ARt/(τ+ − τ− + 1)]
] = ∑τ+t=τ− ARt√
τ+ − τ− + 1 =
∑+2
t=−2ARt√
5
(5.8)
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distributed as standard normal under the null hypothesis of CAR = 0. Thus, we are able
to examine whether CFTC announcements have significant overall CARs, indicating a
significant effect on the overall industry.54
After analyzing the consequences of the announcements for the overall oil and gas in-
dustry and the individual indices, we extend our analysis by focusing on the impact of
CFTC announcements on the 5 biggest companies in our sample: BP, Chevron, Exxon,
Shell and Total. Given the size of these companies and their importance for the global
economy, a closer examination of these companies will yield valuable information for
shareholders, regulators and executives. Thus, we follow the approach described above
and examine the consequences of the CFTC’s announcements on these 5 firms individ-
ually. Moreover, we create an index containing only these 5 firms (Major 5 index) and
analyze its stock price reaction to the announcements.
Additionally, we analyze whether the firms’ stock price reactions depend on their geo-
graphic location and therefore test to see whether the effects of the CFTC’s announce-
ments are more pronounced for firms that are based in the US and Canada (North
America) than for firms that are located in other countries (Non-North American).
This will provide evidence on the CFTC’s ability to reach firms that are not located
in North America but are listed on a US stock index. Moreover, we examine whether
companies from different business segments react differently to the CFTC’s announce-
ments. We subdivide the firms with respect to their business model into three sub-
categories: Upstream, Mid & Downstream and Oil field service.55 Given the differences
across business models (e.g., upstream–related firms should benefit from rising oil prices
while downstream–related firms should suffer), an examination of the reaction to CFTC
announcements may provide valuable findings for regulators and shareholders. How-
ever, as stated above, the CFTC’s regulatory efforts would cause an overall increase in
stock market activity due to decrease in riskiness of oil market investments by deterring
speculative efforts. Hence, the stock price reactions of the firms from the different sub-
categories may also follow the overall market trend and may therefore be similar for all
types of firms in the oil and gas sector.
54We did not adjust our analysis as described in Boehmer et al. (1991), who suggest using the cross-
sectional variance for testing procedures. Since some of our indices contain a small amount of firms, this
would lead to biased cross-sectional variances.
55As most companies in the US are engaged in both midstream and downstream activities, we combine
these two segments of the sector.
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5.3 Results
As previously mentioned, we use stock price data of 122 companies listed in the NYSE
and quoted by seven different indices, i.e., Dow Jones US Oil & Gas Index, PHLX
Oil Service Sector Index, SIG Oil Exploration & Production Index, NYSE ARCA Oil
Index, NYSE ARCA Natural Gas Index S&P Global Oil Index and NYSE Energy Index.
Out of these seven indices, the most comprehensives are NYSE Energy Index with 113
companies and S&P Global Oil Index with 62 companies.
The results of our event study for the overall oil and gas industry and the individual
indices are summarized in Table B.2. The overall industry (the weighted average of all
122 companies quoted by those 7 different indices) responded significantly to 16 out of 35
events. Thus, it can be seen that CFTC announcements can in general affect the stock
returns of oil and gas companies, depending on their content. However, as mentioned
above, some of the announcements do not have important consequences or contain rele-
vant information for the stock markets and thus should not affect the companies’ stock
prices.56 Regarding our research questions, we find that most of the announcements,
specifically just around the credit crunch period, affect the stock returns of oil and gas
companies significantly, indicating a strong regulatory influence of the CFTC in times of
high speculation, market manipulation and market turmoil, which cause higher volatility
in oil prices. However, our results do not indicate a clear pattern regarding the direc-
tion of the firms’ stock price reaction. Given the sample of heterogeneous events in our
analysis, this finding is not surprising as the announcements strongly differ with respect
to their content and importance. Nevertheless, our results show that during the peak of
the financial crisis, e.g., after the Lehman Brothers failure, the CFTC announcements
mostly trigger significantly positive stock market responses, hence indicating that the
CFTC could indeed fulfill its duty in times of market turmoil, as the investors perceived
their interventions positively. However, some of the announcements negatively affected
the oil and gas firms’ stock prices, hence casting doubt on the overall positive effect of
the CFTC’s regulatory efforts. We will discuss selected events that triggered negative
stock reactions in the oil and gas sector in order to evaluate this finding.
Of all the events, the most significant responses of the companies, of the overall industry
returns and of the indices are to announcements number 10 (46 companies responded
significantly), number 15 (42 companies responded significantly) and number 21 (50
companies responded significantly). The largest CARs occurred during these events.
Hence, we examine these events and the sector’s reaction in more detail.
56For example, event number 26 is simply the information that the CFTC will publish a new monthly
report. An announcement like this should not affect the sector significantly. Our results show that in
this case, the CAR is very close to zero and insignificant. However, we also included these types of
announcements in our analysis for the sake of completeness.
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Event number 10 contains the information that a broker has been fined $10 million
by the CFTC due to manipulation of the natural gas market. The overall sector’s
CAR amounted to –5.66% (significant at the 1%-level), and almost all other indices
responded negatively as well. A possible explanation for this finding is that the sector
interpreted the CFTC’s announcement as a warning signal and proof of its willingness
to enforce severe sanctions in times of high (suspected) manipulation, but the majority
of the firms might have considered the potential of benefiting from rising oil prices
higher than the positive aspects of stable (less volatile) oil markets, even though the
price increase might have been driven by speculation and manipulation.57 In times of
lower (assumed) manipulation, these types of announcements have fewer consequences,
as seen for example in the weaker reactions towards announcements 30 and 35. Hence,
our results indicate that severe punishments are perceived as signals against market
manipulation in times of high (assumed) speculation, but lose their deterrent effect if
speculation is not present in the energy sector at a given time.
Announcements number 15 and 2158 both include the information that the sector will
be subject to tighter regulation. The (significant) CARs amount to 5.52% and 10.01%,
respectively. Both events took place closely around the peak of the financial crisis in
2008 and thus during a period of high (assumed) market manipulation. Again, this
indicates that the CFTC’s regulatory interventions have a strong positive impact during
times of high manipulation, proving their regulatory efficiency. Regarding the results,
the firms appear to appreciate the implementation of tighter regulation given rumors
about severe market manipulation in the oil and gas sector.
To further analyze the effects of the announcements, we plot the CARs for the overall
index and the two biggest indices (NYSE Energy Index and S&P Global Oil Index).
Figure 5.1 shows the curves during our observation period in chronological order. It
can be seen that these curves tend to move together, even though they do not comprise
identical companies. More importantly, one can see that the CARs (and thus the firm’s
reaction to the CFTC’s announcements) are more pronounced around the financial crisis
57This explanation would be consistent with the negative, yet insignificant stock market reaction for
event number 1, while the announcements of fines after the period of high-assumed speculation and
manipulation (announcements 35 and 30) affect the stock prices positively. For instance, the sanctions
against BP (announcement 7) triggered positive responses prior to the peak of the crisis, potentially
owing to the large size of the fine (US$ 303).
58The effect of the announcement number 21 appeared to be relatively strong, as the announcement
contained only the information that the CFTC is seeking for public support to expand its regulatory
activities. In general, related literature indicates that these types of meetings can strongly affect the
stock markets in case they contain relevant information on future regulatory activities, but might also be
likely to just contain information of minor importance. To ensure that the stock response in our analysis
is driven by the meeting and not by confounding events, we searched for oil and gas related events or
news around the announcement day. We did not find major events or relevant news at the event date
and the days surrounding the event day, hence finding evidence that the stock markets responses in our
analysis are indeed driven by CFTC announcement number 21.
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(and thus during times of high speculation). In particular, one can see strong positive
reactions in particular between June 2008 and February 2009. Prior to this period,
the reactions are less severe, hence, our results indicate, once more, that the CFTC’s
announcements have a greater effect on the stock returns during times of high market
volatility.
Figure 5.1: CAR of Overall Industry, NYSE Energy Index and S&P Global Oil Index
over all events
During the mentioned period, i.e., months covering the financial credit crunch, all but
two announcements caused positive CARs. Only announcement numbers 18 and 19 lead
to negative CARs. Hence, we examine possible reasons for their negative effects. Both
announcements took place at the exact dates of two natural catastrophic events, namely
Hurricane Dolly (on July 22, 2008) and Hurricane Ike (September 11, 2008) coinciding
with events 18 and 19, respectively. The US oil market suffered directly from these
hurricanes, which threatened the offshore fields in Gulf of Mexico.59 Major companies
that are operating in the region needed to evacuate their personnel and to shut down the
rigs, which eventually caused a decline in the oil stocks. The output cut-off is followed by
the decline in their revenues. Hence, both hurricanes affected negatively the oil related
stocks in the USA.60
59For instance, according to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement
(BOEMRE), Hurricane Dolly caused 4.66% decline in the US oil production. Refer to the official website
of the BOEMRE, formerly known as Mineral Management Service of the USA; http://www.boemre.gov.
60Given that the issue of confounding events is a general problem in the event study methodology
(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997), the positive stock price reactions in our analysis might have also been
caused by alternative events and not by the announcements. Hence, we carefully examined the oil market-
related news during the event windows in our study. Even though we cannot rule out the possibility that
some of these events affected the stock prices of oil firms, for most announcements we could not identify
alternative events that would have direct positive effects on US oil related stocks. Hence, regarding the
overall picture of our results, we conclude that CFTC announcements might indeed have positive effects
on the stock prices of oil and gas firms, at least during the mentioned period.
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As described earlier, we extend our analysis to focus on the impact of CFTC announce-
ments on the 5 biggest companies (Major 5 index) in our sample: BP, Chevron, Exxon,
Shell and Total. Given the size of these companies as well as their importance for the
global economy, a closer examination of these companies in addition to the overall sector
will yield valuable information for shareholders, regulators and executives. The results
of the event study for these 5 companies can be found in Table B.3.
The findings are mostly in line with the results from the previous analysis. Again,
we find highly significant CARs for announcements number 10 and 21. In addition,
we find a particularly strong reaction after announcement number 6 (content: “First
International Commodity Market Manipulation Conference to be hosted by the CFTC”).
This is interesting as the returns are significantly positive. We assume that the big
companies regarded this announcement as positive news because their businesses are
strongly related to the oil price. In the event that the CFTC announces measures
against speculation, this may directly affect these firms’ expected returns. Hence, even
major companies appear to appreciate the CFTC’s role as a regulator against market
manipulation in times of high uncertainty and volatility, indicating its importance and
effectiveness as a regulatory body.
Furthermore, we follow our previous analysis and plot the CAR for the Major 5 index
to further analyze the effects of the announcements during our observation period in
chronological order. The plots can be found in Figure 5.2. The results are once again
comparable to the results for the overall sector. We find that the CARs (and thus the
firms’ reaction to the CFTC’s announcements) are more distinctive during and before
the financial crisis (and thus during times of high uncertainty). Similar to before, we see
high CARs (positive and negative) in particular between June 2008 and February 2009.
Consistent with the findings for the overall sector, the reactions are less severe prior to
this period, but still more pronounced than after this period. Thus, we find evidence that
the CFTC’s announcements can affect the firms’ stock returns more effectively during
times of high volatility, indicating that the CFTC is able to reduce manipulation and
speculation in the energy sector when the level of speculation and manipulation appears
to be highest.
Moreover, Table B.5 provides insights for different reactions of companies with different
geographical locations, i.e., North America based companies and Non-North America
based companies. The results indicate that the firms from different regions react very
similar to each other. In most cases, positive (negative) stock market reactions of North
American companies are accompanied by positive (negative) stock market reactions
of Non-North American companies. Furthermore, we find additional evidence for the
significance of events number 10, 15 and 21 as these events trigger strong reactions for
Chapter 5. The effects of the CFTC’s announcements on US oil and gas stocks 81
Figure 5.2: CAR of Major 5 Index over all events
both types of firms (except the missing reaction of Non-North American based companies
for event number 15). Similarly, the stock price reaction of the different subcategories
of firms in the oil and gas sector (Upstream, Mid-downstream and Oil field service)
confirm these findings. Table B.6 indicates a strong co-movement of the CARs for all
industry subcategories, as most announcements either trigger positive or negative stock
price reactions for all firms. Once again, we find that announcements number 10, 15 and
21 trigger particularly strong reactions for all firms, indicating that the firms follow a
general, overall market trend after the announcements are made rather than exhibiting
firm-specific reactions. Hence, the CFTC announcements lead to comparable effects for
all types of firms in the oil and gas sector, irrespective of the firms’ geographic location
or industry subcategory.
Overall, our results indicate that the CFTC announcements are indeed associated with
significant stock market responses of oil and gas-related firms. This finding also holds
for several subsamples that we analyze in our study, i.e., the major 5 oil firms, North
America based companies and Non-North America based companies and the different
subcategories of firms in the oil and gas sector (Upstream, Mid-downstream and Oil
field service). The direction of the effect is ambiguous, as some announcements trigger
positive stock reactions while others lead to negative reactions. However, for the nega-
tive reactions, we find confounding events that might explain this unexpected reaction,
while we could not find such alternative events for most events that triggered positive
stock price reactions. Hence, our results indicate that the CFTC announcements might
indeed affect the oil and gas companies’ stock prices. In particular, this is the case for
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announcements during the peak of the financial crisis, hence indicating a strong regu-
latory influence in times of high speculation, market manipulation and market turmoil,
which cause higher volatility in oil prices. Our results do not claim to prove that these
announcements exclusively caused the stock price reactions but rather indicate at least
a positive effect of the CFTC’s regulatory interventions on the oil firms’ stock prices.
5.4 Conclusions
We analyze the effects of the announcements of the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission’s (CFTC), the main regulatory authority in commodity futures market, on the
stock returns of companies from the US oil and gas industry around the credit crunch
period surrounding the financial crisis of 2008. Hence, we examine whether the CFTC is
able to fulfill its purpose as a regulatory authority and affect the reaction of these firms
in periods of high uncertainty in the oil market. We employ event study methodology
in order to identify the effects of CFTC announcements on daily returns of oil related
stocks listed in the NYSE for a set of 35 CFTC announcements and 122 companies.
The theoretical linkage between the CFTC announcements and oil related stocks should
be reflected through the crude oil futures market. The CFTC’s regulatory interven-
tions are meant to decrease the riskiness of the crude oil futures market by suppressing
the volatility through deterring the speculation and market manipulation. Moreover,
decreasing riskiness would have profound effects on US oil and gas related stocks, as
the investment decisions in stock markets are generally driven by the expectations and
perceptions of the traders. Hence, the CFTC’s regulatory announcements would have
direct effects on the US oil and gas stock returns.
Our results indicate that CFTC announcements can in general affect the stock returns
of oil and gas companies, depending on their content. We find significant abnormal
returns for several CFTC announcements during our observation period. In particular,
we find strong stock price responses for announcements that include highly relevant
content (e.g., announcing tighter regulation in oil and gas markets) or high fines against
speculators. The effects are stronger during the period of high volatility, which is caused
by high-assumed speculation and market manipulation in the energy sector. We find
particularly strong stock price reactions during the peak of credit crunch, i.e., Lehman
Brothers failure. During this period most of the announcements have positive effects on
the stock returns of oil and gas companies. Yet, during the same period, we also identified
some negative stock reactions, which might be explained by alternative confounding
events that took place simultaneously. Hence, our overall results could not prove that
the CFTC’s announcements exclusively caused positive stock price reactions, yet they
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at least indicate that the CFTC could reach to the stock markets as the regulatory
authority in times of high uncertainty. In addition, we examine the effects of the CFTC
announcements on several subsamples, i.e., the five major oil companies, companies
based on different geographical locations and the different subcategories of firms in the
oil and gas sector. The results are consistent with our prior findings, showing that the
CFTC can also affect the individual companies’ stock returns in times of high volatility.
One of the most important drawbacks of the event study analyses is the selection of
the events. The events that are used in this study, i.e. the CFTC announcements, are
heterogenous and, hence, their effects cannot be clearly anticipated. Moreover other
sectoral confounding events can also affect the oil and gas related stocks. Although, the
results of the current paper are useful to interpret the CFTC’s regulatory effects, the
work can be extended by analyzing these confounding events more clearly.
Appendix A
Supplementary Material for
Chapter 3
Solution of the Model under Endogenous Energy Price
Suppose now that the energy is a non-renewable one. The non-arbitrage condition would
then involve that the real price of energy must increase at the real interest rate:61
qˆ = r(t) (A.1)
Equation A.1 is the well-known Hotelling’s rule in its the simplest form. Now let us use
this information in the model. One may recall that we obtained αKˆC − αEˆ = qˆ from
the equation 3.4b, r = A− δ+ pˆ and pˆ = (α− 1)KˆC + (1− α)Eˆ from equations 3.5 and
3.6. Therefore
α · KˆC − α · Eˆ = qˆ = r = A− δ + pˆ⇒
α · KˆC − α · Eˆ = A− δ(α− 1)KˆC + (1− α)Eˆ ⇒
61Suppose that the energy market is a perfectly competitive one and that extraction is costless. Under
these assumptions, the representative firm would solve the following maximization problem (cf., Gaitan
et al., 2004, Yetkiner and van Zon, 2009):
max
∫ ∞
0
q(t) · E(t) · e−
∫ t
0 r(τ)dτdt
s.t.
∫ ∞
0
E(t)dt ≤ S0
lim
t→∞
{q(t) · E(t) · e−
∫ t
0 r(τ)dτ} = 0
where S0 is the initial stock of the nonrenewable energy. The solution of the isoperimetric calculus of
variations problem leads to the equation A.1.
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KˆC = A− δ + Eˆ
If this information is used in equation 3.9, we obtain:
C˙
C
=
1
θ
· (A− δ + pˆ− ρ)⇒
C˙
C
=
1
θ
· (A− δ + (1− α)(Eˆ − KˆC)− ρ)⇒
C˙
C
=
1
θ
· (α(A− δ)− ρ)
Hence,
pˆ = −(1− α)(A− δ)
r = qˆ = α(A− δ)
Eˆ =
1
θ
[α(A− δ)(1− θ)− ρ] ≡ g′
KˆC =
1
θ
[(A− δ)(θ + α(1− θ))− ρ] ≡ g
Interestingly, given that A − δ > 0 for a positive real interest rate and energy price
growth rate, θ must be less than one. Otherwise, energy demand would be decreasing
in time. As, θ + α(1 − θ) is always true, growth rate of physical stock employed in
consumption good sector is positive as long as (A− δ)(θ + α(1− θ) > ρ.
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Table B.3: CAR of Major 5 Index
Event Number BP Chevron Exxon Shell Total
1 -1.46% -4.90%* -1.72% -2.44% 1.37%
2 0.80% 0.54% -0.72% 2.33% 1.58%
3 -1.00% -0.61% 0.85% -0.97% 0.20%
4 -2.01% -3.14% -4.17%* -2.84% -0.77%
5 -2.84% -5.27%** -2.92% -2.39% -4.75%**
6 7.49%*** 2.43% 3.27% 4.87%** 5.63%***
7 3.76%* 1.86% -0.25% 3.63%* 0.29%
8 0.74% 3.34% 2.38% 1.77% 1.50%
9 0.36% 3.37% -0.58% -2.04% 0.05%
10 -8.62%*** -5.23%** -1.29% -5.46%** -4.87%*
11 0.01% -0.10% -1.78% 1.06% 0.68%
12 4.20%* 1.98% -4.62%** 3.90% 1.46%
13 -6.13%** -2.57% -4.52%** -3.70% -4.16%
14 0.72% 3.04% 2.85% 2.05% 0.27%
15 5.79%** 6.01%* 6.14%* 5.62%** 4.03%
16 1.91% 1.57% 0.93% 0.22% -2.38%
17 -2.88% -1.93% -2.04% -3.40% -2.09%
18 -0.73% -4.38%* 0.90% 0.07% 0.18%
19 -0.48% 3.54% 0.64% 0.56% -0.94%
20 2.44% 4.09% 1.17% 6.09%* 3.00%
21 8.26%* 4.79% 4.72% 9.24%** 10.38%**
22 1.80% -0.49% -1.14% -0.67% 3.60%
23 -5.51% -1.08% -1.25% -7.87% -2.01%
24 6.27% 4.29% 2.24% 6.11% 6.41%
25 0.23% -0.15% -3.17% 1.24% 0.83%
26 3.61% 3.69% 5.00% 6.08% 7.37%
27 -1.28% 3.57% 0.74% -2.80% -3.44%
28 -0.37% 0.24% 0.50% -0.69% 1.01%
29 -2.47% -0.90% -0.52% 0.33% -3.96%
30 -0.77% -0.60% -1.47% 2.30% 0.84%
31 0.59% 0.93% 2.19% 1.26% 3.17%
32 3.35% -1.42% -0.53% 1.12% 0.87%
33 -4.24% -1.04% -3.87% -2.54% -2.09%
34 -1.32% -0.47% 0.02% 0.50% -2.27%
35 0.66% 0.42% -1.51% -0.87% -0.83%
Notes: ***,**,* represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
Appendix B 90
T
a
b
l
e
B
.4
:
R
o
b
u
st
n
es
s:
D
iff
er
en
t
E
ve
n
t
W
in
d
ow
s
E
v
e
n
t
W
in
d
o
w
[-
2
;
+
2
]
E
v
e
n
t
W
in
d
o
w
[-
2
;
+
4
]
E
v
e
n
t
W
in
d
o
w
[-
4
;
+
2
]
E
v
e
n
t
W
in
d
o
w
[-
4
;
+
4
]
E
v
e
n
t
W
in
d
o
w
[-
6
;
+
2
]
E
v
e
n
t
N
u
m
b
e
r
In
d
u
st
ry
C
A
R
#
si
g
.
c
o
m
p
.
In
d
u
st
ry
C
A
R
#
si
g
.
c
o
m
p
.
In
d
u
st
ry
C
A
R
#
si
g
.
c
o
m
p
.
In
d
u
st
ry
C
A
R
#
si
g
.
c
o
m
p
.
In
d
u
st
ry
C
A
R
#
si
g
.
c
o
m
p
.
1
-0
.0
2
0
1
5
0
.0
0
1
4
3
-0
.0
1
9
2
5
0
.0
0
2
3
2
-0
.0
1
9
3
2
-0
.0
0
0
5
3
-0
.0
0
1
8
5
0
.0
0
3
6
3
0
.0
0
2
3
3
0
.0
1
0
8
2
3
0
.0
0
7
7
5
0
.0
1
4
9
4
0
.0
1
4
3
6
0
.0
2
1
5
*
8
0
.0
3
4
2
*
*
*
8
4
-0
.0
0
6
6
1
6
-0
.0
0
6
6
1
3
-0
.0
0
7
6
1
3
-0
.0
0
7
6
1
4
0
.0
1
0
9
1
4
5
-0
.0
4
6
5
*
*
*
3
7
-0
.0
3
1
*
*
*
2
7
-0
.0
4
5
8
*
*
*
2
9
-0
.0
3
0
3
*
*
*
2
7
-0
.0
4
2
2
*
*
*
3
4
6
0
.0
3
6
5
*
*
*
1
8
0
.0
3
3
5
*
*
*
2
0
0
.0
5
1
2
*
*
*
2
8
0
.0
4
8
1
*
*
*
2
4
0
.0
4
1
4
*
*
*
1
2
7
0
.0
2
9
8
*
*
*
2
0
0
.0
3
1
4
*
*
*
1
9
0
.0
1
1
1
2
0
.0
1
2
6
1
3
0
.0
2
1
*
*
1
3
8
0
.0
2
6
*
*
*
9
0
.0
6
2
4
*
*
*
3
5
0
.0
5
5
6
*
*
*
2
5
0
.0
9
2
*
*
*
4
8
0
.0
4
1
9
*
*
*
1
6
9
0
.0
0
3
6
-0
.0
0
8
2
1
0
0
.0
1
3
1
1
9
0
.0
0
1
9
1
6
0
.0
3
5
6
*
*
*
2
6
1
0
-0
.0
5
6
6
*
*
*
4
6
-0
.0
7
4
*
*
*
5
9
-0
.0
5
6
9
*
*
*
3
6
-0
.0
7
4
3
*
*
*
5
5
-0
.0
6
8
4
*
*
*
3
4
1
1
0
.0
0
1
4
1
0
0
.0
1
5
2
*
1
2
0
.0
3
0
3
*
*
*
1
7
0
.0
4
4
1
*
*
*
1
7
0
.0
5
4
2
*
*
*
2
8
1
2
-0
.0
0
6
3
1
6
0
.0
1
9
8
*
*
1
8
0
.0
0
8
7
1
3
0
.0
3
4
8
*
*
*
1
9
-0
.0
3
1
4
*
*
*
2
1
1
3
-0
.0
0
7
2
1
6
-0
.0
2
5
9
*
*
2
3
-0
.0
2
4
*
*
1
4
-0
.0
4
2
6
*
*
*
2
7
0
.0
0
8
1
1
2
1
4
0
.0
3
7
3
*
*
*
2
5
0
.0
3
5
8
*
*
*
1
7
0
.0
6
8
8
*
*
*
3
5
0
.0
6
7
3
*
*
*
2
6
0
.0
5
8
2
*
*
*
2
2
1
5
0
.0
5
5
2
*
*
*
4
2
0
.0
2
9
3
*
*
*
1
3
0
.0
3
6
8
*
*
*
1
7
0
.0
1
0
8
9
0
.0
6
8
6
*
*
*
2
6
1
6
0
.0
3
4
3
*
*
*
6
0
.0
2
6
*
*
8
0
.0
2
3
7
*
*
5
0
.0
1
5
4
6
0
.0
6
8
4
*
*
*
2
7
1
7
0
.0
2
3
8
*
*
7
0
.0
6
6
9
*
*
*
2
9
0
.0
2
6
3
*
*
7
0
.0
6
9
4
*
*
*
2
2
0
.0
1
5
9
6
1
8
-0
.0
4
4
5
*
*
*
2
2
-0
.0
2
4
4
*
*
7
-0
.1
2
7
9
*
*
*
7
3
-0
.1
0
7
9
*
*
*
5
5
-0
.1
3
8
1
*
*
*
7
1
1
9
-0
.0
3
3
1
*
*
1
5
-0
.0
1
6
5
2
0
-0
.0
7
6
6
*
*
*
2
9
-0
.0
6
*
*
*
2
6
-0
.0
8
9
5
*
*
*
3
3
2
0
0
.0
5
4
6
*
*
*
2
0
0
.0
2
5
3
*
7
0
.0
7
1
8
*
*
*
2
6
0
.0
4
2
5
*
*
*
1
2
0
.0
6
7
9
*
*
*
1
7
2
1
0
.1
0
0
1
*
*
*
5
0
0
.0
9
6
8
*
*
*
2
9
0
.1
0
4
*
*
*
3
9
0
.1
0
0
6
*
*
*
2
5
0
.0
2
0
6
1
3
2
2
0
.0
0
2
6
7
0
.0
1
9
5
6
0
.0
1
9
9
7
0
.0
3
6
8
6
0
.0
0
2
6
9
2
3
0
.0
1
9
6
1
6
0
.0
4
5
8
*
2
4
0
.0
0
0
1
1
1
0
.0
2
6
2
1
6
0
.0
0
1
2
1
1
2
4
0
.0
4
3
3
*
2
7
0
.0
0
9
9
1
5
0
.0
1
8
9
1
9
-0
.0
1
4
4
1
2
0
.0
5
2
*
*
2
8
2
5
-0
.0
2
3
9
-0
.0
2
2
5
6
0
.0
0
3
3
1
1
0
.0
0
3
8
1
1
-0
.0
2
1
4
1
3
2
6
-0
.0
0
0
1
2
-0
.0
1
4
9
2
0
.0
0
6
4
4
-0
.0
0
8
4
5
0
.0
5
7
2
*
*
9
2
7
0
.0
1
7
4
0
-0
.0
1
4
0
0
.0
0
5
5
0
-0
.0
2
5
9
1
-0
.0
1
0
6
2
2
8
0
.0
0
5
9
1
0
.0
1
5
9
1
0
.0
0
6
1
0
.0
1
6
1
0
.0
0
9
1
0
2
9
-0
.0
2
6
8
0
-0
.0
0
9
7
1
-0
.0
3
3
1
3
-0
.0
1
6
1
2
-0
.0
2
4
4
2
3
0
0
.0
0
3
9
3
0
.0
0
6
3
1
-0
.0
1
5
2
2
-0
.0
1
2
9
1
-0
.0
2
5
2
2
3
1
0
.0
2
1
4
0
-0
.0
0
1
1
0
0
.0
0
7
6
0
-0
.0
1
4
9
0
0
.0
1
4
9
0
3
2
-0
.0
0
5
4
0
0
.0
1
4
0
-0
.0
1
2
3
0
0
.0
0
7
1
0
-0
.0
3
6
1
*
0
3
3
0
.0
4
5
6
*
*
1
0
.0
3
1
7
2
0
.0
6
5
2
*
*
*
3
0
.0
5
1
3
*
*
2
0
.0
6
9
6
*
*
*
2
3
4
-0
.0
0
6
4
0
-0
.0
0
7
1
0
-0
.0
2
1
1
0
-0
.0
2
1
7
0
0
.0
0
2
5
0
3
5
0
.0
3
1
7
*
1
0
.0
3
8
9
*
*
1
0
.0
4
3
*
*
*
7
0
.0
5
0
2
*
*
*
1
0
0
.0
3
7
6
*
*
6
N
ot
es
:
**
*,
**
,*
re
p
re
se
n
t
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
at
1%
,
5%
a
n
d
1
0
%
le
ve
ls
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
Appendix B 91
Table B.5: Geographical Classification
Event Number North American CAR non-North American CAR
1 -0.0163 -0.021
2 0.0027 0.0189
3 -0.0016 -0.0076
4 0.0002 0.0017
5 -0.0459* -0.043**
6 0.022 0.1628***
7 0.0302 0.038*
8 0.0215 0.0197
9 0.0065 -0.0103
10 -0.0494** -0.1077***
11 0.0024 0.0188
12 -0.0196 0.0137
13 -0.0122 -0.0594*
14 0.0476* 0.0001
15 0.0665** 0.0326
16 0.0345 0.0107
17 0.0179 0.014
18 -0.0473 -0.0207
19 -0.0198 -0.0224
20 0.0447 0.0748*
21 0.0932* 0.0991*
22 -0.0018 0.0268
23 0.037 -0.0055
24 0.0551 0.0561
25 -0.0353 -0.0207
26 -0.0069 0.0346
27 0.0215 -0.0141
28 0.0129 0.0141
29 -0.0216 -0.0379
30 0.0035 -0.0113
31 0.0225 0.0089
32 -0.0052 0.0137
33 0.037 -0.016
34 -0.0048 -0.009
35 0.0346 -0.0305
Notes: ***,**,* represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
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Table B.6: Industry Subcategories: Response of Different Business Segments
Event Number Upstream CAR Mid-downstream CAR Oil field service CAR
1 -0.0155 -0.0014 -0.0233
2 0.0137 -0.0031 0.0005
3 0.0038 -0.0634 0.0132
4 0.0009 -0.0187 0.0223
5 -0.0365 -0.0554** -0.0536
6 0.082*** 0.0026 0.0043
7 0.0406 0.0318 0.0225
8 0.0225 0.0022 0.0333
9 -0.0014 0.001 0.0058
10 -0.0634** -0.0513** -0.0401
11 -0.0008 0.0103 0.0152
12 -0.0183 -0.0027 -0.0271
13 -0.0016 0.0036 -0.0222
14 0.0472 0.0007 0.0571*
15 0.076** 0.0182 0.0613**
16 0.0404 0.0202 0.0323
17 0.0173 0.0189 0.0277
18 -0.0629* -0.0421* -0.0339
19 -0.0381 -0.0066 -0.0099
20 0.0748* 0.0199 0.024
21 0.0983* 0.0865** 0.0936*
22 -0.0014 0.0177 -0.002
23 0.0276 0.0351 0.0396
24 0.0596 0.0284 0.0662
25 -0.0426 -0.0384 -0.0247
26 0.0043 -0.0197 -0.0088
27 0.0166 0.0145 0.0226
28 0.0259 0.0053 0.0004
29 -0.0218 -0.021 -0.0318
30 0.0014 -0.0045 0.0001
31 0.0103 0.0139 0.039
32 -0.0153 0.0000 0.0118
33 0.0376 0.0146 0.0364
34 -0.0089 -0.0027 -0.0018
35 0.0330 -0.0015 0.0366
Notes: ***,**,* represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
Bibliography
Acaravci, A. and Ozturk, I. (2010). On the relationship between energy consumption,
CO2 emissions and economic growth in europe. Energy, 35(12):5412–5420.
Al-Mudhaf, A. and Goodwin, T. H. (1993). Oil shocks and oil stocks: evidence from the
1970s. Applied Economics, 25(2):181–190.
Aloui, C. and Jammazi, R. (2009). The effects of crude oil shocks on stock market shifts
behaviour: a regime switching approach. Energy Economics, 31(5):789–799.
Alquist, R. and Gervais, O. (2013). The role of financial speculation in driving the price
of crude oil. The Energy journal, 34(3):35–54.
Andre´, F. J. and Smulders, S. (2013). Fueling growth when oil peaks: Directed techno-
logical change and the limits to efficiency. European Economic Review, 69:18–39.
Angbazo, L. A. and Narayanan, R. (1996). Catastrophic shocks in the property-liability
insurance industry: Evidence on regulatory and contagion effects. Journal of Risk
and Insurance, 63(4):619–637.
Apergis, N. and Miller, S. M. (2009). Do structural oil-market shocks affect stock prices?
Energy Economics, 31(4):569–575.
Apergis, N. and Payne, J. E. (2010). Renewable energy consumption and economic
growth: evidence from a panel of OECD countries. Energy policy, 38(1):656–660.
Arouri, M. E. H. and Fouquau, J. (2009). On the short-term influence of oil price changes
on stock markets in GCC countries: linear and nonlinear analyses. Economics Bulletin,
29(2):795–804.
Arouri, M. E. H. and Nguyen, D. (2010). Oil prices, stock markets and portfolio invest-
ment: evidence from sector analysis in Europe over the last decade. Energy Policy,
38(8):4528–4539.
Asafu-Adjaye, J. (2000). The relationship between energy consumption, energy prices
and economic growth: time series evidence from Asian developing countries. Energy
economics, 22(6):615–625.
93
Bibliography 94
Awerbuch, S. and Sauter, R. (2006). Exploiting the oil–gdp effect to support renewables
deployment. Energy Policy, 34(17):2805–2819.
Balke, N. S., Brown, S. P., and Yu¨cel, M. K. (2002). Oil price shocks and the US
economy: where does the asymmetry originate? The Energy Journal, 23(3):27–52.
Barro, R. J. and Sala-i Martin, X. (1995). Economic growth, 1995. McGraw Hill, New
York.
Barsky, R. B. and Kilian, L. (2004). Oil and the macroeconomy since the 1970s. Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 18(4):115–134.
Basher, S. A. and Sadorsky, P. (2006). Oil price risk and emerging stock markets. Global
Finance Journal, 17(2):224–251.
Benchekroun, H., Halsema, A., and Withagen, C. (2009). On nonrenewable resource
oligopolies: The asymmetric case. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
33(11):1867 – 1879.
Benchekroun, H., Halsema, A., and Withagen, C. (2010). When additional resource
stocks reduce welfare. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
59(1):109 – 114.
Berk, I. (2014). Two period resource duopoly with endogenous intertemporal capacity
constraints. EWI Working Paper, 14/13.
Berk, I. and Aydogan, B. (2012). Crude oil price shocks and stock returns: evidence
from Turkish stock market under global liquidity conditions. EWI Working Paper,
12/15.
Berk, I. and Yetkiner, H. (2014). Energy prices and economic growth in the long run:
theory and evidence. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 36:228–235.
Bernanke, B. S., Gertler, M., Watson, M., Sims, C. A., and Friedman, B. M. (1997).
Systematic monetary policy and the effects of oil price shocks. Brookings papers on
economic activity, 1997(1):91–157.
Besanko, D. and Doraszelski, U. (2004). Capacity dynamics and endogenous asymme-
tries in firm size. The RAND Journal of Economics, 35(1):pp. 23–49.
Biglaiser, G. and Vettas, N. (2004). Dynamic price competition with capacity constraints
and strategic buyers. CEPR Discussion Paper No.4315.
Bikhchandani, S. and Mamer, J. W. (1993). A duopoly model of pricing for inventory
liquidation. European Journal of Operational Research, 69(2):177 – 186.
Bibliography 95
Birol, F. et al. (2013). World energy outlook. Paris: International Energy Agency.
Bjørnland, H. C. (2009). Oil price shocks and stock market booms in an oil exporting
country. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 56(2):232–254.
Blackburne, E. F. and Frank, M. W. (2009). Estimation of nonstationary heterogeneous
panels. Stata Journal, 7(2):197.
Boehmer, E., Masumeci, J., and Poulsen, A. B. (1991). Event-study methodology under
conditions of event-induced variance. Journal of Financial Economics, 30(2):253–272.
Bollerslev, T. (1986). Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. Journal
of econometrics, 31(3):307–327.
Boyer, M. M. and Filion, D. (2007). Common and fundamental factors in stock returns
of Canadian oil and gas companies. Energy Economics, 29(3):428–453.
BP (2014). BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013. British Petroleum Company,
London.
Bretschger, L. (2013). Energy prices, growth, and the channels in between: theory and
evidence. ETH, Eidgeno¨ssische Technische Hochschule Zu¨rich, WIF, Institute of Eco-
nomic Research.
Brown, S. J. and Warner, J. B. (1980). Measuring security price performance. Journal
of financial economics, 8(3):205–258.
Brown, S. J. and Warner, J. B. (1985). Using daily stock returns: The case of event
studies. Journal of financial economics, 14(1):3–31.
Brown, S. P. and Yu¨cel, M. (1999). Oil prices and us aggregate economic activity: a
question of neutrality. Economic and Financial Review - Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas, 1999:16–23.
Brown, S. P. and Yu¨cel, M. K. (2002). Energy prices and aggregate economic activity:
an interpretative survey. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 42(2):193–
208.
Bu¨yu¨ksahin, B. and Harris, J. H. (2011). Do speculators drive crude oil futures prices.
Energy Journal, 32(2):167–202.
Chakravorty, U., Roumasset, J., and Tse, K. (1997). Endogenous substitution among
energy resources and global warming. Journal of Political Economy, 105(6):1201–1234.
Chen, S.-S. and Chen, H.-C. (2007). Oil prices and real exchange rates. Energy Eco-
nomics, 29(3):390–404.
Bibliography 96
Chien, T. and Hu, J.-L. (2007). Renewable energy and macroeconomic efficiency of
OECD and non-OECD economies. Energy Policy, 35(7):3606–3615.
Chiou, J.-S. and Lee, Y.-H. (2009). Jump dynamics and volatility: Oil and the stock
markets. Energy, 34(6):788–796.
Chortareas, G. and Noikokyris, E. (2014). Oil shocks, stock market prices, and the
US dividend yield decomposition. International Review of Economics and Finance,
29:639–649.
Ciner, C. (2001). Energy shocks and financial markets: nonlinear linkages. Studies in
Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics, 5(3):203–212.
Cong, R.-G., Wei, Y.-M., Jiao, J.-L., and Fan, Y. (2008). Relationships between oil
price shocks and stock market: An empirical analysis from China. Energy Policy,
36(9):3544–3553.
Coudert, V., Mignon, V., and Penot, A. (2007). Oil price and the dollar. Energy Studies
Review, 15(2):48–65.
Dasgupta, P. and Heal, G. (1974). The optimal depletion of exhaustible resources. The
Review of Economic Studies, 41:3–28.
Deaves, R. and Krinsky, I. (1992). The behavior of oil futures returns around OPEC
conferences. Journal of futures Markets, 12(5):563–574.
Demirer, R. and Kutan, A. M. (2010). The behavior of crude oil spot and futures
prices around OPEC and SPR announcements: An event study perspective. Energy
Economics, 32(6):1467–1476.
Dickey, D. A. and Fuller, W. A. (1979). Distribution of the estimators for autoregres-
sive time series with a unit root. Journal of the American statistical association,
74(366a):427–431.
Dickey, D. A. and Fuller, W. A. (1981). Likelihood ratio statistics for autoregressive
time series with a unit root. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society,
49(4):1057–1072.
Dickman, A. and Holloway, J. (2004). Oil market developments and macroeconomic
implications. Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, October 2004.
Dincer, I. (2000). Renewable energy and sustainable development: a crucial review.
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 4(2):157–175.
Draper, D. W. (1984). The behavior of event-related returns on oil futures contracts.
Journal of Futures Markets, 4(2):125–132.
Bibliography 97
Edelstein, P. and Kilian, L. (2007). The response of business fixed investment to changes
in energy prices: A test of some hypotheses about the transmission of energy price
shocks. The BE Journal of Macroeconomics, 7(1):1–41.
Edelstein, P. and Kilian, L. (2009). How sensitive are consumer expenditures to retail
energy prices? Journal of Monetary Economics, 56(6):766–779.
Ediger, V. S. and Berk, I. (2011). Crude oil import policy of Turkey: Historical analysis
of determinants and implications since 1968. Energy Policy, 39(4):2132 – 2142.
Eggoh, J. C., Bangake´, C., and Rault, C. (2011). Energy consumption and economic
growth revisited in African countries. Energy Policy, 39(11):7408–7421.
EIA (2013). Who are the major players supplying the world oil market? Available
at: http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/world_oil_market.cfm. Ac-
cess date: 22.08.2013.
El-Sharif, I., Brown, D., Burton, B., Nixon, B., and Russell, A. (2005). Evidence on the
nature and extent of the relationship between oil prices and equity values in the UK.
Energy Economics, 27(6):819–830.
Elder, J., Miao, H., and Ramchander, S. (2013). Jumps in oil prices: The role of
economic news. Energy Journal, 34(3):217–237.
Eriksson, C. (2004). Directed technical change with endogenous supplies of energy and
labor. document de travail University of Uppsala, Mars.
Eswaran, M. and Lewis, T. R. (1984). Ultimate recovery of an exhaustible resource under
different market structures. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
11(1):55–69.
Evans, R. L. (2007). Fueling our future: an introduction to sustainable energy. Cam-
bridge University Press.
Ewing, B. T., Sari, R., and Soytas, U. (2007). Disaggregate energy consumption and
industrial output in the United States. Energy Policy, 35(2):1274–1281.
Faff, R. W. and Brailsford, T. J. (1999). Oil price risk and the Australian stock market.
Journal of Energy Finance and Development, 4(1):69–87.
Fan, Q. and Jahan-Parvar, M. R. (2012). US industry-level returns and oil prices.
International Review of Economics and Finance, 22(1):112–128.
Fang, Y. (2011). Economic welfare impacts from renewable energy consumption: the
China experience. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 15(9):5120–5128.
Bibliography 98
Fattouh, B., Kilian, L., and Mahadeva, L. (2013). The role of speculation in oil markets:
What have we learned so far? Energy Journal, 34(3).
Frondel, M., Ritter, N., Schmidt, C. M., and Vance, C. (2010). Economic impacts from
the promotion of renewable energy technologies: The German experience. Energy
Policy, 38(8):4048–4056.
Gabszewicz, J. J. and Poddar, S. (1997). Demand fluctuations and capacity utilization
under duopoly. Economic Theory, 10(1):131–146.
Gaitan, B., Tol, R. S., and Yetkiner, I. H. (2004). The Hotelling’s rule revisited in a
dynamic general equilibrium model. Research unit Sustainability and Global Change,
Hamburg University Working Papers, FNU-44.
Gao, W. and Madlener, R. (1999). Oil price shocks and macroeconomic performance.
HIS Newsletter, 8(1):3.
Gardner, T. A. and Joutz, F. L. (1996). Economic growth, energy prices and technolog-
ical innovation. Southern Economic Journal, 62(3):653–666.
Gaudet, G. and Long, N. V. (1994). On the effects of the distribution of initial en-
dowments in a nonrenewable resource duopoly. Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 18(6):1189 – 1198.
Gilbert, R. J. (1978). Dominant firm pricing policy in a market for an exhaustible
resource. The Bell Journal of Economics, 9(2):385–395.
Gjerde, Ø. and Saettem, F. (1999). Causal relations among stock returns and macroeco-
nomic variables in a small, open economy. Journal of International Financial Markets,
Institutions and Money, 9(1):61–74.
Gorelick, S. M. (2011). Oil panic and the global crisis: predictions and myths. John
Wiley & Sons.
Goulder, L. H. and Schneider, S. H. (1999). Induced technological change and the
attractiveness of CO2 abatement policies. Resource and energy economics, 21(3):211–
253.
Greene, D. L. and Leiby, P. N. (2006). The oil security metrics model. ORNL/TM-
2006/505, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
Groth, C. (2007). A new-growth perspective on non-renewable resources. Springer.
Guidi, M. G., Russell, A., and Tarbert, H. (2006). The effect of OPEC policy decisions
on oil and stock prices. OPEC review, 30(1):1–18.
Bibliography 99
Guo, H. and Kliesen, K. L. (2005). Oil price volatility and us macroeconomic activity.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 87(November/December 2005).
Hamilton, J. D. (1983). Oil and the macroeconomy since World War II. The Journal
of Political Economy, 91(2):228–248.
Hamilton, J. D. (1996). This is what happened to the oil price-macroeconomy relation-
ship. Journal of Monetary Economics, 38(2):215–220.
Hamilton, J. D. (2003). What is an oil shock? Journal of econometrics, 113(2):363–398.
Hamilton, J. D. (2009a). Causes and consequences of the oil shock of 2007–08. Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, Spring(1):215–259.
Hamilton, J. D. (2009b). Understanding crude oil prices. Energy Journal, 30(2):179–206.
Hamilton, J. D. (2011). Nonlinearities and the macroeconomic effects of oil prices.
Macroeconomic Dynamics, 15(S3):364–378.
Hamilton, J. D. and Herrera, A. M. (2004). Comment: oil shocks and aggregate macroe-
conomic behavior: the role of monetary policy. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
36(2):265–286.
Hammoudeh, S. and Aleisa, E. (2004). Dynamic relationships among gcc stock markets
and nymex oil futures. Contemporary Economic Policy, 22(2):250–269.
Hartley, P. and Medlock, K. B. (2008). A model of the operation and development of a
national oil company. Energy Economics, 30(5):2459 – 2485.
Heal, G. (1976). The relationship between price and extraction cost for a resource with
a backstop technology. The Bell Journal of Economics, 7(2):371–378.
Heinberg, R. (2007). Peak everything – Waking up to the century of declines. New
Society Publishers, Gabriola Island, BC.
Henriques, I. and Sadorsky, P. (2008). Oil prices and the stock prices of alternative
energy companies. Energy Economics, 30(3):998–1010.
Horan, S. M., Peterson, J. H., and Mahar, J. (2004). Implied volatility of oil futures
options surrounding OPEC meetings. The Energy Journal, 25(3):103–125.
Hotelling, H. (1931). The economics of exhaustible resources. The Journal of Political
Economy, 39(2):137–175.
Huang, B.-N., Hwang, M., and Peng, H.-P. (2005). The asymmetry of the impact of
oil price shocks on economic activities: an application of the multivariate threshold
model. Energy Economics, 27(3):455–476.
Bibliography 100
Huang, R. D., Masulis, R. W., and Stoll, H. R. (1996). Energy shocks and financial
markets. Journal of Futures Markets, 16(1):1–27.
Hubbert, M. K. (1969). Resources and Man. National Academy of Sciences and National
Research Council.
Huntington, H. G. (1998). Crude oil prices and US economic performance: where does
the asymmetry reside? The Energy Journal, 19(4):107–132.
IEA (2013). Energy Statistics of OECD Countries – Energy Prices and Taxes. Interna-
tional Energy Agency OECD Paris.
Im, K. S., Pesaran, M. H., and Shin, Y. (2003). Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous
panels. Journal of econometrics, 115(1):53–74.
Jammazi, R. (2012a). Cross dynamics of oil-stock interactions: A redundant wavelet
analysis. Energy, 44(1):750–777.
Jammazi, R. (2012b). Oil shock transmission to stock market returns: wavelet-
multivariate markov switching GARCH approach. Energy, 37(1):430–454.
Jammazi, R. and Aloui, C. (2010). Wavelet decomposition and regime shifts: assessing
the effects of crude oil shocks on stock market returns. Energy Policy, 38(3):1415–1435.
Jawadi, F., Arouri, M. E. H., and Bellalah, M. (2010). Nonlinear linkages between oil
and stock markets in developed and emerging countries. International Journal of
Business, 15(1):19–31.
Jevons, W. S. (1865). The coal question: an inquiry concerning the progress of the
nation, and the probable exhaustion of our coal-mines. The Macmillan Company.
Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez, R. and Sanchez, M. (2005). Oil price shocks and real GDP growth:
empirical evidence for some OECD countries. Applied economics, 37(2):201–228.
Jones, C. M. and Kaul, G. (1996). Oil and the stock markets. The Journal of Finance,
51(2):463–491.
Just, R. E., Netanyahu, S., and Olson, L. J. (2005). Depletion of natural resources,
technological uncertainty, and the adoption of technological substitutes. Resource
and Energy Economics, 27(2):91–108.
Kahn, G. A. and Hampton Jr, R. (1990). Possible monetary policy responses to the
Iraqi oil shock. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, 2:19–32.
Kilian, L. (2008a). A comparison of the effects of exogenous oil supply shocks on output
and inflation in the G7 countries. Journal of the European Economic Association,
6(1):78–121.
Bibliography 101
Kilian, L. (2008b). The economic effects of energy price shocks. Journal of Economic
Literature, 46(4):871–909.
Kilian, L. (2009). Not all oil price shocks are alike: Disentangling demand and supply
shocks in the crude oil market. The American Economic Review, 99(3):1053–1069.
Kilian, L. and Hicks, B. (2013). Did unexpectedly strong economic growth cause the oil
price shock of 2003–2008? Journal of Forecasting, 32(5):385–394.
Kilian, L. and Lewis, L. T. (2011). Does the Fed respond to oil price shocks? The
Economic Journal, 121(555):1047–1072.
Kilian, L. and Murphy, D. P. (2012). Why agnostic sign restrictions are not enough: un-
derstanding the dynamics of oil market var models. Journal of the European Economic
Association, 10(5):1166–1188.
Kilian, L. and Murphy, D. P. (2014). The role of inventories and speculative trading in
the global market for crude oil. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 29(3):454–478.
Kilian, L. and Park, C. (2009). The impact of oil price shocks on the us stock market.
International Economic Review, 50(4):1267–1287.
Kilian, L. and Vigfusson, R. J. (2011a). Are the responses of the us economy asymmetric
in energy price increases and decreases? Quantitative Economics, 2(3):419–453.
Kilian, L. and Vigfusson, R. J. (2011b). Nonlinearities in the oil price–output relation-
ship. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 15(S3):337–363.
Kraft, J. and Kraft, A. (1978). Relationship between energy and GNP. Journal of
Energy Develpment, 3(2):401–403.
Kwiatkowski, D., Phillips, P. C., Schmidt, P., and Shin, Y. (1992). Testing the null
hypothesis of stationarity against the alternative of a unit root: How sure are we that
economic time series have a unit root? Journal of econometrics, 54(1):159–178.
Laye, J. and Laye, M. (2008). Uniqueness and characterization of capacity constrained
cournot nash equilibrium. Operations Research Letters, 36(2):168 – 172.
Lee, C.-C. (2005). Energy consumption and GDP in developing countries: a cointegrated
panel analysis. Energy Economics, 27(3):415–427.
Lee, C.-C. and Chang, C.-P. (2008). Energy consumption and economic growth in Asian
economies: a more comprehensive analysis using panel data. Resource and Energy
Economics, 30(1):50–65.
Bibliography 102
Lee, K. and Ni, S. (2002). On the dynamic effects of oil price shocks: a study using
industry level data. Journal of Monetary Economics, 49(4):823–852.
Lee, K., Ni, S., and Ratti, R. A. (1995). Oil shocks and the macroeconomy: the role of
price variability. The Energy Journal, 16(4):39–56.
Lehr, U., Lutz, C., and Edler, D. (2012). Green jobs? economic impacts of renewable
energy in Germany. Energy Policy, 47:358–364.
Levin, A., Lin, C.-F., and James Chu, C.-S. (2002). Unit root tests in panel data:
asymptotic and finite-sample properties. Journal of econometrics, 108(1):1–24.
Levitan, R. and Shubik, M. (1972). Price duopoly and capacity constraints. International
Economic Review, 13(1):pp. 111–122.
Lewis, T. R. and Schmalensee, R. (1980). On oligopolistic markets for nonrenewable
natural resources. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 95(3):475–491.
Lin, S. X. and Tamvakis, M. (2010). OPEC announcements and their effects on crude
oil prices. Energy Policy, 38(2):1010–1016.
Loury, G. C. (1978). The optimal exploitation of an unknown reserve. The Review of
Economic Studies, 45(3):621–636.
Loury, G. C. (1986). A theory of ’oil’igopoly: Cournot equilibrium in exhaustible re-
source markets with fixed supplies. International Economic Review, 27(2):285–301.
Lund, H. (2007). Renewable energy strategies for sustainable development. Energy,
32(6):912–919.
Maghyereh, A. (2004). Oil price shocks and emerging stock markets: a generalized VAR
approach. International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies,
1(2):27–40.
Mahadevan, R. and Asafu-Adjaye, J. (2007). Energy consumption, economic growth
and prices: A reassessment using panel vecm for developed and developing countries.
Energy Policy, 35(4):2481–2490.
Marcel, V. (2006). Oil titans: National oil companies in the Middle East. Brookings
Institution Press.
Masters, M. W. (2008). Testimony before the committee on homeland security and
governmental affairs. US Senate, Washington, May, 20.
Mathiesen, B. V., Lund, H., and Karlsson, K. (2011). 100% renewable energy systems,
climate mitigation and economic growth. Applied Energy, 88(2):488–501.
Bibliography 103
McWilliams, A. and Siegel, D. (1997). Event studies in management research: Theoret-
ical and empirical issues. Academy of management journal, 40(3):626–657.
Mork, K. A. (1989). Oil and the macroeconomy when prices go up and down: an
extension of Hamilton’s results. Journal of Political Economy, 97(3):740–744.
Naifar, N. and Al Dohaiman, M. S. (2013). Nonlinear analysis among crude oil prices,
stock markets’ return and macroeconomic variables. International Review of Eco-
nomics and Finance, 27:416–431.
Nandha, M. and Faff, R. (2008). Does oil move equity prices? a global view. Energy
Economics, 30(3):986–997.
Narayan, P. K. and Narayan, S. (2010). Modelling the impact of oil prices on Vietnam’s
stock prices. Applied Energy, 87(1):356–361.
Nordhaus, W. D. (2002). Modeling induced innovation in climate-change policy. In
Grubler, A., Nakicenovic, N., and Nordhaus, W. D., editors, Technological change
and the environment, pages 182–209. Resources for the Future.
Oberndorfer, U. (2009). Energy prices, volatility, and the stock market: evidence from
the Eurozone. Energy Policy, 37(12):5787–5795.
Ocal, O. and Aslan, A. (2013). Renewable energy consumption–economic growth nexus
in Turkey. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 28:494–499.
Oladosu, G. (2009). Identifying the oil price–macroeconomy relationship: An empirical
mode decomposition analysis of US data. Energy Policy, 37(12):5417–5426.
Omer, A. M. (2008). Energy, environment and sustainable development. Renewable and
sustainable energy reviews, 12(9):2265–2300.
O’Neill, T., Penm, J., and Terrell, R. (2008). The role of higher oil prices: a case of
major developed countries. Research in Finance, 24:287–299.
Orwel, G. (2006). Black Gold: the new frontier in oil for investors. John Wiley & Sons.
Osborne, M. J. and Pitchik, C. (1986). Price competition in a capacity-constrained
duopoly. Journal of Economic Theory, 38(2):238 – 260.
O’Sullivan, D. (2009). Petromania: Black gold, paper barrels and oil price bubbles.
Harriman House Limited.
Ozturk, I. (2010). A literature survey on energy–growth nexus. Energy policy, 38(1):340–
349.
Bibliography 104
Ozturk, I. and Acaravci, A. (2010). CO2 emissions, energy consumption and economic
growth in turkey. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 14(9):3220–3225.
Pal, D. (1991). Cournot duopoly with two production periods and cost differentials.
Journal of Economic Theory, 55(2):441 – 448.
Panwar, N., Kaushik, S., and Kothari, S. (2011). Role of renewable energy sources
in environmental protection: a review. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews,
15(3):1513–1524.
Papapetrou, E. (2001). Oil price shocks, stock market, economic activity and employ-
ment in Greece. Energy Economics, 23(5):511–532.
Park, J. and Ratti, R. A. (2008). Oil price shocks and stock markets in the US and 13
European countries. Energy Economics, 30(5):2587–2608.
Pedroni, P. (1999). Critical values for cointegration tests in heterogeneous panels with
multiple regressors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and statistics, 61(S1):653–670.
Persyn, D. and Westerlund, J. (2008). Error-correction-based cointegration tests for
panel data. Stata Journal, 8(2):232.
Pesaran, M. H., Shin, Y., and Smith, R. P. (1995). Estimating long-run relationships
from dynamic heterogeneous panels. Journal of econometrics, 68(1):79–113.
Pesaran, M. H., Shin, Y., and Smith, R. P. (1999). Pooled mean group estimation
of dynamic heterogeneous panels. Journal of the American Statistical Association,
94(446):621–634.
Pindyck, R. S. (1978). The optimal exploration and production of nonrenewable re-
sources. Journal of Political Economy, 86(5):841–861.
Pindyck, R. S. (1981). The optimal production of an exhaustible resource when price is
exogenous and stochastic. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 83(2):277–288.
Polasky, S. (1992). Do oil producers act as ‘oil’igopolists? Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 23(3):216 – 247.
PWC (2005). National oil companies. Available at: http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/
energy-utilities-mining/pdf/tom-collins-noc-presentation-for-website.
pdf. Access date: 22.08.2013.
Rebelo, S. (1991). Long-run policy analysis and long-run growth. Journal of Political
Economy, 99(3):500–521.
Bibliography 105
Reboredo, J. C. and Rivera-Castro, M. A. (2014). Wavelet-based evidence of the impact
of oil prices on stock returns. International Review of Economics and Finance, 29:145
– 176.
Rogoff, K. (2006). Oil and the global economy. Manuscript, Harvard University.
Romer, P. M. (1990). Endogenous technological change. Journal of political Economy,
98(5):S71–S102.
Sadorsky, P. (2001). Risk factors in stock returns of Canadian oil and gas companies.
Energy economics, 23(1):17–28.
Sadorsky, P. (2009). Renewable energy consumption, CO2 emissions and oil prices in
the G7 countries. Energy Economics, 31(3):456–462.
Salant, S. W. (1976). Exhaustible resources and industrial structure: A nash-cournot
approach to the world oil market. Journal of Political Economy, 84(5):1079–1094.
Salo, S. and Tahvonen, O. (2001). Oligopoly equilibria in nonrenewable resource markets.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 25(5):671 – 702.
Saloner, G. (1987). Cournot duopoly with two production periods. Journal of Economic
Theory, 42(1):183–187.
Sanders, D. R., Boris, K., and Manfredo, M. (2004). Hedgers, funds, and small specula-
tors in the energy futures markets: an analysis of the CFTC’s commitments of traders
reports. Energy Economics, 26(3):425–445.
Shahbaz, M., Hye, Q. M. A., and Tiwari, A. K. (2013a). Economic growth, energy con-
sumption, financial development, international trade and CO2 emissions, in Indonesia.
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 25:109–121.
Shahbaz, M., Lean, H. H., and Farooq, A. (2013b). Natural gas consumption and
economic growth in Pakistan. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 18:87–94.
Sill, K. (2007). The macroeconomics of oil shocks. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,
Business Review, 1(1):21–31.
Sims, C. A. (1980). Macroeconomics and reality. Econometrica: Journal of the Econo-
metric Society, 48(1):1–48.
Smil, V. (2000). Energy in the twentieth century: resources, conversions, costs, uses,
and consequences. Annual Review of Energy and the Environment, 25(1):21–51.
Smil, V. (2005). Energy at the crossroads: global perspectives and uncertainties. MIT
press.
Bibliography 106
Smulders, S. (1995). Environmental policy and sustainable economic growth. De
Economist, 143(2):163–195.
Smulders, S. and De Nooij, M. (2003). The impact of energy conservation on technology
and economic growth. Resource and Energy Economics, 25(1):59–79.
Solow, R. M. (1974a). The economics of resources or the resources of economics. The
American Economic Review, 64(2):1–14.
Solow, R. M. (1974b). Intergenerational equity and exhaustible resources. The Review
of Economic Studies, 41:29–45.
Soytas, U. and Oran, A. (2011). Volatility spillover from world oil spot markets to
aggregate and electricity stock index returns in Turkey. Applied Energy, 88(1):354–
360.
Stern, D. I. (1993). Energy and economic growth in the usa: a multivariate approach.
Energy Economics, 15(2):137–150.
Stiglitz, J. (1974). Growth with exhaustible natural resources: Efficient and optimal
growth paths. The Review of Economic Studies, 41:123–137.
Stiglitz, J. E. (1976). Monopoly and the rate of extraction of exhaustible resources. The
American Economic Review, 66(4):655–661.
Tahvonen, O. and Salo, S. (2001). Economic growth and transitions between renewable
and nonrenewable energy resources. European Economic Review, 45(8):1379–1398.
Tertzakian, P. (2007). A thousand barrels a second: The coming oil break point and the
challenges facing an energy dependent world. McGraw-Hill Companies.
The World Bank Group (2013). World Development Indicators 2013. World Bank
Publications.
Tsur, Y. and Zemel, A. (2003). Optimal transition to backstop substitutes for nonre-
newable resources. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 27(4):551–572.
van den Berg, A., Bos, I., Herings, P. J.-J., and Peters, H. (2012). Dynamic Cournot
duopoly with intertemporal capacity constraints. International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 30(2):174 – 192.
Van Zon, A. and Yetkiner, I. H. (2003). An endogenous growth model with embodied
energy-saving technical change. Resource and energy economics, 25(1):81–103.
Wang, Y., Wang, Y., Zhou, J., Zhu, X., and Lu, G. (2011). Energy consumption and
economic growth in china: A multivariate causality test. Energy Policy, 39(7):4399–
4406.
Bibliography 107
Westerlund, J. (2007). Testing for error correction in panel data. Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics, 69(6):709–748.
Wirl, F. and Kujundzic, A. (2004). The impact of OPEC conference outcomes on world
oil prices 1984-2001. The Energy Journal, 25(1):45–62.
Yang, H., Tian, L., and Ding, Z. (2006). Renewable resources, technological progress
and economic growth. International Journal of Nonlinear Science, 1(3):149–154.
Yetkiner, H. and van Zon, A. (2009). Further results on “an endogenous growth model
with embodied energy-saving technical change”. METU Studies in Development,
35(2):445–451.
Zarour, B. A. (2006). Wild oil prices, but brave stock markets! The case of GCC stock
markets. Operational Research, 6(2):145–162.
Curriculum Vitae
Personal Details
Name Istemi Berk
Date of Birth 23.01.1984
Place of Birth Izmir, Turkey
Email istemi.berk@ewi.uni-koeln.de
Education
2011 – 2014 Ph.D. in Economics (Energy Economics), Institute of Energy Economics &
Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences,
University of Cologne, Germany.
2010 – 2011 Ph.D. in Economics (First Year Enrollment), Department of Economics, Izmir
University of Economics, Turkey.
2007 – 2010 M.A. in Financial Economics, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Izmir Uni-
versity of Economics, Turkey.
2002 – 2007 B.Sc. in Petroleum and Natural Gas Engineering, Middle East Technical
University, Turkey.
Professional Experience
2011 – 2014 Research Associate (CGS Scholar), Institute of Energy Economics (EWI),
Universtiy of Cologne, Cologne, Germany.
2008 – 2011 Research and Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, Izmir University
of Economics, Izmir, Turkey.
2010 – 2011 Research Associate, History of Coal and Turkey’s Coal Strategies, Turkish
Coal Enterprises and Izmir University of Economics Joint Project, Izmir,
Turkey.
2010 – 2011 Executive Secretary, Scientific Research Projects, Izmir University of Eco-
nomics, Izmir, Turkey.
Curriculum Vitae 109
Publications
Publications in Journals covered by SCI, SSCI and AHCI
2014 Ediger, V.S¸., Berk, I., Ko¨sebalaban, A. Lignite Resources of Turkey: Geology,
Reserves and Exploration. International Journal of Coal Geology, 132, 13–22.
2014 Berk, I., Yetkiner, I.H. Energy Prices and Economic Growth: Theory and
Evidence in the Long Run. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 36,
228–235.
2011 Ediger, V.S¸., Berk, I. Crude oil import policy of Turkey: Historical analysis of
determinants and implications since 1968. Energy Policy, 39 (4), 2132–2142
Book Chapters
2008 Berk, I., Erdil, E., Yetkiner, I.H. The Competitive Power of Turkeys Down-
stream Petroleum Industry Relative to EU. in: Bekmez, S., ed., Turkey-
European Union Industrial Competitiveness Analyses, Nobel Yayinevi, 357–
382 (in Turkish)
Working Papers
2014 Berk, I. Two Period Resource Duopoly with Endogenous Intertemporal Ca-
pacity Constraints. EWI Working Paper Series No. 14/13
2012 Berk, I., Aydogan, B. Crude Oil Price Shocks and Stock Returns: Evidence
from Turkish Stock Market under Global Liquidity Conditions. EWI Working
Paper Series No. 12/15
Selected Conference Presentations
July & September
2014
Two Period Resource Duopoly with Endogenous Intertemporal Capacity Con-
straints. PhD students Workshop in Economics, Braga & Workshop on Be-
havioral Economics and Industrial Organization, Budapest.
October 2013 Reserve Growth Investments and Oil Market Structure: Two Period Resource
Duopoly with Endogenous Intertemporal Capacity Constraints. Young En-
ergy Economists and Engineers Seminar, Stockholm.
August 2013 Energy Prices and Economic Growth in the Long Run: Theory and Evidence.
13th IAEE European Conference, Du¨sseldorf.
Languages
Turkish Native Speaker
English Fluent
German Intermediate
